Out of Naqvi’s bag of tricks
WHEN Gen. Musharraf seized power in a coup in October 1999, civil society heaved a huge sigh of relief. It may be that it was, at the time, too preoccupied with its own reactions to the Sharif government’s excesses to even notice that a usurpation or some form of constitutional wrongdoing had taken place.
Indeed, the Musharraf coup, much like that of Zia years before, was widely welcomed as a sort of coup de grace or means of release from that appeared to have grown intolerable.
By a singular irony, civil society in this country has always had a penchant for first acquiescing in and then ruing whatever it has itself been responsible for bringing about. If today it is crying ‘foul!’ in response to the NRB chief’s package of constitutional amendments, it is, simply, conveniently forgetting its own complicity in the exercise. There is, for instance, a consummate logic to the effective jettisoning of a prime ministerial and / or parliamentary, in favour of a presidential, system of government, as proposed by Gen. Naqvi. The germs of this transmutation are to be found precisely in the crucial violation of the Constitution of Pakistan so gleefully and unabashedly countenanced by civil society on October 12, 1999.
It would appear that, in formulating his recent tract, Gen. Naqvi has really done no more than attempt to translate what he has perceived as a subliminal desire, on the part of the people of this country, for institutionalized military rule into constitutional terms. That surely is what lies at the back of his straight-faced observation that the Constitution, as envisaged by him, would obviate any future military takeover. it is, presumably from his point of view, a comforting given that military rule is very much in place today. So any apparent tautology or irony is, naturally, lost on him.
What also seems to underlie the government ideologue’s barely disguised authoritarian package is an extraordinary assumption which renders it more than a little risque. According to this, if the people’s love affair with unqualified democracy did not end the day Nawaz Sharif was overthrown, it should have or, at any rate, Pakistanis should by now have come of age and put aside things like democratic moonshine.
Of course, there is a further dimension which we cannot overlook here. That is the sacrosanct ‘American factor’. The NRB chief and other generals had possibly decided that, in view of the emergence of the new cavalier world order with the US in the vanguard, the Americans would be more than satisfied with a mere illusion of democracy in Pakistan. Hence, the ‘graduate’ parliament and page-boy prime minister of Gen. Naqvi’s imagination. But will all this really, given the sweeping powers of the future president and an inevitably subaltern parliament and prime minister in existence solely on sufferance, qualify even as a democratic illusion or facade? Are Article 58 (2B) and simultaneous supremoship of the army and the NSC not what generalissimos the world over have always dreamed about: a recipe for untrammelled absolutist rule?
Whatever the case, we must hand it to Gen. Naqvi for an ‘in your face’ veridicality or for having tried, where finer minds have faltered, to resolve a dilemma which lies at the very heart of the Pakistani experience. Or one might say that he has blown it.
First of all, he seems to have committed a blunder in so very baldly reflecting our military president’s hitherto reined in ambition to arrogate dictatorial powers to himself. Secondly, Gen. Naqvi appears to have misread the Pakistani temperament, failing to recognize the national tendency to tire, fairly quickly, of any one political leader or dispensation. The product of a dangerous and highly volatile society, the average Pakistani citizen may, for example, hanker after order and stability even if these are to flow from authoritarian rule. At the same time, attracted by the promise of greater openness and opportunity, he is not averse to a liberal democratic order either. This means that he is not, politically, monochrome and that can be jealous of his freedom, being a creature of alternating political interims. In that case, it is scarcely conceivable that anything short of coercion would induce him to accept the sort of constitutional straitjacket that has been prepared for him.
It seems, however, that Gen. Naqvi will have a good deal more to answer for. If, as seems likely, the blatantly discriminatory ‘graduation’ clause holds in the forthcoming elections, it is estimated that well over half of our former parliamentarians will stand disqualified. Another 20 per cent are liable to be similarly knocked out on account of alleged bank loan defaults. That does not augur well for the cause of representation. The new parliament will necessarily consist of surrogate representatives who may or may not be able to deliver in their capacity as legislators. But that, supposedly, is the purpose of the exercise. It is the prime aim of the Naqvi formula to ensure that the House is bereft of genuine democratic strength. The somewhat cynical credo on which it is evidently based is this: root out the stalwarts of the major political parties, erode the latter’s popular base, bring in impostors and greenhorns who might be made to serve as robots — all in the name of democracy — and you deal a near death blow to democracy itself.
Whatever the present establishment may like to believe, this constitutional jugglery will hurt the country more than Zia ever did. This and other steps, such as the new ‘two term only’ law, being taken by the government in the run-up to the elections may appear to be directed specifically against Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif. But they will actually, and indeed negatively, affect the common man whose interests these two leaders may be said to represent. Leaderless is being ruddeerless. To deprive the people of their leaders is to deny them direction as well as to rob them of their brief. And that means doing them a grave injustice.
The people of this country realize only too well that for Gen. Musharraf to be at the helm of affairs today is, in the light of the radically changed global and subcontinental scenarios, a historical necessity. Patriot that he doubtless is, Gen. Musharraf should perhaps realize that reconciliation rather than alienation is the need of the hour. Ours is a society riven by divisions and strife, whether ethnic sectarian or ideological. The counter-terrorism trail in the north of Pakistan has only compounded our difficulties. Since we are already busy on two separate fronts, it will scarcely make any sense to open up a fresh one within. If resorted to, this will at best serve to throw further national fissures into relief and strengthen the hands of the enemy.
It is still not too late for Gen. Musharraf to steer his own vulnerable craft and ourselves into safer waters. If, as with the referendum, he is anxious as to the outcome of the elections and the possibility of their proving to be a farce, he should, subject to approval by the Supreme Court, consider deferring them. Such a deferral would be infinitely preferable to a further loss of face as well as calumny such as he was exposed to in the aftermath of this ill-conceived referendum. And, if because such a measure would indubitably be in the larger interest, he should, instead, give serious thought to forming a government of national reconciliation, comprising all the mainstream political parties. Not only would this make for greater national solidarity. It would also restore the nation’s shattered confidence and give the fast waning popularity of the general himself a much needed boost. Gen. Musharraf should, in the meantime, take time off to ponder the ancient Roman maxin: “When flatterers proffer a crown, there is much danger.”
Stabilizing Afghanistan
It is not clear who killed Abdul Qadir, one of Afghanistan’s vice presidents, but the message from Saturday’s assassination is obvious enough. Afghanistan’s post-Taliban political order remains fragile; it is threatened by all the forces that may lie behind the killing: ethnic tensions, rivalries between the provinces and the center, the opium trade. The US and its allies need to recognize that, without stronger efforts to stand behind Hamid Karzai’s interim government, the opportunity to stabilize Afghanistan will be fumbled.
The key problem facing large parts of Afghanistan is lawlessness, which makes economic recovery impossible. The capital of Kabul, where Mr. Qadir was assassinated, is mostly an exception: There, an international peacekeeping force has allowed aid workers and wealthy returning exiles to open offices, and the streets buzz with commerce. But the countryside and some provincial cities are different. People with money stay away, fearing for their safety; or they buy security from local warlords, usually at high rates. Aid agencies face a choice between staying out or accepting that much of their assistance will be stolen by armed groups.
A recent United Nations memo on northern Afghanistan states that “aid workers have faced intimidation, including threats, accusations, kidnapping, attacks, murder, rape of family members of national staff, armed robbery and . . . the gang rape of an international female aid worker.”
In January President Bush promised to “help the new Afghan government provide the security that is the foundation for peace.” But his administration has no apparent plan to deliver on this promise in the foreseeable future. It has resisted expanding the peacekeeping force beyond the capital, despite requests from Mr. Karzai and UN Secretary General Kofi Annan. It is training a new Afghan army, but this is a long-term project: The US aims to prepare 14,400 troops over the next 18 months. By contrast, there are 75,000 soldiers and another 100,000 militiamen working for local commanders in Afghanistan. It will be years at this rate before the central government has the clout to impose its will upon local warlords. Mr. Bush has vowed not to abandon Afghanistan; he has even likened his ambitions for reconstruction to the Marshall Plan. But that plan involved funneling nearly $100bn, in today’s dollars, into Europe; the US this year has pledged just $296m for Afghanistan. Even the administration’s sympathizers are stressing the need to ramp up US efforts. “I fear that we may see this government and our efforts unwind here if we don’t make the appropriate investment of men and effort and resources,” said Sen. Chuck Hagel, R-Neb., on Sunday. —The Washington Post
Politics: opening the Pandora’s box
GROUND rules are being laid down as to who can, and who cannot, take part in politics, contest elections and under what conditions. For example, the candidates for National and Provincial Assemblies should be graduates and the political parties must hold internal party elections. Other bars on candidature have been suggested by independent observers. An article in this newspaper a few days ago suggested that only ‘taxpayers’ should be allowed to contest elections.
One can always find arguments for any arbitrary conditions. Question arises whether it is for the government to determine who should, and who should not, take part in politics? Wherever and whenever such conditions have been laid down arbitrarily the path has invariably led to autocracy, and not liberal democracy. Liberal democracy pre-supposes, that given sufficient time and proper conditions, the shortcomings arising from the undemocratic structure of society will be mitigated through a political process. Just exaggerating the importance of formal education for the Assembly members will not usher in the needed change. It is necessary to simultaneously gear the educational and other systems towards creating conditions favourable to liberalism. Examples abound, where governments, civil and military, have sought to limit the choice before the candidates as well the electorate, intentionally or unintentionally, and in the process, perpetuated the hold of an individual or group.
Democracy in different ‘democratic countries’ may have evolved differently in accordance with their specific needs, but artificial, predetermined, restrictions on candidature are incompatible with the spirit of democracy.
Laying down formal limitations to candidature is like opening a Pandora’s Box. In our own polity, we have seen attempts by at least two previous autocrats, namely Ayub Khan and Ziaul Haq to give lessons in ‘democracy’ and try to install their own notions of it.
Ayub preached and installed his concept of ‘Basic Democracies.’ Zia tried to bring in ‘partyless polls’ and, by extension, ‘politics without politicians,’ which is as logical as, say, cricket without cricketers. Zia also tried to confine politics to ‘pious individuals’ according to his definition of them. Zia’s nominated majlis-i-shoora, of ‘prominent citizens,’ and ‘leaders in professions’ etc., was an equally dismal failure. Such experiments have usually ended with the rule of the originator, but in the process have done much damage.
The present regime’s working has close parallels with Zia’s that go beyond referendum — only more subtle than Zia’s crude methods. Zia claimed to put our polity on an ‘Islamic’ base. The present regime wants to bring ‘real democracy.’
Many would dispute whether in a highly undemocratic society, with low tolerance level of groups and leaders for rival views, where people are motivated more on parochial, religious and sectarian than national basis, it would be possible to bring ‘real democracy’ by gimmicks such as having ‘graduates’ in the Assemblies.
The government seems to be selling the idea that ‘graduates’ will make better legislators, more ‘knowledgeable,’ more ‘honest,’ and probably more ‘liberal’ but this can hardly stand scrutiny. With education fast becoming ever more expensive and elitist, the converse may be true. There is no dearth of anti-liberals among graduates and post-graduates in this country.
We have to make a distinction between election of members to Assemblies and selection of people for public service jobs. We should not make public representatives job seekers. Next, we might be hearing about examinations for the MNAs and the MPAs, or, ‘qualification’ requirements being enhanced to Masters or PhD level.
The very idea of linking leadership with formal education is flawed. Similarly, knowledgeable people are usually self-taught, irrespective of their formal education. All restrictions finally boil down to perpetuating the hold of the existing elite, and hence are regressive.
The conditions thus appear to be calculated more to keep some people out, than to bring ‘graduates’ in. We already have a Constitution, and it is for the Assembly — sovereign, not rubber stamp — to make changes. President Musharraf has already stated that he wants the prime minister to be strong, — though not stronger than the president.
One can understand his need not to be able to afford an elected prime minister stronger than himself, but any institutional measures regarding the powers of the two should be left to the elected representatives if real democracy is desired. Or if they think some other system better suits the country, they should not hesitate to bring it in, without claiming it to be democracy.
The diagnosis about internal party elections seems to be correct, but can legislation do the trick to transform them? In fact, it is the informal political process that screens politicians and political parties. Most of our parties have been formed by the people rallying round a leader, rather than people or groups forming a party and electing leaders.
Half a dozen factions of the Muslim League, most of whom are probably willing to metamorphose into ‘king’s party,’ centre round a ‘leader.’ Many newer parties are just one man shows.
‘Sham party elections’ can circumvent legislation, because a practical mechanism to ensure such a process just cannot be instituted by the government. What authority would judge that the condition has been met? And has the financial cost of meeting such drastic conditions, assuming there can be one, been considered? Party elections will come only as the political process matures, so it should be allowed to continue freely.
Now to the suggestion that only ‘taxpayers’ should be allowed to contest elections because all government is about tax collection. The learned writer has rightly criticized the graduation condition, but unfortunately has lent support to another regressive idea in its place. The slogan of the American colonists against imposition of taxes by the British Crown before American independence, ‘no taxation without representation,’ is used by the writer as an argument for this position. But did this slogan really mean what he is trying to say? The colonists resisted the ‘Stamp Act,’ of 1734 by the British Crown, because it was oppressive. It required them to put tax stamps not only on all legal documents, but even on newspapers and playing cards. They believed that the British government had no moral right to tax them without allowing them representation in the parliament. The Stamp Act was repealed in 1766, but the slogan became the basis of American independence in 1776.
Lawyers have played great role as professional politicians, and the basic job of a parliament is legislation, but does it mean that only ‘qualified’ lawyers should be eligible for elections to parliament? Most ideologies tend to describe the desirable qualities in a leader, but laying down formal criteria is repugnant to the very concept of leadership. Historically, attempts to define and confine leadership to particular groups have not succeeded. Plato considered only philosophers fit to be rulers. Aristotle justified slavery and considered women and slaves unfit to participate in politics. Under such influences, women in many European countries did not have the right to vote, what to talk of participating as candidates, till relatively recently. And if you ask a diehard fundamentalist, he may say that only ‘pious men’ should be allowed to be members of parliament!!
Now if, on ‘ideological’ grounds, a future government were to lay down that only people qualified from a religious school could take part in elections, would that not, by the logic used by the present set-up, be justified? Are they not paving the way, inadvertently, for such encumbrance?
The real problem associated with politics or public life is not formal education or the lack of it, but ethical and moral. The exercise of political power carries with it enormous responsibility, and the fact that politicians in office have the power to exercise legitimate violence on behalf of the state, as well as allocate financial resources belonging to the nation, means that the men entrusted with such power should have a well developed ethical and moral sense, which again cannot come by laid down criteria, but can only be tested in practice.
People ought to elect politicians capable of exercising power, both political and financial, with responsibility. To quote Weber, politicians should be willing to take the responsibility for the consequences of their actions and decisions. For this to happen, not only the ends but the means to achieve those ends are important in themselves. If we are to exclude anyone formally from contesting elections, it should only be those already proved guilty of moral laxity, financial impropriety, or abuse of power.





























