Low Graphics Site
White bar
Daily SectionMarker

Misc SectionMarker

Horoscope Recipes Weekly SectionMarker

Weekly SectionMarker

Pakistan's Internet Magazine
Herald
Dawn GroupMarker

Archive, Search, Feedback & HelpMarker

Dawn Classified



FrontPage National International Local Business KSE Forex Sports Editorial Opinion Letters Features Today's Cartoon TV Guide Cowasjee Ayaz Irfan Hussain Review Dawn Magazine Young World Images Dawn Group Subscription To Advertise

DINA
DAWN - the Internet Edition


April 2, 2002 Tuesday Muharram 18,1423

DAWN Classified
Please Visit our Sponsor (Ads open in separate window)

Opinion


Twisting statements of Jinnah
US role in Middle East: DAWN EXCLUSIVE
America’s flawed approach
Balwant Dass: ALL OVER THE PLACE
Shadow government



Twisting statements of Jinnah


By Prof Khurshid Ahmad

EVERY transaction, either between two individuals or between two states, always has two aspects: one purely legal and political and the other ideological. The spheres of law and politics are well-known. If an individual or a nation wants to avoid the path of confrontation, collision and bloodshed, it is imperative for them to settle their disputes by remaining within these spheres.

As for the ideological dimension of issues, there are infinite possibilities for settlement with persuasion, preaching and canvassing, dialogue and mutual understanding — provided no party suffers from the notion of its own being powerful and dominant and refrains from trying to impose its terms or views on the other. Confrontation in ideological context takes place only when the doors are shut for freedom of opinion and mutual understanding, or when logic and persuasion are replaced by the force of sword.

In this context, for the last few months in particular the US president, the secretary of state, the British prime minister and even the secretary-general of the United Nations, among others, are all deliberating on the objectives of the creation of Pakistan. Along with the ministers and diplomats, intellectuals, writers and journalists have joined the effort. Having annihilated Afghanistan, President Bush is looking for something new, like the “axis of evil”.

Margaret Thatcher has also come up with her own ‘vision’. In her special essay that has been published in the British press on Feb. 12, 2002, she compared ‘Islamic extremism’ with ‘Communist threat’ at the start of the cold war. Leader after leader, everyone considers it his/her duty to lecture on the rationale of Pakistan, especially on the vision of Iqbal and Jinnah. Then, all the lecturing and instructions end up in suggesting that there is only one way to progress for Pakistan — the way of viable, progressive, modern, secular and irreligious Pakistan.

In the forefront of this effort is American leadership of all levels. Quite brazenly, it is bent upon imposing its own concepts and views on other nations and peoples in the name of global campaign for democracy and human rights. This is how America is trying to bring other nations under its world-wide political and economic domination. Muslim countries are a particular target and, according to the practice of striking at the weak point, Pakistan is at the receiving end of ‘special attention’.

There is nothing new in it, however, as the attitude of these powers has always been hostile to others. At the time of the creation of Pakistan, Britain showed its ‘dishonesty’ in the formula of the division of the subcontinent and created problems like Kashmir issue and unjust distribution of water. The United Nations played a grossly unjust role in the case of Kashmir. America, on the one hand, patronized dictatorships while repeating the mantra of democracy, on the other, it sucked Pakistan economy with its parasitic and ‘visibly invisible’ agenda and ensnared it in debts to the extent that it needs more debts only to continue its life.

Then, the Muslim world, Islamic movements and Pakistan in particular became a special focus of attention in the wake of the events of Sept. 11. On the one hand, the noose is being tightened politically, economically and militarily; on the other, such ideological debates have been kindled that pertain to Muslims’ concept of religion (Deen), state and Muslim nationhood, ie the concepts that are concerned with our ideological existence.

The background to the hair-splitting and recurring analysis of General Musharraf’s interview to the weekly Newsweek and the Quaid’s speech of Aug. 11, 1947 in the English press and television is that lesson that the US intellectuals an diplomats have been repeating for the last few months.

It would amount to doing great injustice to the Quaid-i-Azam if some sentences of his Aug. 11, 1947 speech are twisted to serve as a basis for the establishment of a secular state and for ending the role of religion in the sphere of our collective life. Quaid-i-Azam, entire leadership of the Muslim League and, above all, the whole Muslim community of the subcontinent had vividly expressed their destination and goal. These were the objectives for which the struggle was waged and invaluable sacrifices were offered. How can those who talk about secular values refute that Allama Iqbal has based the argument of his famous address of 1930 on the unity of religion and state, of the spiritual and the mundane. Iqbal says that Islam is a religion that has its own collective system of life without which it is incomplete and the Muslims remain deprived of its blessings.

In his letter to the Quaid-i-Azam on May 28, 1937, Allama Iqbal maintained that the enforcement of Shariah and the development of the country were impossible without the establishment of one or more independent Islamic states. He said that he believed that this presented the only way for solving the Muslims’ economic problems and enabling them to serve the country (India before partition). In other words, he held that the establishment of an independent Muslim state and enforcement of Shariah were imperative for economic development and peaceful existence.

The Quaid-i-Azam, too, expressly said that Pakistan means, along with independence, protection of Islamic ideology that has been bequeathed to us as a valuable gift and treasure. He hoped for cooperation of all for this end.

It is noteworthy that the Quaid highlighted not only the importance of Islamic ideology, he also underscored the need of its protection and progress. This is what the Quaid-i-Azam stood for. But those who are pressing for secular values and structure see it as “Anti-Jinnah vision”!

The leaders of the Pakistan movement passed the Objectives Resolution on March 12, 1949 whole-heartedly and with complete unity of heart and mind. This Resolution provides the basis for Pakistan’s Constitution, governance, and collective policy making. The whole nation is behind it.

In his address at the Karachi Bar Association on Jan. 25, 1948, the Quaid-i-Azam had said that Islam was not merely an amalgam of rites and rituals and spiritual doctrines, it was rather a code of life for the Muslims according to which they discipline their daily life in all spheres of thought and action including politics and economy. He had clearly said that according to the Islamic concept of government, Allah is at the source of guidance and obedience is for Him alone. Qur’anic commandments and principles provide the means to achieving this obedience. In Islam, there is no concept of obedience to any king, parliament, or some other institution. Qur’anic teachings determine the extent of our independence in political and social spheres. In other words, Islamic government is the government of Qur’anic teachings and values.

Contradictions in the argument of those who present the Quaid’s or Iqbal’s views in such a way as to suit their own secular ends are exposed because of their self-contradictory nature. On the one hand, they talk about democracy, but on the other call for dictatorial action for negating the will and aspirations of the entire nation on the basis of some extract from the Quaid’s speeches.

What Jinnah and Iqbal stood and strove for was the establishment of an Islamic society and state in the light of Quran and Sunnat of the Prophet (pbuh), which could meet the demands of social justice and where Islamic law is enforced in its entirety. As for theocracy, there is no such concept of Islam where some people have exclusive hold over some affairs and serve as the sole means to knowing Allah’s will and attaining his pleasure. Those who try to advance their argument by creating confusion over theocracy and quote disparate statements of Iqbal or Jinnah should know what Iqbal has said in his ‘Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam’ and in its sixth address in particular. He holds that there is no concept of theocracy in Islam.

The Quaid-i-Azam, too, had said that he was against theocracy because Islam has no such concept where some people are ‘custodians’ of religion. In the words of Maulana Maududi, “we are against theocracy because it has nothing to do with Islam”.

The degenerated thinking of the so-called liberal people can be gauged from the fact that on the one hand they distance themselves from theocracy but, on the other, they say that whoever has come to power, no matter how, has in a way been honoured by God and therefore has a right to rule!

Pakistan was created in the name of Islam. Its progress, in all fields, is possible only when it is kept on its right track — just and true to its genesis and rationale. Those who are pressing for the introduction of secularism and renunciation of the role of Islam and religion are prescribing an illusive course, which is destructive for the country and does not solve any of the problems facing the nation.

Those who are twisting Iqbal’s and Jinnah’s statements for their own ends are doing a great disservice both to those whom they falsely attribute their assertions and to the country they created. They need to know more about Islam as a code of life, Islamic concept of government and the unity of the spiritual and the mundane. In our recourse to Islam lie our progress, development and salvation.

The writer is chairman of the Institute of Policy Studies, Islamabad and a former Senator.

Top



US role in Middle East: DAWN EXCLUSIVE


By Henry A. Kissinger

THE reappearance of active American diplomacy in the Middle East has been greeted with a mixture of hope and trepidation. Hope, because the rage of both parties is giving way to exhaustion. Trepidation, because both sides know their objectives to be essentially incompatible. The secret dream of the Israelis is legitimization of the status quo. For Palestinians, the goal is the imposition of terms reducing Israel to its 1967 borders, which could facilitate the destruction of the Jewish state.

Many who generally criticize America’s foreign policy (and count among our sins obliviousness to their advice) are joining the widespread call for Washington to play a dominant role. These pleas have been given fresh impetus by the initiative of Crown Prince Abdullah of Saudi Arabia, which proposes normalization of relations between the Arab world and Israel if Israel returns to the 1967 frontiers. Thus Vice President Dick Cheney’s journey to the Middle East, intended to elicit Arab support for a possible showdown with Iraq, was reshaped by his Arab hosts into an occasion for a new initiative to end the Arab-Israeli conflict.

This deflection of attention from terrorism to the Palestinian issue is in itself a considerable achievement for Saudi diplomacy. At the same time, the near unanimity in Europe and the Arab world urging American intervention stems from the hope that, in the end, we will impose on Israel a settlement essentially identical to the Abdullah plan.

In the past 30 years, American diplomacy has been the catalyst for practically all the progress the peace process made. But given the explosive politics of the region, it is all too easy to overestimate what is possible. In 2000, the impetuous attempt to settle all issues in one negotiation of limited duration at Camp David contributed to the outbreak of the current warfare.

In present conditions, a comparison of both sides’ positions demonstrates that another attempt at a negotiated final solution would not fare better. The only formal plan by an Israeli government was put forward by Prime Minister Ehud Barak at Camp David. In it, he offered more than 90 per cent of the disputed territories (the formula was complex) but retained about 70 per cent of the settlements. In exchange, the Palestinians were asked to renounce any future claims, including the right to return into Israel proper (though they would be free to return to a Palestinian state). Prime Minister Ariel Sharon has disavowed this proposal. Yasser Arafat preferred the intifada to the implications of finality.

The most forthcoming Arab proposal has come from Crown Prince Abdullah. According to its imprecise outline, Israel would return to the dividing lines of 1967 in exchange for the normalization of relations with the Arab states. Literally, this would imply Israeli abandonment of all settlements and Arab control of the old City of Jerusalem, including the holy places. The Abdullah plan does not define what is meant by normalization and is silent about such issues as the right of refugees to return (though it would surely be insisted on in an actual negotiation).

Welcome as this engagement in the peace process is — the first by an Arab state not having a direct national conflict with Israel — its specific terms represent a restatement of a position that has produced the existing deadlock. The pre-1967 “border” in Palestine — unlike the Egyptian, Syrian or Jordanian frontiers with Israel — was never an international frontier but a ceasefire line established at the end of the 1948 war. It was never recognized by any Arab state until after the 1967 war and has been grudgingly accepted recently by states that do not yet recognize the legitimacy of Israel.

I have never encountered an Israeli prime minister or chief of staff who considered the ‘67 borders defensible, and especially if coupled with an abandonment of a security position along the Jordan River. This is because the ‘67 borders leave a corridor as narrow as eight miles between Haifa and Tel Aviv and put the border of Israel at the edge of its international airport. Moreover, Israel would have to give up settlements containing approximately 200,000 inhabitants (about 4 per cent of its Jewish population).

In return, Israel would achieve diplomatic relations with its neighbours. But in almost all other negotiations, mutual recognition of the parties is taken for granted, not treated as a concession. In fact, non-recognition implies the legal non-existence of the other state, which, in the context of the Middle East, is tantamount to an option to destroy it. Once granted, recognition can always be withdrawn; breaking diplomatic relations is a recognized diplomatic tool. Nor does formal normalization involve much else: Israel’s peace agreement with Egypt of 23 years ago has brought little in the way of enhanced economic or cultural relations other than an exchange of ambassadors who are rarely brought into play.

While the terms of the crown prince’s proposal represent no breakthrough, Saudi engagement could be important if it is used to produce a ceasefire and to start negotiations without preconditions from either side. But if its ultimate purpose is to induce the United States to impose its specific provisions, it would undermine the security of Israel and ultimately the stability of the region.

The precariousness of Israel’s position is paradoxical. Israel has never been more powerful and at the same time never more vulnerable. Israel is militarily stronger than any conceivable Arab adversary; it is clearly able to inflict heavy losses on Palestinian terrorist groups. But it has evolved into a middle-class advanced society and, as such, the strain of guerilla warfare is psychologically draining.

The intifada has generated an ambivalent rigidity in Israeli society. Prior to the Oslo agreement, the Israeli peace movement viewed reconciliation with the Arab world primarily in terms of psychological reassurance; land would be traded for peace even though the Arab quid pro quo would be revocable. But since the intifada, the vast majority of Israelis no longer believe in reconciliation; they want victory and the crushing of their Arab adversaries.

At the same time, there is growing despair over the seeming futility of the enterprise. With the proportion of Israeli casualties to that of the guerillas going up, and the fact that Israel’s retaliation beyond a certain point will not be tolerated by the United States, a sense of resignation is spreading. The desire to turn on the tormentors is beginning to be offset by signs of a hunger for peace at any price.

Israel finds itself facing the classic dynamic of guerilla warfare as it has played out for two generations now. The guerillas not only do not recoil from terrorism but practise an egregious form of it because a violent, emotional, (and to bystanders) excessive retaliation serves their purpose: to trigger intervention by the international community, especially the United States.

In the process, sanctuaries are established — however dubious their basis in international law — that, to all practical purposes, eliminate the capacity of the defending forces to get to the root of the guerilla challenge. That process gradually erodes Israel’s margin of survival even while the world’s media and diplomats bewail its excesses. Torn between a recognition of strategic necessities and the pull of emotional imperatives, Israel runs the risk of sliding into paralysis.

Yet the imposition of the indefensible ‘67 frontiers is not the solution. For after the experiences of Oslo, Israelis know (as should the rest of the world) that the real division among Palestinians is not between those who want peace in the Western sense — as a point after which the world lives free of tensions with a consciousness of reconciliation. In reality, the number of Palestinian leaders holding this view is minuscule. The fundamental schism is between those who want to bring about the destruction of Israel by continuing the present struggle, and those who believe that an agreement now would be a better strategy to rally forces for the ultimate showdown later on.

Even if those Palestinians who sign a “final” agreement have no afterthoughts, no one can guarantee that they will not be replaced by radical successors. A peace agreement will not quell but may stimulate the intransigence of Hamas and other radical groups or states. If, as is asserted, ARafat cannot be asked to accept a permanent ceasefire as an entrance price into negotiations because his radical opponents would have a veto, why would not the same condition apply after a peace settlement? Thus the differences between a permanent and an interim settlement are more a matter of adjectives than substance.

But before the United States launches itself into a major diplomatic effort, it must be clear about what is at stake. Will the mediation be interpreted in the region as being produced by terrorism, or as an attempt to shape an outcome based on familiar American principles? Will the perceived lesson be that Sept. 11 in the end obliged America to adopt positions it had rejected previously? Or will terrorism be viewed as obstructing rather than inspiring a positive American role?

If negotiations start, will the military prowess displayed by the Palestinians in the intifada provide an excuse for Arafat to play the constructive role Anwar Sadat did after the temporary Arab successes of the 1973 war? Or will he view America in retreat and Israel on the verge of an abyss — toward which he will push it step by step with the help of outside mediation? The answers to these questions will determine the prospects for a peaceful evolution of the region, and also to a large extent the prospects for America’s war against terrorism.

The Palestinians will not accept a ceasefire because they believe they have momentum; the Israelis will not yield because they fear for their existence. America can bridge this gap only by making clear to both sides that the only feasible goal is a limited settlement in which each will achieve less than its maximum aim but more than it can accomplish by a continuation of the conflict. It must urge Israel toward a peace programme. It must impress upon its Arab interlocutors the limits of achievable concessions.

To contribute to genuine progress, America must back a programme that combines respect for Arab dignity with Israel’s necessities for survival. There is no middle way.—Dawn/Los Angeles Times Syndicate

Top



America’s flawed approach


By Shameem Akhtar

THE re-occupation of the Palestinian territory by Israel after a massive armoured and aerial invasion in reprisal for the suicide bomb attacks by Al Aqsa Brigade Martyrs, the militant wing of Arafat’s secularist Fatah, and the religious zealots, Al Hamas, shows that the entire Palestinian nation has risen against the Zionist power.

It is not the religious extremists alone who have taken to arms, but the Marxist PFLP and DFLP, too, have joined the Palestinian resistance movement.

In fact, it was the PFLP which got at the former Israeli minister, Rahvam Zeevi, a diehard racist, in a tit-for-tat vendetta for the assassination of their chief, Abu Mustafa Ali.

The Israelis target the Palestinian leadership of all persuasions as a matter of light and resort to indiscriminate killing of the civilian population of the West Bank and Gaza by aerial bombardment and tank fire with impunity. They insist on capturing the Palestinians suspected of retaliatory killings of the Israelis.

That Arafat is unable to prevent the militants from carrying out sniper attacks and bomb blasts can be judged from the recent mob attack of the prison to rescue the Palestinian detainees. In vain do Ariel Sharon and his American allies blame the Palestinian leader for not doing enough to control the violence. Hence Sharon’s search for a more compliant substitute for Arafat. Little does he know that the alternative to the present Palestinian leadership would not be a dove. This is something which the Americans understand.

What the US and Israel do not admit is that the West Bank and Gaza do not present a law and order problem which could be policed by the occupying power. It is a full-scale war between Israel which has re-occupied Gaza, Bethlehem, Ramalla and other parts of the Palestinian territory ceded to the Authority by the Oslo agreement.

The Intifada has assumed the proportions of a full-fledged war that has stepped out of the stone age into the era of rockets.

The Palestinians have blasted the Israeli tanks and have been running an indigenous rocket factory. If Israel mounts an offensive with 150 tanks and F-16s and Apache helicopter gunships to destroy the headquarters of the Palestinian police and Arafat’s Elite Force seeking reinforcement of 20,000 troops to occupy West Bank and Gaza, and still believe that it is fighting against terrorism, it is grossly mistaken.

The Palestinian-Israeli war intensified during February-March period, having taken a toll of more than 100 lives. The Israelis are wondering that unlike Intifada-I, this time the Palestinians have been killing Israelis in a ratio of 1:3 while the 17-month war has incurred an expenditure of $4 billion. For their part, the Israelis have so far killed over eleven hundred Palestinians and destroyed the 20-billion dollar infrastructure of Palestine financed by the European Union.

The Israeli excesses against the Palestinian population were censured by the European Union which pledged substantial assistance to the Palestinian Authority for the reconstruction of its facilities destroyed by Israel.

The Israeli re-occupation of the Palestinian territory has exposed the hollowness of the Oslo accord.

At the same time the Israeli attacks have shown how vulnerable was the Palestinian entity in the face of the expansionist designs of the Zionist state. And if there was any need for security it was for the Palestinian entity and not for Israel.

Therefore in any future territorial arrangement, the Palestinian state should have its common historical borders with Jordan and Egypt while the Jewish settlements encircling it should be dismantled.

For it is the Palestinian entity that has been repeatedly attacked by Israel which has annexed vast stretches of the former’s territory. The Security Council Resolution 242 rejects such acquisition of territory as illegal but fights shy of getting the occupation vacated.

The approach of the US towards the Palestinian problem is flawed in that it is obsessed with the security of a state that has expanded its borders far beyond its legal limits as set forth by the UN General Assembly resolution 181 (ii). The 1977 Carter plan particularly stressed the need for strategic depth for Israel and proposed the cession of some Palestinian land to that state. In fact it is the proposed Palestinian state comprising enclaves within the Israeli territory which will be needing land to form a compact state that could be viable.

The Americans have forgotten their commitment to an Arab Palestinian state under the UN resolution and the much-trumpeted Oslo accord would not go beyond self-rule. In the midst of war and bloodshed the Bush administration has moved a resolution that sees mere vision of a Palestinian state but does not seek its fulfilment.

In the absence of any guarantee for the finalization of the peace accord, much less its implementation, the national Palestinian resistance has intensified.

The Tenet and Mitchell formulas appear as dilatory tactics aimed at allowing the occupying power time and opportunity to consolidate its usurpation of the Palestinian territory by right of prescription. Israel made a false claim on March 19 that it had completely withdrawn its invading troops from the autonomous Palestinian areas although they were still stationed in Beit Hanoun and Beit Lahia and intermittent fighting continued in the West Bank and Gaza, resulting in the death of three Palestinians and one Israeli army officer.

The US vice-president during his 11-nation whirlwind tour saw Ariel Sharon on March 19 but refused to meet Arafat since he held him responsible for the continuing violence in the Palestinian territory. Later, on his return, he joined George Bush, at a working breakfast session on March 21 during which the president endorsed Cheney’s stance, blaming the Palestinian leader for not complying with the condition set forth by them.

That the US officials meet one party, the Israeli Prime Minister, unconditionally, and set strong conditions for meeting the other party, the Palestinian leader, gives the lie to Washington’s claim to impartiality in the Arab-Israeli dispute. Such blatant partisanship renders the US ineligible for brokering the Middle East peace.

What is needed is the end of the US monopoly on the peace process and its replacement by a broad-based conciliation conference including the permanent members of the Security Council and the representatives of the non-aligned bloc of nations. Or else, it will be a dictated peace which will be a prelude to a future war.

Top



Balwant Dass: ALL OVER THE PLACE


By Omar Kureishi

THERE doesn’t have to be a blood connection to be family. Balwant Dass was family. My brother Sattoo knew him since the days of World War II, both in the uniform of the Royal Indian Air Force, young men in their flying machines.

I knew him much later and he was both a friend and a colleague. It was a relationship that I valued and I did not know how much until Ardeshir Cowasjee rang me up, bright and early, to tell me that Balwant Dass had passed away.

He was one of the most decent men I have had the privilege of knowing, an uncomplicated, simple man and through all the highs and lows, ups and downs that all of us must undergo, both professional and personal, he kept his dignity.

He had this gift of self-effacement and yet in his presence, one spoke in a low voice. At Sattoo’s house, where I would meet him, the language of the discussion could get both colourful and virile, but when Balwant Dass was there, the expletives were deleted.

I had to miss his funeral but I spoke to his wife, Mavis and his daughter Anita on the telephone. I can handle grief reasonably well, it might be said that I have had my share of it, but I found that I was starting to choke up and hurried through the telephone call.

Balwant Dass belonged to a generation that is all but vanishing, taking with it a system of values that seems to belong to some other heavenly body than that in which we live in the present times. It would be outlandish to invest that generation with virtues it did not possess.

My own days of youth, unusually happy in remembering them, nevertheless, were strife-torn. There was World War II and there was the struggle against the British and then the movement for Pakistan and the communal riots, leading to the carnage in the Punjab, acts of indescribable savagery of which killing seemed the most merciful.

But in the end, Pakistan came into being and its green and white flag was hoisted and the Union Jack was lowered. The formative years of the new country were extremely difficult. I don’t think we made of Pakistan what the Quaid-i-Azam wanted it to be and we cannot truthfully bask in glory. But we lived our lives at a slower pace, perhaps, we were less materialistic or put this another way, less cut-throat.

Balwant Dass was one of the early officers of the Pakistan Air Force, one of the few who made the PAF what it is today, a much loved colleague of men like Asghar Khan, Nur Khan, Steve Yusuf, Zafar Choudary, ‘Bapu’ Murad. When Asghar Khan became the President of PIA and Chief Administrator of Civil Aviation and Tourism, he put Balwant Dass in charge of Civil Aviation and that is when I got to work with him.

In his quiet way, he was a no-nonsense man and minded his own business, never a party to any kind of office intrigue. It was obvious that Asghar Khan was very fond of him but both men,in a sense were alike. That either of them was fond of you did not confer any privileges on you. It was a handicap for one felt that the rules were more strictly enforced than on others.

Nur Khan was like that too and recently I reminded him that apart for my routine annual increments, I stayed in the job in which I had started. That, I think, made that generation special.

I had never met Nur Khan when my brother told me that he (Nur Khan) wanted to meet me. And when I met him and he offered me a job in PIA, he had vaguely said that my name had been mentioned to him. I never asked him who had recommended my name and he did not volunteer it. Years later, Sattoo told me that it was Balwant Dass who had given my name when Nur Khan had told him that he was looking for someone to set up and head a public relations department for PIA. Not once, did Balwant Dass tell me or even hint at it. Thus I was never able to thank him and it’s too late now.

Oscar Wilde had quipped that youth was wasted on the young. It would seem so too is the wisdom of the old. Balwant Dass retired and became a gentleman-farmer working the small plot of agricultural land he possessed in rural Sindh. He seemed contented and lived beyond the Biblical life span of three score years and ten, a devoted husband, father and grandfather.

He had no quarrel with the world and it would seem that the world did not have a quarrel with him for I have never heard anyone saying a single unkind word about him. In the end, death came to him as a friend for he died peacefully, considerate, as always, for his family and friends.

To offer one’s condolences and sympathies has become something of a ritual but I offer them from the heart to Mavis, Anita and all the members of his family. Much loved while he was alive, much mourned in his death, may his soul rest in peace and God give his family and his friends the strength to turn their sadness into a memory to be cherished. To have been a good man is not easy in a world that has so little love and joy to give and even more difficult when the world extracts such a heavy price for just staying alive. Balwant Dass was a good man.

Top



Shadow government


AS you are reading this column, there is a “Shadow Government” somewhere in the bowels of the mountains of Maryland, where people are stationed to keep the country going in case of nuclear war. I’m not sure how long these officials have to remain underground, but it is the toughest job in the country.

This is what it must be like:

The officials are having dinner in the their cave.

Marty Muggeridge says, “I am supposed to be the shadow president this week.”

Hal Haige says, “It’s my turn. You were president last week.”

“No one ever lets me be president,” Gonbalt says. “I’m tired of being the shadow environmental Cabinet officer.”

Hogan, the standby Homeland Security director says, “I want everyone to be stripped before I allow them into the cave.”

The standby attorney general says, “I want to practise military tribunals, just in case. If I ever have to be the real AG, I’m going to take away all the people’s rights.”

While they are eating, Artie Bear, the backup secretary of Defence, comes in the room and says tearfully, “Someone has been sleeping in my bed.”

The ersatz secretary of the Treasury says, “And someone was eating out of my bowl.”

The substitute secretary of State says, “Someone has been sitting in my chair.”

The stand-in attorney general says, “This is a case for the FBI.”

The surrogate CIA head chimes in, “We have a tip that it is Goldilocks, the shadow secretary of Labour.”

The substitute AG says, “Let’s round up anyone in the cave who looks suspicious.”

Nancy Hubbard, the backup National Security director says, “I went to the cupboard this morning and it was bare.”

The alternate OMB director says, “There was nothing in the budget for the cupboard. You should have stocked it with pork.”

One of the shadow White House officials says, “We’re not supposed to do anything until the balloon goes up. But there is no reason why we can’t practice damage control.”

“How can we have spin if we don’t have a press secretary?”

“I’m here,” a man at the end of the table says. “I can give you all the spin you want.” As the shadow men and women are talking, someone enters the cave. The secretary of Defence asks the secretary of State, “Who is that?”

“Beats me. I never saw him before in my life.”

The shadow Homeland Security director says, “I better keep an eye on him.”

The pseudo secretary of Agriculture says, “He looks exactly like Vice President Cheney.”

It is Vice President Cheney,” the substitute secretary of the Treasury says.

“Then what is he doing down here?”

“The CIA man replies, “They want him out of sight, and what better place than with the Shadow Government?”

Haige says, “If the real vice president is here, then I can’t be the shadow vice president.”

“You can be the shadow secretary of Commerce.”

Haige says, “I’m always getting the wrong end of the stick.”—Dawn/Tribune Media Services

Top



Top of Page





Seprater
Contributions
Privacy Policy
© DAWN Group of Newspapers, 2005