A SUGGESTION is coming from certain quarters, including some of our political parties, that a certain number of seats in the national and provincial legislatures should be reserved for the non-Muslim minorities in Pakistan. The argument being that in the absence of such reserved seats no member of a minority community will be elected, meaning that Muslims will not vote for a non-Muslim candidate contesting from a general constituency.

Another implication of this proposal is that only non-Muslims can, and Muslims cannot, safeguard the interests of non-Muslims. This need not be the case. Why do citizens need representation in a legislative body? More than the articulation of their interests is involved. Their interests may possibly be protected by an un-elected functionary, such as a good king or an enlightened dictator, even better than they may be by an elected official. General Musharraf claims to be doing just that, and rulers have professed likewise for many centuries in many lands. It is known to political theory as “virtual representation.”

In the context of democratic governance, Muslim members of parliament may speak and act to protect the interests of minorities. The presence of non-Muslim members on the floor is not essential to this undertaking. Nor is it to be taken for granted that non-Muslim members will be more effective in serving the interests of the minorities. Forming a very small part of the assembly, they and their submissions may or may not be taken seriously. Protecting minority rights is the duty of the majority, and that of the government it maintains in office.

The primary function of the representative assemblies in a democracy is to assert and implement the people’s right to participation in the making of laws under which they will live. Their right to dismiss one set of lawmakers and rulers, if they do not like the latter’s performance, and to replace them with another, is an expression of their supremacy.

Why are seats in the assemblies being reserved for women? Much more than protecting any special rights they may have, the idea, I think, is to accustom men to their presence in the assembly, and to the idea of working with them, for the common good. Reservation of seats for them is a measure in the nature of “affirmative action.” Like all such measures, the expectation here must be that, with the passage of time and as they gain more experience of the rough and tumble of politics, women will be able to contest and win elections on merit from general constituencies, and reserving seats for them will no longer be necessary.

It works somewhat the same way in the case of non-Muslim minorities. Just as Muslim men take a dim view of the propriety and efficacy of an active political role for their women, many Muslim men and women are sceptical of the social origins, capability, and even the intentions of non-Muslims. In the case of both women and non-Muslims simple prejudice, more than a correct perception of reality, is at work.

Not long ago I read a report that no non-Muslim had been elected as a district or even as a tehsil/taluka nazim in the recent local elections. It is then considered likely that Muslim voters will not elect a non-Muslim from a general constituency. Hence, it is said, the need for reserving assembly seats for them.

This train of reasoning should be examined a little further. In the first place, we need to know how many non-Muslims contested, who they and their opponents were, and where the contests took place before we can come to a reliable conclusion. In the meantime, let us ask if the Muslims work reasonably well with non-Muslims in other areas of governance. Non-Muslims have served in our higher education and judiciary with great distinction.

I know on the basis of personal observation that Christian and Parsi professors in our colleges have been very well regarded by their colleagues, students, and alumni. It is indisputable that Mr. A.R. Cornelius (Chief Justice of Pakistan for a number of years) and Mr. Dorab Patel (a judge of the Supreme Court) were highly respected by their Muslim colleagues in the Court and the legal profession. Nor can we assume that Hindu civil servants working in the government of Sindh are ineffective because their Muslim superiors and subordinates will not listen to them, or that the Hindu lawyers in Karachi are languishing for want of clients because Muslim litigants do not trust them.

The assumption that the Muslims cannot adequately represent the non-Muslims, or that they will not vote for a non-Muslim contesting for an elective office, needs to be tested. If the occasion does arise, it may occur to Muslim voters that if they elected a Hindu or a Christian to represent them, he would probably go out of his way to be diligent in serving them, and would prove to be as good as, or even better than, any Muslim might. He may turn out to be quite effective once he gets to the assembly and his Muslim colleagues become used to his presence amongst them.

I once heard, in connection with Italian politics, that a Communist and a Catholic, both members of the same assembly, would get along better than two Catholics or two Communists outside. The office will often transform its holder. In any case, let us go ahead without reserving seats for minorities and see how it works out.

What do non-Muslims want by way of political participation? Do they want, first and foremost, that half a dozen or a dozen of their co-religionists should occupy a bench or two in the assemblies and receive the customary pay and perquisites?

It is likely that, more than anything, they want not to be treated as minorities any longer. They want to be a part of the mainstream, and regarded as equal citizens. They wait for the Muslim majority (ninety-five percent of the population) to heed and implement the Quaid-i-Azam’s admonition that religion has nothing to do with the business of the state.

If we continue to ignore his advice, we will push our polity deeper into the throes of an ever-expanding and disintegrative civil strife. For the state of mind that persuades some Muslims to persecute Hindus and Christians is the same state of mind that arouses the Sunnis to kill the Shias and the Shias to kill the Sunnis. How long before the Wahabis become its victims, and then the Deobandis? Will this mean-spiritedness ever stop?

The government of General Musharraf has been denouncing extremism, and has taken steps to curb it. But apparently his policy is not working. An American journalist was kidnapped and then slaughtered a few weeks ago. Shias are being killed in Karachi and elsewhere almost every day. On March 17 unknown militants threw grenades into a Protestant church in Islamabad, killed five worshippers (including two Americans), and wounded many others. These acts announce that the extremists remain undaunted by the general’s declarations.

Are the general and his government really helpless, or could it be that his policies are not being put to work to the full extent of their professed intent? It is known that the ISI had been sponsoring and supporting Islamic extremists and militants for some twenty years. The critical question today is whether it has finally and fully broken its links with these carriers of passion, prejudice, and violence.

An intriguing question comes to mind. Is the general really able to control his own subordinates all the way? It is said that the “chain of command” is fully operative in the Pakistan army, and that may very well be the case in the ordinary course of its normal activities. But what happens when the army takes over the essentially political function of governing the country? Having become bureaucrats, won’t the colonels and lieutenant generals, occupying civilian positions, learn the modes of bureaucratic behaviour? It is likely that they will.

Bureaucracies are well known for their ability to find reasons why policies desired by the heads of government cannot be implemented. Even when they do not question a policy, they may defeat it through indifferent implementation. The ISI in Pakistan is a large bureaucracy that has been accustomed to certain policy orientations and freedom of action in pursuing them. Some of its members may even be ideologically committed to the policies they have been following.

Making a clean break with their past is bound to be not only tedious but painful. If it transpires that General Musharraf is not able to control all rungs of the hierarchy in the ISI, no one should be surprised. Even dictators cannot exercise comprehensive control over their subordinates unless they can operate like Stalin, who never hesitated to liquidate even his closest associates if he suspected them of thinking their own thoughts.

Returning to the minorities, the issue of their representation will not be resolved satisfactorily unless religious prejudice and intolerance are banished, and these will not be banished until the link between the state and religion is broken. That the great majority of the people in Pakistan favour this course of action is evident from the fact that in successive elections they have consistently disowned the Islamic parties that wish to strengthen the link between religion and politics. Even so the process of delinking them, which involves reformulation, if not reversal, of long standing professions and policies, will be fraught with hazards. It will require a great deal of ingenuity, perseverance, and courage-even ruthlessness— on the part of the present government and its successors.

PRESIDENT Musharraf is facing yet another difficult choice of his career in transition from soldiering to politics. In a private way his dilemma on holding, or not holding, a referendum to continue in office for five more years could be more agonizing than siding with America in its war on Taliban.

The president’s well wishers should advise him against the referendum for reasons both universal and peculiar to Pakistan. Whenever the Constitution or tradition of a country stipulates a referendum it is to ascertain the wishes of the voters on a government policy or proposed legislation but not to enable an individual to hold an elective public office.

Perhaps the first referendum for a constitutional ratification was held in Massachusetts in 1778. The amendments to the constitutions of all states of the US and the Swiss Cantons now can be done only through referendums. Similar is the requirement in some other countries like Australia and Ireland and in the post-war constitutions of France and Italy.

A supplement to the Constitution of Pakistan provides for a referendum but it is neither obligatory, nor optional, nor voluntary. It is subject to the discretion of the president, or on the advice of the prime minister, whenever he considers it desirable to refer any “matter of national importance” to a referendum. Thus whether a matter is of national importance which should be put to the people for a vote lies in the sole discretion and desire of the president. The subject matter has to be put to the voters in the form of a question that is capable of being answered either by ‘yes’ or ‘no’.

General Zia-ul-Haq’s aim in holding a referendum in December 1984 was, as is General Musharraf’s today, to get five more years as head of state and government after he had been there for seven already. To make this personal aggrandizement into a national issue eligible for a referendum he devised a long-winded question beyond the comprehension of the most people which bears reproduction here as a masterpiece of trickery wholly unworthy of being repeated once again now 18 years later:

“Do you endorse the process initiated by the President of Pakistan, General Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq, for bringing the laws of Pakistan in conformity with the injunctions of Islam as laid down in the Holy Quran and Sunna of the Holy Prophet (peace be upon him) and for the preservation of the ideology of Pakistan; and are you in favour of the continuation and further consolidation of that process and for the smooth and orderly transfer of power to the elected representatives of the people?”

A ‘no’ answer to this question would have been both heretical and unpatriotic and, further, against the return of the country to democratic rule after eight years of martial law. A ‘yes’ answer would give five more years in office to Zia-ul-Haq with sweeping personal powers on the pretence of enforcing Islamic injunctions and protecting the ideology of Pakistan.

The referendum day was marked by eerie silence and deserted polling stations. The impartial observers then, and authentic accounts written later put the voter attendance at around 10 per cent. The Election Commission (among its members Justices, Rafiq Tarar, later the President of Pakistan, and Qadeer Chaudhry, till recently the CEC) stunned the incredulous people by a grotesque declaration on the TV and radio that the turn-out was 62.20 per cent of whom 97.71 had voted ‘yes.’ The shame of it all still haunts the nation and the judiciary.

General Musharraf by his pronouncements and reputation as yet remains free of the guile and ambition associated with Zia-ul-Haq. The result of the referendum he holds and the trail it leaves behind however may not be much different. Since under the constitutional provision as it stands, the referendum has to be on a national issue and not for the election of the head of state, the question framed must necessarily be involved and devious. The interest of the citizenry could hardly be aroused in the absence of a contender for the office.

President Musharraf therefore should hold only the general elections as he has promised and planned in October next. Referendum will almost certainly cast a deep shadow on his intentions and might also shake his administration to its foundations. The elections will be good for the people and, as events are shaping within the country and outside,also good for Musharraf. The brokers of power and finance internationally have come to accept Musharraf as the leader Pakistan needs. The popular underpinnings provided by the elections will ease the conscience of the democratic world in dealing with him.

At home, if the arch contenders for power are kept out of the election arena, and there appears little likelihood of the Election Commission letting Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz sharif contest, Musharraf should not face much opposition in getting elected as president by the electoral college comprising the Senate, the National Assembly and the provincial assemblies.

The break-away factions of the main parties, new parties like Millat, Insaf, Awami and most regional,sub-nationalist ethnic and religious groups are keen to share power with him for they have no candidate, or at least none under whom all can unite, to replace him. The ranks of the politicians, old and new, wishing to be his henchmen or ministers are swelling by the day.

Because of the recognition Musharraf has gained for bringing about economic stability, if not growth, and for casting the troublesome extremists out of the national mainstream, without neutralizing them though, the people at large do not hark back to the last decade of democracy with any degree of nostalgia.

Leaving aside their other successes and failures, the elected governments of the nineties projected Pakistan (as Shahid Javed Burki pointed out in his last Wednesday’s essay in this paper) as the most corrupt country in the world. Musharraf’s thirty months have brought it down seven rungs. Most people are now convinced that a vengeful regime emerging out of the elections will inflict deeper wounds on the body-politic than it has suffered already and the country may once again slip back into political violence and economic depression out of which it is still struggling to clamber out.

In any case, Musharraf should find the straight road to public office through a general election easier to negotiate than the crooked path of a referendum. Many did that before him. More democrats of today have their roots in the army and other institutions of power, or the patronage they received from them, than in the service at the grassroots. Among them are the holders of high offices in the past and future aspirants like Nawaz Sharif, Ejazul Haq, Gohar Ayub, Hamid Gul and many more. His credentials on that score are better than all of them.

Standing on the threshold of his new, perhaps permanent, career in politics Musharraf has to curb his reformist zeal. All that he needs to do before the elections is the redistribution of power and responsibility between the prime minister and the president and, secondly, between the federation and the provinces.

The prime ministers should not feel, as Nawaz Sharif did, that the prime minister of Pakistan is a king and caliph rolled into one. And the provincial governments should not feel, as indeed they do, that they are mere vassals of the federal government. The other innovations can wait. The governmental systems are not invented. They grow out of experience and conventions.

THE inner grapevine of Delhi — the one with the real grapes as distinct from hothouse plants — is bristling with the news that Sonia Gandhi is preparing for a late 2002 general election. That is one of the explanations being offered for the selection of at least three candidates to the Rajya Sabha. Their rite of passage has apparently been purchased by a very reliable corporate house, a deal justified by this impending election.

It is in the nature of such stories that they cannot be verified. This does not necessarily make them untrue, but they remain suspect and must therefore be discounted. Moreover, reliance now is accused of every sin as well as virtue on earth. Again, this does not necessarily make the accusation untrue, but since there can never really be verification of suitcase-friendship we must not rush to any judgment.

What is far more relevant, politically, is that Sonia Gandhi has given Rajya Sabha seats to two men who are convinced that she cannot win the next general elections.

Of the three “grapevine” candidates, one is a complete non-entity, Abrar Ahmad, Congress hopeful from Rajasthan. Sonia Gandhi has chosen to replace K.K. Birla with a non-entity, but that is her prerogative. This gentleman used to be a minor entity once, as some junior minister in finance, but apparently used the opportunity to make important corporate friends who know how to repay favours. His other qualification for Congress largesse is that he keeps his mouth shut, and obedience is always popular with any political leader, not just Sonia Gandhi.

The other two are more interesting. Subirami Reddy is an amazing personality, who thrives in the Congress despite huge, rather crass five-star-hotel parties; a guest list sprinkled with filmstars and brimming with starlets; and an obsessive itch for self-publicity. No one has a larger invitation card or more free photographs available to newspapers. Reddy lost from Vishakapatnam in the last general elections.

The second is the more traditional politician Murli Deora, whose public relations is infinitely more intelligent. He lost the last elections from south Mumbai. The last elections were also the first in which Sonia Gandhi was the undisputed leader of the Congress. Both Reddy and Deora were surprised by their defeats. Both believed, with some justification, that they were more popular in their constituencies than their parties because of the work they had done for the voters.

They believed that their individual goodwill would see them through even if the overall performance of the Congress was poor, as indeed it was, although less so in Maharashtra than in Andhra Pradesh.

Both were confident of pulling through till the last minute. Both were shocked by their defeat. Since neither could blame himself for losing, they sought external reasons. The general defeat of the Congress was not sufficient as a reason. Reddy had won from Vishakapatnam despite a Telugu Desam wave earlier and had nursed his constituency lavishly. He had spent another fortune during the elections itself. Very few Congressmen have nurtured their constituencies as caringly as Murli Deora has nurtured south Mumbai.

He has held the seat in the face of tidal waves, let alone waves. Both Reddy and Deora realized, privately, that the decisive factor in their defeat was that Sonia Gandhi had become unacceptable to their largely urban constituencies. Obviously they would never say that publicly. But they knew that they could not handle what might be called the “post-272” electorate in a television-savvy region.

Moreover Deora discovered that the Muslim vote, a critical element in his vote-accrual, had left him because of the Congress and that Sonia Gandhi had not been able to bring it back.

Reddy and Deora are practical politicians who cannot survive without membership of the parliament. The one thing that they are certain about is that Sonia Gandhi cannot bring them back to the Lok Sabha from Vishakapatnam and south Mumbai. They do not blame themselves for this situation. In their own eyes, they remain the best of nurses, and what better credentials can a candidate have for the Lok Sabha?

They do not blame the overall political environment either. How could they? With the central government self-destructing on a daily basis, the mood is going to be fertile for anyone challenging the NDA in the next general elections. Moreover, there will be natural sympathy for both of them since they lost the last time. In that sense the next elections are ideal for them. But they have no confidence in Sonia Gandhi’s ability to deliver an election that she should be able to pick up without an effort.

If they had faith in her they would have waited. If a much-older Rajiv Gandhi had been leader of the Congress now, they would have waited; in any case he would have dismissed their suggestion for a Rajya Sabha seat with a characteristic smile and asked them who would come to the Lok Sabha if not them. Congressmen like Reddy and Deora would have been expected not only to finance their own campaigns to the Lok Sabha but also to help others by dipping into their moneybags.

But both Reddy and Deora preferred to grovel and slip into the Rajya Sabha rather than wait and fight for the Lok Sabha. Nor would they have had to wait much longer. The general elections may not come this year, but it will be difficult to prevent them from taking place next year. Reddy and Deora preferred humiliation and a seat today to Sonia Gandhi and uncertainty tomorrow.

Sonia Gandhi of course had no clue about the implications of sending two defeated Lok Sabha candidates from eminently winnable constituencies to the Rajya Sabha. In sum, she has rewarded two politicians who have no faith in her electoral abilities. Because, and this is beyond argument, if the Congress cannot win in places like Vishakapatnam and south Mumbai in the next elections, when urban anger against the BJP and its allies will be at a peak, then the Congress cannot hope to come anywhere near power. These two are bell-weather constituencies, in the south and the west from which any reasonable Congress candidate should romp through.

These seats will now go to comparatively inexperienced candidates while Reddy and Deora delight in their well-paid good fortune in Central Hall. The irony of course is that Reddy and Deora may be right in their scepticism about Sonia Gandhi’s abilities. They have, with their actions, made explicit what others know implicitly—-that the results of the Assembly polls will not automatically convert into a victory in a national election.

There are many reasons for this, both subjective and objective. It is the Congress governments, for instance, which will be facing the anti-incumbency factor in the states where they are in power.

In Punjab for instance the Akalis will do much better the next time than they did this time. In Uttaranchal, the Congress will be split leaving opportunity open for the BJP. In Madhya Pradesh even Digvijay Singh will not be able to pull off a miracle again.

But the big unspoken dread of course is about the impact that Sonia Gandhi’s own personality makes on the vote. In the states the voters were not electing her; they were electing others as chief ministers. Congressmen like Reddy and Deora, and so many others less fortunate than them who cannot get into the Rajya Sabha, do not want to take a chance on the results of another clash between Atal Behari Vajpayee and Sonia Gandhi.

They are not ready to bet that “strange-accent” Sonia will be able to take on the homespun Atal when the struggle comes to the bone. Her enemies claim that Sonia Gandhi rewarded the Reddys and Deoras because of lucrative pressure from corporate power. I would prefer to believe that she was merely gullible, but that is not good news for the Congress either. The jury is still out, and more evidence will be available to decide whether the reason is corporate pressure or gullibility.

The Congress could, if handled correctly, win a simple majority in the next general elections: the central coalition government has done enough self-damage to ensure this. But if the Reddys and the Deoras are right, and Sonia Gandhi is incapable of winning in Vishakapatnam and south Mumbai, then Sonia Gandhi could end up as the Mayawati of India.

In other words, we will see a repetition of the Uttar Pradesh results at the national level, with the parliament divided three ways: the BJP, the Congress and the third front. Sonia Gandhi, like Mayawati, will lead a group of MPs searching for a bargain in the fourteenth Lok Sabha in order to prevent the Constitution, very quickly, of a fifteenth Lok Sabha.

Could the president of India impose president’s rule on the whole of India? I will need to check with some constitutional lawyer. One, that is, who is not in the Congress.

The writer is editor-in-chief of Asian Age, New Delhi