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January 26, 2002 Saturday Ziqa’ad 11, 1422





Moral snares for Bush in ‘anti-terror war’



By Andrew J. Bacevich


LOS ANGELES: The GIs arriving in the southern Philippines to offer aid in the fight against the terrorist group Abu Sayyaf are by no means the first US troops to take up station in places such as Mindanao, Basilan and Jolo. As they do so, Americans would do well to recall when the United States last set out to crush Muslim separatists in that exotic clime.

In 1903, having put down an insurrection by Filipino nationalists hoping that the overthrow of Spanish rule might lead to independence, President Theodore Roosevelt moved quickly to complete the pacification of the United States’ new Pacific colony. He ordered his favourite proconsul, Gen Leonard Wood, to bring to heel separatists inhabiting what US authorities called Moro province, home to 250,000 Filipino Muslims who had long opposed domination by whoever happened to be ruling in Manila. Poorly equipped and organized, the Moros did not constitute much of an opponent in any conventional sense. American soldiers figured to make short work of such a backward foe and bring order and civilization to Moroland.

Events did not unfold as planned. Instead, an ugly, inconclusive guerrilla campaign ensued. By the time it petered out years later, thousands of Muslims and more than a few Americans had died. The US Army stood accused of massacring noncombatants in cold blood. And Moro resistance to outsiders remained stubbornly intact - as it still remains to this day.

In Moroland, the UStates got more than it reckoned for. Primitive conditions, a vast inhospitable jungle and, above all, the Moro warrior’s perverse willingness to die offset the overwhelming US edge in technology and firepower. Assaults on enemy cottas - primitive fortresses - inevitably produced tactical success, along with heavy Moro losses. But they did not yield decisive victory.

As the war dragged on, US inhibitions fell by the wayside. Frustrated by the Moros’ refusal to embrace Western ways, Wood abandoned any pretence of uplifting the natives. Gradually, US forces drifted toward what came to resemble a strategy of extermination. The low point occurred in March 1906 on Jolo at the extinct volcano of Bud Dajo.

Several hundred Moros had gathered atop the volcano, spooking US commanders into thinking that an uprising was afoot. To pre-empt any such plot, several battalions of American regulars surrounded the summit, vigorously shelled it and then assaulted. Virtually the entire Moro encampment was wiped out, about 600 in all. Many of those killed were women and children.

Flushed with success at having vanquished the Taliban, the Bush administration may be susceptible to the same failings that befell Roosevelt and Wood - hubris chief among them. The US should be wary of expectations that what worked in Afghanistan will translate into easy victory elsewhere. More important, it should be wary of the moral snares that lie ahead. —Dawn/LATS Service (c) Los Angeles Times.






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