ANOTHER chapter in Afghanistan’s bloody history is drawing to a close: Taliban rule is over in the north of the country, and maybe soon in the south too.

The end, when it came, was sudden and surprising. Having withstood five weeks of US bombardment and Northern Alliance offensives, the Taliban had acquired a rock-like image: here was a force that was not going to be defeated or put on the run any time soon. Eventually, though, the sheer force of US bombing (cluster bombs, B-52s and the awesome ‘daisy cutter’) proved too much. The Taliban abandoned Kabul in the middle of the night, without firing a shot.

Many, especially in Washington and London, will see the Taliban’s defeat as a vindication of the aerial bombardment strategy adopted by the ‘international coalition’. It has paid off in that the Taliban have been ousted from power without any US or British lives being expended. But its success has to be balanced against the hundreds of Afghan civilians killed by the bombing, and the thousands more who could die because of its impact on the humanitarian relief effort.

Before considering the political challenges raised by the fall of Kabul, it is important to stress that the war is not over yet. The end of the Taliban government is not the same as the end of the Taliban as a force. The latter seems inevitable now, but will still take time and to considerable effort — on the ground, rather than from the air. The Taliban will not abandon their home base in the south as readily as they did Kabul and Mazar-i-Sharif. What is more, while military pressure may cause many of the ‘soft’ Taliban to surrender or defect, a hard core will go on resisting to the bloody end.

There is little to mourn the passing of the Taliban government. They did bring peace and order to the regions that they conquered. But they extracted a terrible price out of the people for it. The compulsory ‘shuttle-cocking’ of women, men being forced to grow beards and pray, ban on music, chess, TV and innumerable other pursuits — all these were the lighter burdens of Taliban rule. There were many far more brutal, far more horrific aspects. Saira Shah’s film ‘Behind the Veil’ aired recently on CNN, gave a glimpse into Taliban brutality. Recall the summary execution of a burqa-clad woman, and the young boy skinned alive. The Taliban will not be missed.

But their departure has created a political vacuum. The political wing of the campaign, put on hold while the military was pursued, has fallen way behind. There is no multi-ethnic body ready to take over to run Afghanistan. The Northern Alliance fits that description to some extent, having Tajiks, Uzbeks and Hazaras within its fold, but it is without the crucial Pakhtoon element. Without that it cannot hope to establish its writ in the vast Pakhtoon-dominated south of the country.

The Northern Alliance is fatally flawed for another reason too. The Taliban had an appalling human rights record, but that of the Northern Alliance is even worse. True, they do not espouse the harsh so-called Islamic order adopted and enforced by the Taliban, but in terms of cruelty and bloodshed they are easily as bad. The last time they conquered Kabul, the wave of looting, rape, and murder that they unleashed claimed 50,000 lives. Northern Alliance commanders have carried out massacres of Taliban prisoners. General Dostum apparently disciplines his own troops by tying them to tank tracks and driving them around until they become ‘mincemeat’.

The Northern Alliance, not surprisingly, claim to have learnt from the mistakes of the past. Their foreign minister Abdullah Abdullah narrates a convincing tale of reform. But the evidence so far does not corroborate his words. The UN reports that more than 100 Taliban (mostly young Pakistanis) were killed after they were captured from a school in Mazar-i-Sharif where they were hiding. The BBC quoted figures as high as 600 for the total number of people killed in the city. UN warehouses and other NGO offices are reported to have been raided.

The US has long been aware of the Northern Alliance’s weaknesses. Hence its continued stress on a broad-based government. But the American dilemma is that, unless it sends its own ground forces to move in and take up positions or until some sort of multinational force can be put together, it has no choice but to rely on the Northern Alliance. Washington’s hope is that it can use the carrot of ammunitions and other supplies to restrain the NA. ‘Behave, or no goodies.’ The problem is, that leverage could work on the ‘rational’ leadership but have no impact on the average NA soldier. Recall also that the Alliance is a far from cohesive, disciplined force — particularly since the assassination of its revered leader Ahmed Shah Masood.

The US has already failed its first test of control over the Alliance. President Bush told them not to enter Kabul but their ‘policemen’ went ahead anyway. The fate of the unfortunate Taliban (especially Arabs) left in the capital was graphically depicted on the BBC. Abdullah Abdullah has since declared that the Alliance does not plan to form a government on its own, and has invited representatives of other Afghan groups for talks on a future set-up. But his statements are already being contradicted by Prof. Burhanuddin Rabbani. Rabbani’s assertion that former king Zahir Shah was welcome, but as an ordinary citizen, does not bode well for ‘nation-building’ efforts by Washington.

The human rights record of the Northern Alliance is appalling. Other Pakhtoon leaders, e.g. former mujahideen commanders, will not join them if they engage in an anti-Pakhtoon killing spree. That in turn would lead to the factionalism and in-fighting of pre-Taliban days.

The UN, silent for much of this latest Afghan conflict, is getting into gear both to avert this scenario and to get urgently needed humanitarian aid into the country. The Security Council has met to discuss a new administration for Afghanistan. There is talk of sending in a multinational (Muslim-dominated) force [the alternative option of a UN peace-keeping force would take at minimum four months to get ready.] Food stockpiled just outside Afghanistan’s borders is being moved in.

The Taliban government has fallen, but Afghanistan’s problems are far from over. Fighting continues, there is no political solution in sight; and a humanitarian crisis is looming. But there is also cause for optimism. Afghan leaders and the international community have an opportunity to rectify the mistakes of the past by, for once, putting the interests of the Afghan people first. If they do, the next chapter in Afghanistan’s history could — incredibly — be one of peace, stability and reconstruction. If they don’t, there will be more violence, bloodshed and destruction.

THE Parsees are a fine race — enterprising, liberal, philanthropic and singularly free of obsessions. And yet they are deeply religious in their own way without letting their faith obtrude on other people. Unfortunately there are not many Parsees in Pakistan, only a few thousand. Which is good for them, otherwise they might have become victims of our misplaced Islamic zeal.

Not much is written about this race, in Pakistan at least, and yet their contribution to industry, commerce and society in this country is far beyond their numbers. Even in this depleted state they continue to produce some excellent specimens of humanity. My purpose today is not to write about the living, but two of their community who are no more. One, a woman, who lived in Mumbai before World War I and was outstanding in any case, and the other whom many in Karachi will remember for what he did for that city, and for Pakistan.

I had occasion to see Jamshed Nusserwanji Mehta during the year I spent in Karachi as a cub reporter immediately after August 1947, but Bhikajee Rustam Kama has been a revelation for I had not heard of this remarkable lady before. For details about both I am indebted to that prolific but tireless research scholar and author, Ahmed Salim, whose authoritative book, Pakistan & its Minorities, I recently read in manuscript form. It is still to be published and may well be his magnum opus.

The book describes her as “the famous radical woman leader.” She was that rare species, an aggressive Parsee woman in politics. In 1906 Bhikajee Kama announced in stirring words in the International Socialist Congress in Stuttgart that the day was coming when the people of India “would wake up and follow the example of our Russian friends whom we salute.” In this session the Russian delegation was led by Lenin himself who was very pleased at Asian participation in the Congress.

Exposing the tactics of the British rulers in India, Bhikajee Kama said that their continued control was not only calamitous for the interests of India but was also a danger for all lovers of freedom in the world. She called upon socialists all over the globe to cooperate with the subjugated Indian people and help them attain independence. She expressed great sympathy for the “brave and determined people of Russia who are engaged in a confrontation with the Czarist regime.”

At the end of her address Ms Kama unfurled the flag of free India on the stage — an act which was greeted with tremendous applause, much to the discomfiture of the British delegation which raised a technical objection. But so moved was the Congress by her passionate words that it accepted the spirit that had prompted her strong words and the unfurling of the flag. Many of the Indian revolutionary exiles of the period heard the name of Lenin for the first time. Interestingly he was also the author of a little-known book on British rule in India.

After attending the Congress, Bhikajee Kama went to the USA and made numerous speeches there in support of freedom for India. She was deeply impressed by the Russian uprising of 1905 and expressed herself in favour of the violent methods and tactics of Russian revolutionaries to attain Indian release from foreign rule. Later, in 1910 she also attended the International Socialist Congress meeting in Brussels where she openly stated that “the only answer to foreign occupation is the pistol and the bomb.” What a woman! I wish there was more to read about her.

Jamshed Nusserwanji was an old friend of the Quaid-e-Azam, a sympathiser who shared his woes. When there were anti-Hindu riots in Karachi in January 1948, the Quaid was terribly disturbed. He could not imagine that such an unholy thing could take place after Pakistan had come into being, and that too with his presence in the city. Jamshed Nusserwanji did much to relieve his grief and despondency.

He narrates how, on the day of the killings, he called on the Quaid and was shown into the garden where the unhappy Governor General sat morosely on a bench, all alone. His voice was gloomy as he said, “Jamshed, what shall I do? How could these people do this? It is shattering.” The old Parsee did what he could to relieve his grief and despondency, but it was hardly a balm for the great man’s suffering. What had happened was now beyond repair.

As chairman of the Karachi Municipality for long years before partition Nusserwanji had many achievements and welfare projects to his credit, including drainage and water supply schemes, primary education, maternity homes. Construction of Jamshed Quarters, etc., all public service was performed by him without distinction of caste, colour or creed. He was broad-minded and a true liberal, more so since he was a sincere adherent of the Theosophical Society.

His private life was governed by the principles of the Zoroastrian faith, but he genuinely revered all other religions and made it a point to attend the religious functions of Christians, Muslims, Hindus and Sikhs. It seems that no observance of any faith was complete without Jamshed Nusserwanji being in attendance.

This is not all. He was extremely worried by the state of the refugees who came pouring into Karachi from India. As a non-Muslim nobody expected him to devote himself to their welfare, but the humanitarian in him could not be repressed. A.K. Brohi, the famous lawyer records his remarks, which he says, sounded like those of a soul in torment. “Brohi,” said Jamshed, “in the coming dozen years or so we shall not only be faced with a large population of destitute, uneducated and anti-social elements but confront an even worse situation in which a section of the people will be mentally and psychologically affected. This generation will not be able to produce healthy, strong and useful citizens.” How prophetic!

Mr Brohi quotes him further: “It is not that the problem cannot be solved, or that it requires a large outlay of funds. No, what is needed is basic understanding and creative thinking. I have a scheme whereby within one year all these refugees can be made a functional part of the country’s economic and social life. But what can I do? Nobody listens to me.” It is tragic that no Muslim leader, or a Muslim League leader, of Karachi even thought on these constructive lines at that time. A great man indeed.

THROUGHOUT history, wars have had a way of rearranging relations among nations.

The US war against terrorism will be no different. In fact, if anything good could come out of the tragic events of Sept. 11, it’s the stunning reversal of relations between Washington and Moscow.

Since at least the mid-1990s the relationship between the United States and Russia has grown steadily more difficult. Earlier this year, Russian President Vladimir Putin even began to play his China card against what he saw as the arrogant, unilateral and sometimes hostile attitude of Washington toward his country.

And Washington, whether it was Clinton or Bush in charge, felt there were more important issues than assuaging the hurt feelings of a weak, former adversary. For instance, the expansion of NATO closer to Russia’s borders or the development of a missile-defense system. Many foreign-policy experts felt it was an unfortunate, even tragic direction, but they could only watch in dismay as the relationship deteriorated.

Since the terrorist attack on the United States, however, Russian experts across the board agree that there is the potential for a fundamentally improved relationship that could ultimately change world politics. It’s not inevitable, and there are going to be some rough spots along the way that both sides must navigate. But when Putin and Bush meet in Texas later this month, it could be one of the most consequential summits in decades.

Clearly, Putin has made a strategic decision that his country’s long-term interests lie in a much better relationship with the West, especially the United States. He might well have made this decision before Sept. 11, but the terrorist attack has provided both him and Bush with an opportunity to overcome the tensions of the past decade and restructure their relationship in a manner that could have long-term consequences.

The Russians are now soft-peddling their opposition to Washington developing a missile-defense system and might even be resigned to NATO expansion. The possibility that Russia might even someday become a member of NATO, which seemed wholly implausible just a few months ago, now is at least a credible possibility.

But most of the Russian experts I’ve talked with recently do not for a moment believe that Putin has taken these steps without an expectation that there will be something in it for Russia. Putin has taken a gamble that Bush will respond. In that sense, Putin is ahead of Russian public opinion and even the opinion of the political elites. That is why it’s essential that the Bush administration respond to Putin’s overtures. Specific actions, such as debt forgiveness to help Russia’s still struggling economy, will be important. But so will the manner in which Washington treats Moscow.

How specific issues are handled is important. For instance, Putin indicated Russia is ready to accept a modification of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty to allow the testing of a missile-defense system. But that is different from a unilateral U.S. abrogation of the treaty. He also wants agreement on deep cuts in offensive nuclear weapons.

This will be one of the chief topics in his Texas summit with Bush. Bush must sit on the ideologues in his administration who seem more interested in killing the treaty than developing a missile defense.

How Washington handles NATO expansion, especially adding the Baltic states that border Russia, is another very sensitive issue. Ideally, the administration would delay a decision, now scheduled for next year. But ideologues may be too strong and too bent on that goal. That is why finding some type of formula to make Russia eventually part of NATO may be the alternative.

How Russia is treated by Washington — the style of the relationship — will be as important as any one specific policy measure. Putin bitterly resented what he saw as Washington’s total lack of understanding of the problems the Russians face in Chechnya. Now that the United States must deal with terrorism, the Russians expect a more understanding attitude from Washington. Bush must do that without giving Russia’s hard-liners a green light to do anything they want there.—Newsday

THE fall of Kabul has not ended the period of uncertainty in Afghanistan. It is still unclear what will be the form of political set-up in this war-ravaged country. Following their meeting in New York George Bush and Gen Pervez Musharraf, had asked the Northern Alliance not to occupy Kabul. However, the Alliance went ahead and occupied Kabul.

It cannot be said that the objectives for which the US-led war against the Taliban had been launched are about to be achieved. There is nothing to suggest that the Al Qaeda organization has been decimated. Nor have the two most wanted persons Mullah mohammad Omar and Osama bin Laden, been captured. Air strikes over Afghanistan continue almost with the same ferocity with which they began on October 7. The American leadership has made it clear that the war in Afghanistan is far from being over.

Fears have been expressed that there could be dissensions within the senior ranks of the Northern Alliance. Factions of Taliban also appear to be entrenched in pockets of resistance. The ethnic, linguistic and sectarian divisions in Afghanistan are deep and have existed for a long period of time. They could lead to the fragmentation of the Afghan society.

The Tehrik-i-Nifaz-i-Shariat sent more than 12,000 volunteers into Afghanistan to fight alongside the taliban; 6,000 to 7,000 of them have already reportedly returned to their home base in the tribal area.

Many seasoned Pakistani observers of the Afghanistan scene believe that Osama bin Laden, who was idolized by Pakistanis during the crisis in Afghanistan, seems to have lost his charisma. There could be a sense of disenchantment with him primarily because he is not a Pakhtoon

Some factions of the Taliban may have gone into the mountainous regions not merely to seek shelter from the continuing US air strike but also to regroup and rejuvenate for a long guerilla war against the Northern Alliance and its allies. However it seems that the ranks of the Taliban have been greatly depleted.

The struggle for power appears to have commenced in Kabul. Burhanuddin Rabbani, leader of the Jamiat-i-Islami faction of the seven-party alliance of Mujahideen that fought against the Soviets at the end of 1979, has already returned to Kabul. He continues to be recognized by the UN as the bona fides president of Afghanistan. Rabbani was a major recipient of the military and financial aid provided by the US and Pakistan to the Mujahideen. Gulbadin Hikmatyar, a powerful Pakhtoon leader, who was serving as prime minister under Rabbani before their ouster by the Taliban, could also want to make a bid for return to power.

The Jalalabad-based eastern zone leadership council, headed by Haji Qadeer, has already proclaimed the establishment of an autonomous government in the Nangarhar region in north-eastern Afghanistan. The council is expected to do the same in three other provinces — Kunar, Laghman and Nooristan — in the near future. These developments could be the beginning of the fragmentation of Afghanistan. The country is ethnically divided more today than it ever was. There are signs of independent fiefdoms emerging under various warlords, as it was before the Taliban overran the country.

To make an already complex situation even more complicated, the parties inside and outside Afghanistan which are concerned about the country’s future, do not appear to share the same agenda.

The thinking of the US and of the others about a mechanism for the setting up of a post-Taliban administration in Kabul cannot be said to be harmonious.

A spokesman of the Pakistan foreign office, in a Press briefing on Saturday, stressed that the UN should urgently call a meeting of all Afghan groups, to work for the demilitarization of Kabul and for inducting an interim government “to avoid a civil war in Afghanistan.” Surprisingly, while confirming that Pakistan had been in touch with various Afghan factions, the spokesman disclosed that Islamabad had no “recent contact” with the Northern Alliance.

Pakistan has never felt quite comfortable with the rise of the Northern Alliance. For one thing the Alliance does not have adequate representation of the Pakhtoons who comprise nearly 60 per cent of Afghanistan’s population. Secondly, India and Russia have also been attempting to influence the functioning of the Alliance. Lately, India has been more supportive of the proposed Group of 21 nations, instead of the original ‘six plus two’ group, for evolving the mechanism of installing a new government in Kabul.

In deliberating on the prospects of a future government set-up in Kabul, the international community has been taking all relevant factors into account. It has also considered Loya Jirga process and an urgent need to provide humanitarian aid to the Afghan people and a possible role for the ex-King Zahir Shah. However, nothing concrete has so for emerged.