PRESIDENT Gen Pervez Musharraf has plenty to thank Osama bin Laden, for Sept 11 was a godsend for him. Throwing his weight behind the American-led coalition against terrorism has turned him overnight from an internationally shunned military leader who came to power through a coup into the new blue-eyed leader of the world who is being showered with accolades and promises of economic aid for his country. To the obvious envy and frustration of the Indian leaders, the president was the star of the international anti-terrorism show at the United Nations General Assembly in New York over the weekend.

Through a split-second decision to side with the lone superpower in the world in its hour of need, the president has managed to gain instant international recognition that he strove so hard but could not quite achieve at New Delhi and Agra and through painstaking domestic reforms since October 1999.

Leaders who previously would not even have bothered to talk to him have since been making a beeline for Islamabad. The foreign office has rolled out the red carpet for foreign dignitaries many more times in the past one month than in the whole two years that Gen Musharraf has been in power.

The prime ministers of Britain and Holland, the German chancellor and the president of Turkey were among the foreign leaders who braved terrorist and anthrax scares to fly into Islamabad to pat the president on the back for his “decisiveness” and “courage” in joining the international fight against terrorism.

From the mighty USA itself came its secretaries of state and of defence, as well as the commander-in-chief of the United States Central Command, all wanting reassurances from the president that he is fully with them in the coalition against terrorism and, specifically, in the strikes on Afghanistan.

The president also had his hands full during the past month receiving the foreign ministers of Germany, France, Greece and Saudi Arabia, in addition to a string of other advisers, representatives, ministers of state and UN officials.

Apart from the generous accolades being showered upon him for his “bravery” in joining the coalition against terrorism, promises of economic aid for debt-ridden and cash-strapped Pakistan have also been pouring in. The largest and latest amount, $1 billion, was pledged by President George Bush in New York over the weekend.

A strong sense of deja vu pervades this whole episode. In 1979, America needed Pakistan’s help in expelling the Soviets from Afghanistan: Gen Ziaul Haq obliged and got in return international legitimacy for his military regime and aid for his country. In 1994, the Americans wanted a regime installed in Kabul that could act as a counter to the Iranian revolution. The then elected government in Islamabad obliged by helping the Taliban into power and, for this, it again got aid in return.

The country is still reeling from the economic and political repercussions of these policies. Pakistan has been in debt because of this aid. Can the country afford to take in any more of such economic assistance? Won’t it just make Pakistan more heavily indebted than it already is? Perhaps this is the aim because greater debts mean greater dependence on the aid givers.

Why is it that no country or international lending agency has yet offered to write off part let alone the whole debt that Pakistan owes to it? Instead of giving Islamabad more aid, why not use the $1 billion to write off some of its debts instead?

Why is it that real economic benefit in the form of increased market access to Pakistani goods in America or Europe, reduced duties and tariffs on these goods, and provision of technology and know-how to improve the quality of its goods for export have not been so forthcoming? The answers all seem to point towards the objective of keeping Islamabad under the thumb of the aid donors.

The growing trend towards religious extremism in the country has been one major political repercussion of American and hence Islamabad’s past policies on Afghanistan. Prior to Sept 11, President Musharraf had been trying to bring the country away from religious extremism through domestic reforms, including deweaponization and revamping the madressahs, streamlining their curriculum and bringing them under some kind of central control.

Unfortunately Islamabad’s alignment with the US after Sept 11 has changed the whole perspective of these reforms. The full implications of Islamabad’s current policies have yet to emerge, but one thing certain is that the same reforms towards moderation that were billed as an attempt at building national unity now run the risk of being generally construed as “anti-Islam” measures being fostered and dictated by America upon Pakistan.

The lesson for Islamabad vis-a-vis relations with America is obvious: the Americans give assistance not whenever Pakistan needs it, but whenever they need Pakistan. Pakistan’s relevance to America has so far only been confined to the latter’s short- term interests. This explains why the same Gen Musharraf who was earlier shunned and sanctioned by America is now welcomed as an international hero.

The pattern that has emerged in Pakistan’s foreign policy from all this is hardly one that can be described as independent and targeted. Its foreign policy has basically been made up of ad hoc responses and reactions to whatever the current American policies are, particularly in Afghanistan. A consistent foreign policy with clear-cut objectives has been sorely lacking. The only consistency evident is the dependence and reliance on America, and enmity with India, out of which Pakistan’s foreign policies are carved.

Meanwhile, its leaders sink in readily whatever immediate and short-term rewards that accrues from aligning with America without any thought and consideration to the long-term economic, political and social repercussions that these policies will have on the nation.