In light of APEC summit

THE APEC summit in Shanghai on 19-20 October 19 and 20 assumed added significance in the light of the global transformation that followed the September 11 terrorist attacks on the US. With China playing the host, Beijing’s desire to ensure its success coincided with the resolve of the US president to use the summit to strengthen the global coalition against terrorism. The occasion was utilized by President Bush to highlight and promote convergence over the war in Afghanistan with a power that the Republican administration had tended to see as a “strategic competitor.”

China fully grasped the delicacy of the situation arising out of September 11 events and President Jiang Zemin telephoned President Bush immediately thereafter to express sympathy over the grievous loss of live as a result of the terrorist outrage. He also offered China’s full cooperation in the fight against terrorism. This attitude no doubt reinforced the desire of the US President to proceed to China for the summit of the APEC, the first overseas journey he undertook after the September 11 event.

The summit in Shanghai acquired a totally different character as a result of the terrorist attack against the symbols of US power and prestige. APEC being primarily an economic grouping, extending across the Pacific to bring together Asian powers and countries of the Western Hemisphere that have essentially a European culture; its summit meetings had dealt normally with various aspects of economic cooperation. However, the terrorist outrage of 11 September pushed economic issues into the background, and the occasion was used by President Bush to proclaim the resolve of his government to root out terrorism from the globe, an enterprise in which he sought the involvement and support of all members of the international community. The theme, that failure by any country to join in this fight would be regarded as being tantamount to support for terrorism compelled nearly universal adherence to the alliance against terrorism.

This writer’s visit to China immediately after the summit enabled useful exchanges with senior researchers as well as with former diplomats still holding influential positions in China. The western media had highlighted mainly the success achieved by President Bush in strengthening the “anti-terrorist coalition”, and in winning the Chinese endorsement of the operations launched against the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. According to a New York Times report, a significant breakthrough was achieved when China agreed to cooperate in sharing intelligence and in interdicting the financing of terrorist groups.

However, while China responded positively to the US demand to be on board in the war against terrorism, President Bush and his conservative security advisers were seen sticking to their unilateralist approach a hallmark of the present US administration. Therefore, differences persist between Beijing and Washington not only on arms control policies but also on regional issues having a bearing on bilateral relations.

For its part, the US has not made any significant change in its policies that affect China, including those involving Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) and the inclusion of Taiwan in its BMD plans. In responding to Chinese demands that the “one China” policy agreed between the two countries be respected, President Bush drew attention to the fact that the US congress had also passed the Taiwan Relations Act that committed the US to the defence of Taiwan.

It was China that had taken several initiatives for a rapprochement with the US despite the Bush administration’s inclination to deal with China as a “strategic competitor.” These included modification of reservations over an increased Japanese military role overseas.

The Chinese foreign minister, Tang Jiaxuan, during his visit to western countries, had also underlined a conciliatory approach towards the US despite its obvious stress on the containment approach towards China.

Though China supports the US policy of eliminating the terrorist threat in the world, it has already registered its own perceptions on how this campaign needs to be pursued. So far as the attack on Afghanistan is concerned, it has called for targeted bombing to minimize civilian casualties in a country that has suffered so much destruction and loss of life during two decades of conflict China has also urged a greater role for the US in Afghanistan, notably in connection with the establishment of an alternative government in that country.

Chinese scholars have expressed concern also about the military presence that the US is establishing in Central Asia for its operations against Afghanistan. Recalling the US ambition for global hegemony, they apprehend that this may continue even after the military operation against Afghanistan in over. Continued US presence in Afghanistan would limit the “strategic space” in this vital region for both China and Russia, and virtually complete an encirclement of China in view of the US having its military presence in South Korea and Japan, and partnership arrangements with Taiwan, several South-East Asian countries and India.

During discussions at an arms control conference in Beijing, major differences between the approaches of the US and China were visible. It was noted that the Bush administration had not made any significant reductions in budgetary allocations for missile defence, there being a diversion of only $200 million towards terrorism. The tendency of the Bush administration to rely on regional arms control arrangements rather than global ones was noted. The decision to reject the CTBT was linked to a desire to resume nuclear tests.

In the bilateral context, President Bush’s approach in the discussions with President Jiang Zemin had apparently not been marked by any softening of the US stance on Tibet and human rights. Even the understanding reached by President Bush with President Putin of Russia was seen as a move towards isolating China. The Russian agreement in principle to a revision of the ABM Treaty, and to go along with the missile defence plans of the US,which is to be discussed at the forthcoming Bush-Putin summit in Texas, may well affect the Sino-Russian strategic alliance to promote a multipolar world order.

Overall, the Sino-US relationship has undergone a significant shift towards greater cordiality. China has been a beneficiary of the changes resulting from the September 11 events, especially on account of the US preoccupation with terrorism. China has a role to play in shaping the events in Afghanistan both as a neighbour and as a permanent member of the UN Security Council. It is well placed geographically to participate in the reconstruction of Afghanistan once the US-led military operation there is over and a new political set-up in Kabul is in place.

China is already exercising its leverage in favour of limiting military action by the US and in urging a major role for the UN both in the establishment of a new political dispensation in Afghanistan and in the coordination of the task of rehabilitating a shattered Afghanistan. Geo-strategic imperatives compel a major role for Pakistan in influencing the political and economic evolution in that country. Our time-tested friendship with China would remain a cornerstone of the new security architecture in this region in which the US now has a renewed and abiding interest.

The options in Afghanistan

WHILE options for establishing a broad-based government in Afghanistan were never numerous, the few worth exploring are fast dwindling away. The Zahir Shah possibility has been eliminated by lack of support for the monarch deposed about four decades ago.

Chances of finding defectors among the Taliban should be, by and large, ruled out after the hanging of Commander Abdul Haq who had entered Afghanistan in the hope of enlisting the support of the disenchanted among the Taliban elements. His trip to a piece of power ended up in his capture and summary execution at the hands of the Taliban.

Pir Syed Ahmed Gilani, an armchair pro-American politician organized a meeting of ‘moderate’ Afghan elements in Peshawar on October 23. Pir Gilani, who heads Assembly for Peace and National Unity of Afghanistan, a non-descript organization with a handful of Afghan refugee supporters in Pakistan and not even a tiny foothold inside Afghanistan, managed to put up some sort of a show in terms of attendance but its proceedings held little promise of a lasting impact.

Peshawar-based jihadi groups cold shouldered Gilani by nominating second- and third-rank members for the meeting. Gilani’s get-together of elders was marked by the absence of prestigious men from that category and by lack of friendliness among the participants. Inter-group rivalries of Afghan refugees undermined Gilani’s effort.

Other ambitious, self-styled leaders saw it as a move for enhancing personal credentials for a major role in a post-Taliban dispensation. That made him a rival to many and the moot a threat to their interests as most prominent Afghans outside Pakistan are candidates for a share in the post-Taliban pie and those in Peshawar have been dreaming of a place in the Afghan sun since the withdrawal of the Soviet forces.

Jihadi groups based in Peshawar had apparently assessed Pir Gilani’s initiative as still-born but sent their representatives to look at the lay of the land for a move from outside Afghanistan and to find out the extent and worth of backing from the US and Pakistan. Holding such a meeting in Peshawar at this point in time suggested patronage for organizers. But even that did not produce a ground swell of support and interest for Gilani. The meeting’s call for the setting up a broad-based government in Afghanistan lacked an adequate base of support.

The kind of proposal Gilani made can be floated but the question how this was to be accomplished remained unanswered at the meeting. It did not arouse much enthusiasm even among the various Pakistan-based groups of refugees; to say nothing of those inside Afghanistan. If he was playing to American and Pakistani galleries, there was no applause, not even a nod of approval. Despite the backing of the local media, the meeting proved a non-starter.

The main cause of Gilani’s failure was the attitude of ex-king Zahir Shah’s group. He was proposed as the central figure in a future dispensation without the Taliban but his camp in Rome totally ignored Gilani.

The ex-king was not represented at the elder’s meeting in Peshawar.

Two days later, hopes for an alternative administration in Kabul met a more serious set-back as the pursuit of wooing disenchanted elements among the Taliban resulted in the capture and execution of Commander Abdul Haq and two of his companions. The event reinforced the view that there are no dissidents among Mulla Omar’s followers.

Commander Abdul Haq was active in the Mujahideen’s campaign against Soviet occupation forces in the eighties, was critically injured and had one of his legs amputated. He had made a highly publicized re-entry into Afghanistan on October 25. He had outlined his plans before the media for challenging the Taliban and aired his belief that moderate elements existed inside Afghanistan whom he wanted to reorganize. According to him, they were just waiting for a signal from outside to move against the Taliban.

Abdul Haq’s confidence turned out to be tragically misplaced. Hardly had the former commander gone into Afghanistan when he was arrested. His request on mobile telephone for rescue by the US received a prompt response but the copter sent on the mission assessed the impossibility of the situation and flew back to safety, abandoning the commander to the Taliban and to his inevitable fate.

The Zahir Shah option still remains a non-starter. According to General (retd) Javed Nasir, a former head of Inter Services Intelligence, “his name had come up in 1992 when Pakistan was trying to evolve a formula (for a government in the Kabul) acceptable to the Mujahideen”. But the report received by the ISI ruled him out. The report, quoted by General Nasir from memory, stated: “Zahir Shah is in his eighties. He is in a semi-paralyzed state. Cannot even stand on his legs on his own. Cannot communicate. Can neither speak nor hear. Needs two nurses to take him to the toilet and to replace his custom-made pampers which he had been using for years”.

This state of health makes Zahir Shah an unlikely candidate for a unifier’s role, unless he is meant to be used to pressurize the Taliban and to probe possibility of defections in their ranks. The ploy might even do the opposite of what is intended by making the Taliban doubly alert and firmly discourage any defections.

These developments add to the uncertainly of Afghanistan’s political future. For the US, the Northern Alliance remains in reckoning. Pakistan is strongly opposed to it and General Musharraf has been categorical in rejecting the Alliance except as one component of a broad-based dispensation.

However, if the US considers the Northern Alliance a suitable vehicle for its ends, it would not worry much about Pakistan’s misgivings and may even twist Pakistan’s army to make it accept the Alliance as the dominant force in a future ruling arrangement in Kabul.

But the Alliance is unsure of itself. It hasn’t moved forward and the few advances it has made to take on the Taliban in recent days have underlined its limitations.

Its leadership’s reluctance to face up to the decade-old antagonists has in fact boosted the Taliban’s image. Its demand for heavier bombing of the Taliban’s positions on the northern front is evidence of its weakness.

Whether the US had planned to continue bombing till Afghanistan is reduced to rubble — to ‘smoke out’ bin Laden and the Taliban leadership — or it has been forced to do so because of lack of success in the offensive so far is only a matter of conjecture. But what has come out quite clearly so far is that America’s perceptions of conditions inside Afghanistan have proved wide off the mark. There are no chinks in the Taliban’s armour and there is no opposition to their rule either.

Following the attack, if a surge of popular anger against the Taliban was expected to well up,this has not come about. The Taliban, it seems, have been ruling over 90 per cent of Afghanistan with the approval of the majority of the country’s over 25 million people. They may not be an elected government but they are a widely accepted government. That makes the war on terror a war against the people of Afghanistan; they are the ones who are suffering the most. They are the ones who, it seems, would continue to be punished for a crime they had nothing to do with.

Roots of hatred

WHAT did Osama bin Laden — or whoever was the mastermind — really hope to achieve by destroying the World Trade Centre? Our sense of outrage must not prevent us from realizing that he must have planned this terrifying act, not as an end in itself, but as part of a much broader strategy against his enemy.

And we know enough about Mr bin Laden to know that his first concern is his own country of Saudi Arabia. It was not Israel which provoked the ferocity of his fundamentalist crusade: it was the American military presence in Saudi Arabia in the Gulf War 10 years ago, when Iraq invaded Kuwait and the Saudi King had to ask the Americans to defend the kingdom.

He saw the Americans as corrupting and defiling the true Islamic faith of the founder of his country, King Saud, who had been the hero of the fundamentalist. Mr bin Laden has been determined ever since to restore Saudi Arabia to its previous role, as the guardian of that austere faith and the sacred places of Islam.

It is obvious why he chose the twin towers as the prime target — for the second time — for they provided the most visible symbol of American capitalism which he hated; and no spectacle could achieve more publicity in the world’s media than their collapse. But he must also have known that it would precipitate an angry response from Americans, and a clamour for reprisals.

Indeed, this was surely his next objective: to provoke a display of American military might across the world. And so far his plan has worked well. Among all the reports from Pakistan, Afghanistan or the Middle East, few have emerged from Saudi Arabia. But in that autocratic country no news can mean bad news. Visitors report a widening gap between the Saudi elite, well-educated and the unemployed. And there have been reports of Saudi soldiers praising Osama bin Laden — as opposed to his rich, respectable brothers who have been close to the Saudi royals.

Nothing could be more worrying to the Saudi royal family than a new rebellion by militant fundamentalist inside their country. And if the Saudi fundamentalists were to succeed, nothing could be more dangerous to western capitalism; for they could cut off huge oil supplies and deprive industrial countries of their most crucial lifeline.

It is hardly possible that Osama bin Laden does not have this eventual prospect in mind. He was brought up in Saudi Arabia where, as he saw it, the oil billions were undermining the purity of Islam and corrupting the ruling class including his own family; and he has since been able to see all the vulnerabilities of the West, whether through is own expensive education, or through his family construction business, or through working with the CIA in Afghanistan.

The ambition to undermine global capitalism will not be confined to Saudi militant fundamentalists: it will be shared by millions of destitute people across the developing world who have felt humiliated and impoverished by the relentless domination of the West. They will see the thousands of dead victims in Manhattan as unimportant compared to the millions who have been killed, maimed or uprooted in countries devastated by wars for which they blame Americans.

And for many Arabs, Africans and Asians who have been made to feel that they are hopeless, incompetent and marginal, the demolition of the twin towers with such lethal efficiency must inevitably bring some sense of pride: That they have at last achieved something that no westerner thought they were capable of, and which compels the world to take note of them.

Westerners have so far been unable to look beyond the immediate atrocity and provocation, to think more carefully about the root causes of the terrorism. We in the West may be too busy portraying the terrorists as cowards and fanatics.

The writer is author of “The Seven Sisters” and “The Arms Bazaar.”

Complexities of the Afghan operation

HISTORICALLY, a prolonged stay in Afghanistan has never served the interest of any foreign power nor has it been beneficial for the neighbouring states. One hopes that America’s military operation in Afghanistan is not unduly prolonged because that is likely to increase strategic complexities for Central and South Asia. A long lasting war will not serve the strategic interest of any regional state and is likely to create domestic tensions.

During the past few days there has been an increasing concern internationally regarding the possible duration of America’s military operation in Afghanistan. Opinion regarding the continuation of operations during the holy month of Ramazan is divided. While continuing operations may be a military necessity, it may not be viable politically. There is concern among a number of Muslim countries that continued bombing during the holy month of fasting would create domestic political complications. However, American forces may not want to lose the momentum and allow the Taliban forces time to regroup and consolidate.

There is also the war-weariness factor, meaning that Washington now wants to attain its objective at the earliest without losing any time. Indeed, this is what has been recommended by the Pakistan government as well. Islamabad, like other regional states, would want the US to complete its operation and leave. The departure, nonetheless, depends on the attainment of wider objectives, a prospect that does not appear encouraging at the moment. The carpet bombing and use of penetration bombs to destroy caves and underground bunkers, or the use of the Tomahawks missiles has not helped in zeroing in on bin Laden or Mulla Omar.

The possibility of capturing these two is likely to become more difficult as winter sets in. The operation is getting militarily and politically frustrating for Washington that had initially hoped to achieve its objectives within a relatively short time, without the requirement of sizable strength of ground forces to be landed. Currently, the US is trying different options: (a) to defeat the Taliban through direct military action and (b) replacing them with a new, more agreeable political set-up. This latter objective calls facilitating rival groups and individuals to upstage the Taliban and ensure defections in their ranks. This can begin to have an effect after sustained efforts for a year or more.

Also, American policymaking circles are of the view that they must continue their war as long as it takes them to get bin Laden. It should be clear that a lot, including President Bush’s political survival, depends on the American force’s ability to dislodge the Taliban and install an alternative political set-up in Kabul. Already, there is talk of national rebuilding in Afghanistan that could take years to achieve. But the question is: can the US afford to stay on in the region that long without running into a host of other problems?

A long stay would be counter-productive for Washington in a number of ways, especially strategically. First, it is likely to make the US more unpopular in the Islamic world. Second, it would increase problems of domestic unrest in countries that are aiding America in its drive against terrorism. The most important case in this regard is Pakistan which is now the frontline state vis-a-vis the action against Afghanistan. Already, there are images formed abroad about Pakistan. The street demonstrations give an impression to outsiders of Pakistan being on the verge of some form of collapse.

No matter what is said by the Bush administration from time to time about Islamabad’s commitment to the American-led military operations, the images relayed out of Pakistan by the international media are increasingly projecting the picture of a highly volatile society dominated by ‘mullahs’ out to challenge America’s power. Added to this are stories of Christians being killed or members of the nuclear bureaucracy secretly aiding the Taliban. In fact, a major worry in western quarters is that the success of American military operations depend critically upon General Musharraf’s survival in power and his ability to carry the country along on the question of support to the world coalition against terrorism.

Indeed, it was not surprising that a majority of the American participants in a recently held conference organized by the primary research institute of the US Navy Pacific Command voiced their apprehension on this score. Of course, such fears put dampers on the future of American assistance to Islamabad, especially military, aid. Washington does not want to find itself in a situation like it did in Somalia or Sudan where friendly regimes had crumbled taking down millions of dollars of American investment in these countries with them.

Unfortunately, there is a lobby in the US that is trying hard to project Pakistan as a ‘failed state’ that cannot be trusted or must not possess weapons of mass destruction. The issue is not that any one doubts the fact that the nuclear assets are strictly controlled by the military, but the fear is that some renegade element within might try to pass on critical nuclear elements or information to terrorists or these close to Osama bin Laden’s Al-Qaeda group.

What Islamabad must do in terms of damage control is to increase efforts to prove that the Musharraf government is firmly in the saddle and that Pakistan’s nuclear assets are in safe hands. The people outside need to understand that the demonstrations on Pakistani streets are not an indication of any turmoil within the strategic institutions of Pakistan or even amongst the masses. The issue that Islamabad must consider is how to provide alternative images of country to the international community at this critical time.

This, however, does not distract from the possibility of an increase in unrest in Pakistan if Americans decide to stay long in Afghanistan. Any agitation by the people would denote a war-weariness compounded by growing economic problems caused by financial recession and the burden of millions of Afghan refugees powering into Pakistan. It is also worth mentioning that frustration within Pakistan would increase if foreign financial help does not arrive soon. The natural question that would bother any person is what Islamabad has gained by becoming a frontline state yet again.

A prolonged American stay in Afghanistan would also be problematic for other regional countries such as China. Beijing would certainly not like America’s military presence in South or Central Asia. A US base in Uzbekistan, for instance, would be incompatible with China’s strategic interests. There is a concern that America might use this opportunity to build military linkages with Uzbekistan or Tajikistan, a development that would not be welcomed by China or Russia. Experts are of the view that Beijing is likely to get extremely nervous if American forces stay another six months there.

Understandably, a concentration of American forces in countries adjoining China would disturb the military and strategic balance in the region. It is also plain believed that in case American forces prolong their stay, China would insist on the US to adopt multilateral force option rather than Washington going it alone in Afghanistan.

A lack of consensus is likely to produce negative implications that may make a solution in Afghanistan unduly difficult and turn the beleaguered country into a focal point of rivalry between different regional and world powers. It is worth mentioning that Russia has already committed to provide $ 40 million worth of equipment to the Northern Alliance. More equipment in a war-torn Afghanistan would be adding fuel to a fire that no one would then know how to extinguish.

How to insure terror

THE terrorist attacks in the United States have hit the airline network and the postal network, two arteries of the economy. But they have also hit insurance, another industry that underpins the orderly working of business.

In order to attract capital, companies have to convince investors that their money won’t be suddenly wiped out, so they insure their buildings and property against fire, earthquakes and other catastrophes. But next January, when many existing policies expire, companies may find terrorism coverage impossible to buy. The administration and Congress are rightly working to head off that danger. But their ideas are unconvincing.

The administration and some leading senators want the government to pick up most of the cost of future terrorist attacks after the industry pays the first $10 billion. Property/casualty insurers have reserves of more than $300 billion, so even after paying out $30 billion-plus for Sept. 11, they have enough to sustain a further hit of $10 billion.

Of course, individual insurers have much smaller reserves, so a terrorist attack on property covered entirely by one or two firms might cause bankruptcies. But insurers are expert at parceling out risks among themselves. Commercial skyscrapers are covered by syndicates of firms, so that none is liable for more than a fraction of the value. —The Washinton Post