November 9, 2001	Friday	Shaba’an 22, 1422

LONDON: The more that is known about the leaders of Afghanistan’s Northern Alliance opposition, the less attractive and dependable a bunch they seem to be. In the early days after Sept 11, the heirs to the Mujahideen fighters who opposed the Soviet invasion were seen as natural US allies. Then as tales of the alliance’s behaviour in Kabul prior to the Taliban victory in 1996 and its continuing links to the heroin trade began to circulate, the US went cool on the idea of collaboration.

The bombing of Kabul and Kandahar has so far failed to topple the Taliba. Special forces ground operations have been severely curtailed by a continuing intelligence famine; those that have been risked have been less than glorious. Attempts to suborn or enlist Pakhtoon tribal leaders and defectors in the south have met with disaster. One anti-Taliban leader was caught and executed. Another, Hamid Karzai, had to be hastily ‘extracted’ by US helicopters. With the humanitarian situation growing steadily worse, and winter fast approaching, the US appears to have decided that its best chance of winning control on the ground, and establishing bases for future military and relief operations, is to back the NA. The Pentagon now confirms that it is to supply arms as well as non-lethal equipment. It has increased the number of US personnel directly assisting and liaising with the alliance. And it has switched the focus of its aerial attacks to the Taliban’s northern defensive lines, especially around Mazar-e-Sharif. The minimum objective behind the bomb attacks appears to be the facilitation of a Northern Alliance breakthrough at Mazar before winter sets in.

Yet concerns about the NA remain unchanged. It is deeply divided along ethnic and personal lines. Its commanders welcome US materiel but are clearly in no hurry to do US bidding. The NA’s military effectiveness is highly dubious and its political intentions uncertain. There is no telling how its various factions may react if the Taliban regime collapses and, in the absence of a prior, agreed settlement, the country is thrown into turmoil. Since the murder of Ahmed Shah Massoud, the NA has lacked a strong leader of its own, let alone one who could help unite Afghanistan. The US has a history of mistaken alliances with dodgy proxy forces, from Vietnam to Iraq to Cuba to Nicaragua. Here in the making is one of the more disturbing yet. —Dawn/The Guardian News Service.