THE US response to the cataclysmic events of September 11 in the form of war against terrorism continues with full intensity in Afghanistan. With the launching of the recent ground operations a new phase in the war has begun. Many, however, are wondering how long it will last, where it will lead to and what would be its impact on the internal dynamics of Pakistan.

The American strategy which seems to be taking shape aims at trying to put maximum pressure on the Taliban by engaging them on different fronts and attacking them from all directions. By heavily bombing Taliban’s defensive positions in Northern Afghanistan the US is trying to facilitate the Northern Alliance’s advance towards Mazare-Sharif, which is located at the crossroads of Taliban supply lines and has an important airport that can be subsequently used by coalition forces for mounting operations in Taliban territory. Heavy and sustained aerial strikes on Kabul are also meant to pave the way for its eventual take-over.

By employing these tactics the US expects to draw the Taliban and their Arab and foreign fighters up north so that they present an attractive target for aerial bombing. To some extent, the US air strikes did succeed in hitting troops on the front line but having learnt the hard way the Taliban have moved into the Kabul city which will make the task of precision bombing more difficult for the Americans.

The bombing in the south and south-west particularly, of Kandahar and Heart, accompanied by commando operations conducted by American and British special forces is meant to maintain sustained pressure.

On its own, the Northern Alliance is no match for the Taliban who have proved to be tough and sturdy fighters. Besides, the Alliance is relatively a small militia and ever since the death of Ahmed Shah Masoud it lacks effective command and leadership. The Alliance has been placing excessive reliance on US air power for softening the Taliban’s defensive positions.

Conversely, the Americans are expecting the Northern Alliance to undertake the ground fighting and bear the major brunt of the war. Both are using each other for military expediency. Meanwhile, the Taliban are digging in, and living up to the classic Afghan reputation of showing great tenacity and resolve in resisting the Americans. Ultimately, it will be a test of wills between the two sides.

Unlike previous US military operations in Vietnam or for that matter during the Gulf War, the present campaign is very different as it depends largely on the deployment of special Forces operating mostly behind enemy lines. The US aims at wearing down the Taliban forces by launching a grinding war of attrition. The US is undertaking heliborne operations for tracking and destroying Al Qaeda cells, attacking leadership targets and eliminating pockets of Taliban resistance. The US appears to be taking many other actions to weaken and eventually remove the Taliban from power. America wants to avoid committing the mistake which the Soviets made by launching a frontal assault on Afghanistan.

Land operations by special forces in the treacherous terrain of Afghanistan are nevertheless, prone to great risks and so far the US has not achieved any substantial progress in its campaign. It is possible that the coalition forces are unable to capture either Mulla Omar or Osama bin Laden, a prospect to which even Mr. Rumsfeld has also alluded.

This may result in escalating the military effort and entangling the US in a quagmire. Americans realize that Afghanistan has been the graveyard of invading forces in the past, but if they fail to achieve their objective by the use of special forces, they may be compelled to deploy troops for land operations. At least the hard core of the Taliban remains highly ideologically motivated and does not fear death.

The relentless air strikes, no doubt, have a military value but are also reflective of the American mindset, which overvalues their own lives and undervalues those of others. Heavy bombing is not cost-free in terms of the battle for hearts and minds of the people. Overemphasis by the US on military instruments to achieve its goals and downplaying the political and other means of statecraft can be risky. The lingering body bag syndrome and also a desire to achieve quick results run counter to even America’s own long-term objective of eliminating terrorism as it ignores the larger issues at stake. Prosecuting war successfully is only one aspect. The other equally important task will be to put in place a viable government that promotes stability.

Indeed, the formation of a post-Taliban government will be the greatest challenge confronting the US. The decade of resistance against the Soviet occupation and the protracted internecine fighting have devastated the social and tribal structure of Afghanistan. The proposal to convene an “emergency Loya Jirga” with former king, Zahir Shah, as its symbolic head, has so far received lukewarm support even from the moderates, and both the Taliban and the Northern Alliance seem opposed to the idea. With the capture and execution of Abdul Haq, the initiative has received a further set-back.

Islamabad is justifiably concerned about the prospects of Kabul falling into the hands of the Northern Alliance before a UN peace plan is ready for implementation, as that would lead to carnage and bloodbath. To avoid all that Kabul should be declared a no-war zone so that a political arrangement can be worked out under the auspices of the UN. In such a dispensation all of the country’s ethnic groups should be represented, or else another bout of civil war will break out and drag the whole region into its vortex.

Undoubtedly, the heart of the Muslims the world over bleeds when innocent Afghan civilians fall victim to the US rage. Initially there was not much support for the Taliban in Pakistan except from a fringe radical minority, but with each passing day of heavy air strikes the lines of sympathy and support for the people and for the Taliban regime are becoming blurred. Thus far the military government has been able to keep the opposition from the religious parties and militant groups within manageable limits.

But if the war prolongs pressure would mount as images of casualties and the impact of heavy influx of Afghan refugees are increasingly felt, particularly in the tribal belt and in the adjoining provinces of Balochistan and the NWFP. Taking a cue from the Palestinian protests at Al Aqsa, the Pakistanis too like other Muslims are fast adopting the mosques for prayers as well as protests. Because they have so much to protest for and such few places to do so.

Democracy now takes a low priority with the US and the European Union. For them what is more important in the new context is the ability of the government to deliver on the demands of the US and General Musharraf has proved to be exceptionally good at it. But the coalition has to exercise restraint and understanding about its demands on Pakistan lest the whole exercise turns counterproductive. Islamabad too has to be mindful that for its relationship with the US to be enduring it has to acquire greater national cohesion and stability.

Ironically, democracy for the time being may have a low priority for the West, but for fighting radicalism and mobilizing public opinion it is needed more than ever. The sidelining of mainstream political parties and forces has created a gap that is being filled by radical religious parties. The politico-religious parties are exploiting this situation by presenting themselves as though they represent the voice of the people and the military regime is merely advancing the interests and agenda of the US. Whereas the reality is that the strategic dilemma that Pakistan faces today leaves it with only three difficult choices: (1) to live under the shadow of the US for sometime; 2) to accept the hegemony of the Indians; 3) to get Talibanized and become another Afghanistan.

General Musharraf has acted with great prudence by opting for the first course. But implementing this policy without mobilizing public opinion in support will be difficult. For this reason the government would be well advised to allow the resumption of political activity so that the mainstream political parties are able to voice the feelings of the silent majority and also blunt the sting of religious radicalism and militancy.

The writer a retired Lt-Gen of the Pakistan Army.

“THERE were times during the past decade,” concluded a recent editorial in The Guardian, “when the statesmanship of Yitzhak Rabin and Yasser Arafat were an inspiration to those in Belfast fumbling towards a common vision of peace and a sense of mutual trust. If Arafat and Sharon could, for a moment, break their mutual dance of hatred and look towards Belfast they might, in turn, find something to inspire hope.”

The reference was to contrasting developments in both parts of the world: whereas the Provisional Irish Republican Army’s long-awaited decision last week to begin putting its weapons “beyond use” has given powerful new momentum to the peace process in Northern Ireland, recent events in Israel and the occupied territories have once more relegated prospects of resolving the Palestinian problem.

Several years ago, a similar thought crossed one’s mind while watching Arafat among the audience that witnessed the inauguration of Nelson Mandela as the first president of a democratic South Africa. There was a time, not all that long ago, when an imprisoned Mandela was written off as a terrorist by the standard-bearers of the West.

Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan were, not surprisingly, extremely reluctant to invoke economic and military sanctions against the apartheid regime, but were eventually compelled to bow to international popular pressure.

Mrs Thatcher also tended to view Sinn Fein leader Gerry Adams with obsessive distaste and was capable of thinking only in terms of a military response to the IRA. It was under her successor, John Major, that influential sections of the British establishment found themselves able to consider the Irish question in terms that permitted a reasonable answer to emerge.

Once Britain had decided that it was not interested in clinging on at any price to its last sizable colony, it became possible to pay the necessary attention to practical alternatives and the apparent intractability of the dispute gradually began to diminish.

Although the ultimate republican aim of a united Ireland remains in the realm of wishful thinking and, as recently demonstrated by the ugly instances of Protestant violence against Catholic schoolgirls, the pall cast by decades of sectarian hatred cannot be legislated away, the IRA’s decision to disarm means a crucial psychological barrier has been crossed. For a substantial proportion of republicans, the abandonment of weaponry without a clear victory in sight is a matter of some delicacy — which explains why the process has been couched in terms such as “decommissioning” and the precise fate of the weapons remains a closely guarded secret.

Crucially, the IRA action has been verified by international monitors, and both the Blair government and the mainstream unionist leadership accept that a large arms cache has been disposed of in such a manner that its contents can never again be used. The British wisely lost no time in reciprocating by dismantling a few army posts in Ulster. This was a vital concession, given that Catholics in Northern Ireland have, with plenty of justification, tended to view the British military presence in their homeland as a provocation.

Sinn Fein and the IRA have cited the need to save the Good Friday Agreement, on which prospects for a permanent peace are predicated, as the primary reason for the decommissioning. The validity of this argument is borne out by the fact that self-rule in Northern Ireland was once more on the verge of collapse before this dramatic development. However, it is harder to accept without reservations the republican stance that the focus on weaponry is essentially a distraction, given that the issue would resolve itself under the appropriate conditions.

This is not by any means a ridiculous argument, and it is also self-evident that the IRA would not find it impossible to re-arm in the event of a sharp deterioration in circumstances. It is nonetheless also true that discarding arms as a sign of good faith is a gesture that conveys all the right signals and strengthens peacemakers on both sides of the sectarian divide. The IRA’s move has helped marginalize hardliners — those fanatically opposed to any sort of a compromise — among the republicans as well as the unionists.

As a result, prospects for a settlement are stronger than they have been at any point since London and Dublin launched a concerted effort to resolve the Irish question. It is vital to remember, however, that such progress would have proved impossible had the British authorities persisted with their shortsighted policy of demonizing Mr Adams and Martin McGuinness as terrorists and refusing to negotiate with the republicans.

It would probably do little good to apprise Ariel Sharon of the significance of the Irish lesson, given that the war criminal-turned-prime minister is impervious to reason and seems determined to damage beyond redemption chances of a solution to the conflict that has scarred his nation for so long — a task in which certain elements among the Palestinians appear equally determined to lend him a hand.

The manner in which Mr Sharon and the Vajpayee government in New Delhi sought to capitalize on the events of September 11 by positioning themselves alongside the United States as fellow victims of terrorism was a fairly remarkable exercise in opportunism. To India’s dismay, the US has, for obvious geopolitical reasons, adopted Pakistan as its chief regional ally in the unprincipled assault against Afghanistan. And to Mr Sharon’s shock, the Israeli government finds itself at the receiving end of increasing shrill American homilies about exercising restraint in view of Washington’s desire not to further alienate the Arab world.

But, galled though he may be by the Bush-Blair advocacy of a Palestinian state, Mr Sharon knows that he has powerful friends in Washington, including Dick Cheney, Donald Rumsfeld and Paul Wolfowitz, and that US rhetoric is unlikely to be supplemented by concrete measures such as economic sanctions. No matter how many Palestinians are murdered by the security forces, Israel will continue to receive $3 billion (one-third of which takes the shape of military aid) a year from the US.

Arguably the chief problem with Israel’s — as well as, for that matter, India’s — approach to terrorism is the tendency to treat it as an affliction rather than as the symptom of a profound disorder. As the US is bound to discover sooner or later, combating terror with terror only produces more of the same. What’s more, it serves the terrorists’ purpose. There should be little doubt in Mr Sharon’s mind that his rabidly right-wing tourism minister Rehavam Zeevi was targeted by the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine precisely because PFLP leader Abu Ali Mustafa had been assassinated by Israel.

The wildly disproportionate response to Zeevi’s killing will produce more violence, and it will do no good whatsoever to blame Arafat for it. Designating the Palestinian leader as “our bin Laden” suggests that Mr Sharon’s mindset has shown no improvement in the nearly 20 years since he encouraged the Sabra and Shatila massacres.

The Israeli-Palestinian conflict is an area in which concerted western pressure can do some good, but only if it arises from a heartfelt determination to right a historical wrong rather than a perceived need, every now and then, to appease Arab public opinion. The Israeli leadership needs to be convinced that a viable settlement can only take the shape of coexistence with a truly independent Palestinian state. But a successor to Mr Sharon will have to emerge before any progress can be expected.

There are vast differences as well as remarkable similarities between the Irish and the Palestinian problems. But in both cases the answer can at least be found, as the old song says, blowing in the wind. As far as Kashmir is concerned, even the right questions have thus far proved elusive.