Pakistan’s Hobson’s choice

THE September 11 terrorist attacks on the United States in which thousands of innocent lives were lost has put Pakistan in the eye of the gathering storm of American-led global war against international terrorism. Armed with solid congressional support and backed by overwhelming public desire for “revenge and justice”, American President George W. Bush has vowed to get Osama bin Laden, “the prime suspect” behind the American tragedy, “dead or alive.”

Osama bin Laden has been the “honoured guest” of the Taliban-controlled Afghanistan which has refused to hand him over to the international community for trial for want of convincing evidence against him for his alleged acts of international terrorism.

In this emerging American-led global campaign against terrorism, Pakistan’s army-led government has decided to jettison the Taliban and has chosen to side with Washington by offering the latter its “unstinted cooperation.” As a result of this decision, the fundamental assumption of Pakistan’s Afghan policy that a Taliban-controlled Afghanistan was in the vital interest of Pakistan has been discarded. This paradigm shift in Islamabad’s thinking towards the Taliban, viewing them as a strategic liability rather than an asset was clearly acknowledged by Gen Pervez Musharraf in his televized address to the nation on September 19. He said, “I have done everything for Afghanistan and Taliban when the world is against them. I have met twenty to twenty-five world leaders and talked to each of them in favour of the Taliban... I have been repeating this stance before all leaders but I am sorry to say that none of our friends accepted this.”

Referring to the “critical situation” that had arisen as a result of September 11 acts of terrorism which had raised a “wave of deep grief, anger and retaliation in the United states,” Gen Musharraf categorically stated that “at this juncture I am worried about Pakistan only” and that “I give top priority to the defence of Pakistan. Defence of any other country comes later.”

By distancing itself from the Taliban-ruled Afghanistan and also agreeing to provide help to Washington in such key areas as “intelligence and information exchange”, use of Pakistan “air space” and “logistic support” in its impending military action against Osama bin Laden and his network in the Taliban controlled Afghanistan, Musharraf government has courted significant domestic risks.

These risks relate to the survival of his regime in the face of pro-Taliban sentiments within Pakistan, deep societal split along the liberal/radical right ideological divide, and strong divisions within the Pakistan security establishment, especially along pro-American and anti-American feelings. None of these risks, however,is unmanageable for the government. Despite his being an unelected leader, Gen Musharraf is regarded by a vast majority of the people as a capable, sincere and well-meaning person.

His grip on power remains firm and because of his consultative decision-making style there is little room for anyone to harbour a grudge against him. His well-honed communication skills and his predilection for transparent and “loud thinking” even on critical issues is appreciated by his colleagues in the military. His regime’s relationship with the Pakistani media, especially the vernacular press, has been smooth and devoid of any friction or tension.

None of these positive elements, however, promise Gen Musharraf easy success if he is faced with a situation of mass agitation mounted by gun-toting mullahs willing to take on the government in the name of jihad. The likelihood of this happening is remote, if not impossible, for three reasons. First, in order for this kind of mass upsurge to happen and succeed, one needs a charismatic religious leader. Secondly, the religious right in Pakistan is badly divided along sectarian and denominational lines and pol