IF the 1973 constitution had taken its normal course under the leadership of Mr Z.A. Bhutto, Pakistan would have been declared an Islamic state in accordance with the criteria of the orthodox ulema by 1982. From this vantage point, it was only a small step for General Ziaul Haq to introduce his Islamic order based on the constitution he inherited.

In the two decades since the convention of the ulema held in 1951 (see my article Religious Orthodoxy during Ayub regime, Encounter, July 4, 2010), the religious leaders managed to get a constitutional guarantee to accomplish their goal. The convention had claimed to represent various schools of thought, albeit the main thrust of their 22-point Basic Principles of Islamic State reflected the orthodox Sunni views. Now during the constitutional debates under Mr Bhutto, even that pretence was discarded and a vocal minority among the traditionalists started to claim to represent true Islam.

It was openly stated by many ulema that different Islamic interpretations would prevent enforcement of the objective of Islamic State. Later, during the Ziaul Haq regime, the chief architect of his 'Islamisation', Tanzilur Rahman had categorically emphasised this point.

This is a historical fact which is often ignored in Pakistan that states which claim to be defenders of the faith become strictly denominational. Among Muslim countries, the states that have claimed to be officially religious have either been based on Sunni orthodoxy (e.g. Saudi Arabia) or Shia doctrine (e.g. Iran).

With reference to the well-known speech of Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the founder of Pakistan, delivered to the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan on August 11, 1947 it could be said that he wanted Pakistan to be a Muslim state with no sectarian group claiming superiority over other sects, and all citizens to have equal rights. It is worth noting that he had asked Lahore-based poet Jagan Nath Azad to write the first national anthem of Pakistan. To ascribe his carefully written August 11, 1947 speech and other actions including this decision to his 'old age and loose thinking' would be highly uncalled for, to say the least, as a writer belonging to the era of Ziaul Haq has tried to do.

Mr Bhutto was a western-educated and a westernised politician, like Mr Jinnah. The 1973 constitution, drafted under his leadership was unlike the previous two constitutions. The 1956 constitution called for further study of the demands by religious leaders, though it kept the title of Islamic Republic of Pakistan.

Ayub Khan's constitution had introduced Islamic features with a view to reconstructing religious thought in the context of modern times. The 1973 constitution, however, gave full accommodation to the ulema. It was debated in the Constituent Assembly that represented political parties based on the results of 1970 elections. Actions taken by Mr Bhutto in this regard then must necessarily be related to his style of leadership and his political goals.

Fortunately a number of studies are available that shed light on this matter, and among them I have relied mainly on the writings of Anwar Syed, Stanley Wolpert, Lawrence Ziring, and Tariq Ali. But first the Islamic provisions in outline, as follows.

The constitution includes Objectives Resolution in its preamble, and also confirms the title of Islamic Republic of Pakistan in Article 1. In Article 2, however, it further adds that 'Islam shall be the State religion of Pakistan'. This does arouse some curiosity about the need for inserting this clause.

The only viable explanation seems to be that the body politic, the collectivity constituting the government of the people in the territory called Pakistan is not neutral about the role of religion but is committed to one religion, Islam. One gets a sharper focus on this point when one compares it with Jinnah's speech of August 11, 1947 in which he declared that the state had nothing to do with religion and that it was a personal matter.

Concerning the main section on Islamic provisions, The Advisory Council of Islamic Ideology (ACII) of Ayub Khan constitution was now no longer advisory in its title, It became Council of Islamic Ideology (CII) with the stipulation that its members would be appointed from among those with knowledge of economic, legal or other disciplines (substituting 'and' of Ayub Council).

Also in a separate sub-section, it was proposed that 'so far as practicable various schools of thought ...' would be represented on the Council — Article 228 (2) and (3-a). The diversity provided in 1962 constitution disappeared with 'so far as possible', as it soon became apparent that members from minority views had started to withdraw from the council, making it more homogeneous in its composition. As mentioned above, this has been the objective of the orthodox Sunni ulema, in any case.

The main function of the CII remained to be advisory but to strengthen the importance of its recommendations, Article 230(2) reiterated a section of the Objectives Resolution, and by requiring the Council to suggest 'ways and means of enabling and encouraging the Muslims of Pakistan to order their lives individually and collectively in all respects in accordance with the principles and concepts of Islam as enunciated in the Holy Quran and Sunnah.' There are loud echoes of promoting Virtue (Ma'aruf) and preventing Vice (Munkar) in this section.

This brings me to the point I made at the beginning. 1973 constitution, Article 230 (4) required the CII to 'submit its final report within seven years of its appointment....Parliament and the Assembly, after considering the report shall enact laws in respect thereof within a period of two years of the final report.' In simple arithmetic the deadline for the enforcement of Article 230 (4) would have been 1982, as mentioned above.

We need to underline the fact that from 1971 to 1973 it was a turbulent period in the political history of Pakistan. According to 1970 general elections, Shaikh Mujibur Rahman had the right to form the government at the centre. This was the advice Mr Bhutto received from his senior PPP colleagues.

But wedded to the military strategy about East Pakistan, he chose the course of action in which he would be the main beneficiary. With departure of Yahya Khan, he became the Chief Martial Law Administrator, and started to show signs of being imperious and arrogant. Political violence, often with official blessings to his newly formed Federal Security Force became routine. Dissent was not tolerated and those who spoke were punished.

Using full forces of the government resources at his disposal, the main objective of Mr Bhutto was to construct a permanent majority that would ensure the longevity of his administration.

He wanted to be the president of Pakistan but was persuaded that the parliamentary system would be preferable with extraordinary powers for the prime minister in order to establish stability in the country.

In the negotiations he focused mainly on this aspect of the constitution, leaving other matters including Islamic provisions for other members of the Constituent Assembly. It was a trade-off, between his preferred Articles and Clauses and emphasis of the conservative and traditionalist members on Islamic order. Article 230 (4) became the basis on which the 1973 constitution was approved by consensus.

In my view this arrangement put Bhutto in a bind that came to haunt him in 1977 general elections, when the orthodox ulema from the United Democratic Front and now an important part of Pakistan National Alliance (PNA) had campaigned to deny him an absolute majority in the elections.

And with the announcement of the results, it became obvious to all sides that rigging had been done on an extensive scale. In fact Bhutto had sensed the power of this movement, but decided to ignore it. As the political analysts point out, history was against him. There had started a new surge as part of the soul-searching following the loss of East Pakistan a refuge in puritanical Islam, as mentioned above, preached by a vocal minority. The slogan of Islamic bomb and the 1974 Islamic Summit had further fanned the sentiments. The strength of the religious groups in the PNA should have come as no surprise to him.

In the end he became the victim of the new-born Salafis. But more on this at a later date.

The writer is a retired professor of economics; his areas of special interest include a critical study of Islamic economic system.

izzud-din.pal@videotron.ca