THE conflict in Swat and militancy in other places saw the increasing use of suicide attacks by terrorists. Such attacks are 'cost-effective' and inflict maximum damage as compared to conventional warfare. Out of at least 90 major terrorist incidents in 2009, 62 were suicide bombings in which more than 1,400 people lost their lives. The attacks underscore the failure of counter-terrorism intelligence. Terrorists are an invisible enemy. To destroy their three basic components — fighting force, facilities and finance — importance must be accorded to the use of intelligence along with the application of force.
The government has engaged the army in destroying the safe havens of militancy in Swat, Waziristan and other troubled areas. But the militants have their tentacles firmly planted in metropolitan areas as well. Here they have men and material to plan and carry out their sinister designs so successfully that law-enforcement agencies are often totally clueless about their activities. The investigation of major terrorist incidents — the attacks on GHQ, the Sri Lankan cricketers and the recent explosion in a house in Karachi's Baldia Town — reveal that the perpetrators had planning and execution facilities in the vicinity of their target areas. Therefore, nabbing the terrorist elements from urban centres, where military operations may not be an option, should be done through the intelligence-based use of force.
The existing organisational structure, infrastructure and operational methodology of intelligence agencies in Pakistan is of a period prior to the rise in incidents of terrorism. When it comes to basic sources of intelligence, i.e. human intelligence, signal intelligence, electronic intelligence, communication intelligence, imaginary intelligence and sophisticated equipment and training, our agencies are found to be lacking. There is a dire need of reforms backed by legislation.
Terrorism is a global issue. Many affected states have brought about major reforms in intelligence and have not witnessed any further major terrorist attacks. Following the Sept 11 attacks, the United States created the Office of Homeland Security, which was upgraded in Nov 2002 to the Department of Homeland Security merging 22 separate agencies into a single integrated department tasked to protect US soil from terrorism.
The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, known as the 9/11 Commission, singled out intelligence agencies that had flaws in their counter-terrorism methods.
In compliance with recommendations of the commission, the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act 2004 was introduced to substantially address the deficiencies and loopholes in the intelligence community. The reforms subsequently resulted in a discernible reduction in attack threats and helped the FBI foil several terrorist plots, such as the Miami-based plan to target federal buildings and the Sears (now Willis) Tower in Chicago, the New York City subway and the transit tunnel under the Hudson river.
Cognisant of deteriorating global security in the backdrop of the 9/11 and 7/7 attacks, the UK took significant steps to restructure the intelligence agencies to enhance their counter-terrorism effectiveness in pre-emption and disruption of terrorist activities. Its premier domestic security service, commonly known as MI5, dealing with counter-espionage, is assisted by special branches of the London Metropolitan Police.
These special branches were provided new guidelines that made counter-terrorism through intelligence a top priority. In 2003, UK authorities established the Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre, reporting to the director-general of the MI5, to remove the institutional obstacles between the intelligence agencies through co-locating analysts from all other intelligence agencies. The result of these reforms was the thwarting of a terrorist plan to detonate explosive devices smuggled in hand luggage on as many as 10 aircraft at Heathrow Airport.
Learning lessons from the 26/11 Mumbai attacks, when the attackers presumably reached Mumbai via the ocean, India merged the operations rooms of the navy and coast guards to be able to monitor and conduct surveillance of coastlines from a central location.
Political stability and strong democratic institutions distinguish these states from Pakistan. Weak political institutions, a military-controlled democracy, a fragile economy and lack of corresponding infrastructure have so far precluded the introduction of intelligence reforms in Pakistan.
Unfortunately, both dictators and interest-oriented politicians have tried to use the intelligence agencies to promote their own agenda, thus causing the agencies to stray from their actual profession. To strengthen his position, Gen Pervez Musharraf exploited the ISI to create turncoats and cobble them into a political party in 2002 instead of focusing on intelligence reforms to defeat terrorism. The present government made a decision to place both the ISI and IB under the interior division's control in July 2008. The decision was revoked the very next day reflecting on the weakness of political institutions.
Intelligence reforms to make the agencies effective in counter-terrorism require major finances as they lead to recruitment of more personnel, establishment of offices and provision of infrastructure in a bid to expand the intelligence network throughout the country. This may be another factor behind the establishment's apathy towards modifying the intelligence set-up.
While the Intelligence Bureau reports to the interior ministry, Pakistan's main counter-espionage agencies are controlled by the army. The crime investigation department works under the police and the Federal Investigation Agency reports to its own headquarters. The operations rooms of these agencies should at least be merged to ensure coordination and intelligence-sharing.
Let us understand that just as bacteria can be seen through a microscope, the intelligence agencies can detect the covert networks of terrorists and destroy them through the law-enforcement agencies.
The need of the hour is to introduce intelligence reforms through legislation with emphasis on accountability to curtail the likelihood of abuse of power. This is necessary to make the intelligence agencies strong and effective to carry out counter-terrorism activities. Launching operations may kill terrorists, but their complete elimination with the effective disruption of their facilities and suppression of their ideology can only be achieved through efficient intelligence.
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