World Bank for democracy-driven reforms

Published December 21, 2002

KARACHI, Dec 20: The World Bank has come out with a new vision of a democracy-driven reforms for Pakistan. The WB visualizes the success of future reforms that is linked to “the increased democratization, decentralization and transparency.”

Dwelling upon “substantial political restructuring including devolution” by Pakistan, World Bank officials reckon the “future reforms will succeed to the extent that they correct the problems in the political economy that have undermined past policies.”

In a new hypothesis on political economy and social spending, the World Bank goes “beyond the framework of landlord domination of political process” to “distortions in the competition for the votes of the poor”.

Comparing poor performance in public expenditures stretching over the 1980s, with a non-elected government and the 1990s, with elected governments, World Bank officials observe: “The key distinguishing feature of non-elected governments is the inability of citizens to hold them accountable on a regular basis. This leaves such governments freer to pursue policies that are at odds with citizen interests.”

In case of Pakistan, World Bank officials assert that simultaneous improvement of the investment climate and the prospects of poverty reduction will emerge when narrow groups that have been able to target their and their own constituents’ interests are forced to take into account broad needs, including the needs of women and other disadvantaged groups and classes. They sum up: This is the demand of growth, development and poverty alleviation.

The World Bank recommends that the elected governments should be accountable to the voters. Another characteristic of electoral politics in Pakistan that undermines the provision of public services to the poor, say World Bank analysts, is “the impermanence of elected governments.” Without mentioning it, the World Bank report was referring to the dismissal of elected governments by the military generals.

The instability of elected governments “shortens the political horizons of decision-makers and reduces the penalty to them of reneging on any electoral promises that they do make.”

In other countries where political parties are well developed and constitutional government has been observed over several electoral generations, the cost to political parties of not carrying out their promises are much higher.

Hence, World Bank experts point out that policy promises of parties are much more important electorally, than they are in Pakistan and the role of individual relationships in politics is much less.

Stating that the lack of accountability can be improved by increased democratization, decentralization and transparency, they, however, point out that “these labels hide a wide array of potential reforms.”

In so far as local elites are the only interlocutors with the government that the rural poor have at their disposal, World Bank analysts assert that their potential marginalization under non-elected governments may not benefit the poor. The poor have no other way of exerting leverage on national policy level makers and officials, whether elected or military.

Poor governance in Pakistan is attributed to a number of factors which are responsible for snags in implementation of reforms and slow economic growth. These are also related to the problems afflicting the political economy.

Traditionally, the political decision-makers are seen to have focused on “elite capture of the state and the fractionalization of the society.” The elected legislators have concentrated on goods and services that could be targeted as patronage to supporters, such as infrastructure — rather than true public goods like universal access to public education or the rule of law and bureaucratic quality.

A recent World Bank report has also pointed out to an over-staffed and under-skilled civilian bureaucracy; an over-centralization organisational structure and inappropriate skill mix; seriously eroded internal accountability and lack of accountability to the public.

Rural elites have always had exceptional influence, whether by marriage or other family ties in either military or civilian governments, or because of constitutionally mandated over-representation in the elected legislature. They successfully block federal taxation of their incomes and do not represent the interest of the poor.

The World Bank report concludes that “it is abundantly clear that the rich have opted out of the public system, as in many other countries, and have not used their considerable political power to improve public policies that benefit the poor.”