IT would be wildly optimistic to describe the trilateral meeting in Tokyo between the Pakistani, American and Afghan foreign ministers on Sunday as a new beginning, the three countries having deep and unresolved differences on how to salvage a relatively stable and peaceful Afghanistan after the latest decade of war. However, on the Pakistani side, what has become clearer since November is that while the army still has deep influence over this country’s Afghan policy and continues to be the most influential player behind the scenes on how Pakistan approaches the US, there is space opening up for other institutions to influence policy. In particular, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs led by the young and relatively inexperienced Hina Khar has been more assertive, though the jury is still out on whether the foreign ministry’s interventions have on balance been beneficial or detrimental. Now, then, is the time for other centres of power to try and articulate a more rational, beneficial and transparent policy on Afghanistan — the kind of policy that the ISI-GHQ combine has failed miserably in crafting over the years. Unhappily, the other logical centres of power, the Prime Minister House and parliament, are still virtually toothless, leaving the Foreign Office as a potential key player in tandem with the presidency for wresting away some space from the army.

But what would a new vision of Pakistan foreign policy look like? Foreign Minister Khar has spoken of some elements of this during her tenure: rejecting the notion of strategic depth in Afghanistan; working to stabilise ties with the US on a reciprocal basis; the US needing to accept that many of Pakistan’s grievances and concerns are legitimate; and of progress with India that benefits both countries and resolves issues of fundamental importance to both sides. At its core, though, perhaps what the world seeks of Pakistan, and what Pakistan needs to deliver on for its own sake, is to impose the state’s authority inside the country more effectively and take out of the equation the extremist jihadi groups who have proliferated across the country. Do that and Pakistan’s relationship with the outside world will dramatically increase while internally the state will be able to shift its focus and resources to the social and economic needs of a rapidly growing and very young population.

But that will not happen until all institutions of the state, particularly the army, are more forthright about what it is that threatens Pakistan and why this country needs to fight violent religious extremism. If Pakistan continues to debate much longer whether this is ‘our war’, there may not be much left to save down the road.