HAD Rory Stewart been born a hundred years ago, he would no doubt have been drawn to the British Colonial Service, and sought adventure in distant lands. In 2002, he walked across Afghanistan, learning about the land and its diverse people. He served as a district administrator in Iraq during the occupation, and has been an army officer and a diplomat. He is now an MP with the Conservative Party.
Despite all his achievements, he is only 39. For years, he has been expressing his dissenting views about the West’s invasion and occupation of Iraq and Afghanistan. So when the BBC announced he was featuring in a two-part documentary he had written, I settled back to watch and learn.
The first part focussed on Britain’s disastrous attempts to control the turbulent country in the 19th century. The shattering defeat in 1841 showed just how tenacious and ruthless a foe the Afghan tribesman was. But fears of a Russian invasion kept the Brits in the Great Game.
The second part examined the futile Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, and its impact on both states. In the latter, apart from the massive loss of life, the destruction of entire villages and much of the infrastructure, society was thrown into turmoil due to the attempt to modernise ancient customs overnight by force. Stewart travelled to Russia to talk to veterans of the Soviet invasion, and most of them expressed their disillusionment over a brutal war that resulted in 25,000 Red Army soldiers killed. When he asked a retired general what advice he had for the Western forces now serving in Afghanistan, the reply was: “Tell them to take the quickest route home.”
I was hoping that a segment of the programme would be devoted to the ongoing occupation of our neighbour by Nato forces. Sadly, it ended with the retreat of a defeated Red Army. However, Stewart does ruminate over what caused both empires to invest so much blood and treasure in a hopeless cause, and offers insights into the behaviour of great powers. An important conclusion he draws is that once they have taken the decision to invade, it is hard for them to extricate themselves without admitting weakness.
In these circumstances, generals plead to their political masters for more time and greater resources. Thus the American surge sanctioned by Obama as a last throw of the dice. Stewart sees similarities in Washington’s policies in Vietnam where American involvement ended after some 58,000 US soldiers had been killed.
As an Afghan explains to Stewart: “Afghanistan is an easy country to enter, but a hard one to leave.” Now that Western powers have entered the endgame, all they are looking for is a face-saving exit. Long gone is the lofty talk of rebuilding the country and instituting social and political reforms. The poppy fields are flourishing, as is traditional forms of corruption.
Once Nato troops withdraw in 2014, there are plans to leave around 20,000 US Special Forces soldiers behind, together with aircraft to prevent a Taliban takeover. But if 130,000 troops cannot force a victory, it is doubtful that a sixth of this number will be sufficient. Also, it is questionable that after fourteen years of futile fighting and dying in a remote corner of the world, the American public will support a continuing military presence. As it is, Nato countries are committed to provide Kabul with $4 billion a year to pay for Afghan forces. Again, it might be difficult to meet this pledge in an era of recession and budget cuts.
Once the pullout begins, there will be a tendency to rush for the exits. Any move to stay to help Karzai will be politically unpopular. In this scenario, the momentum will be with the Taliban. The signal such a victory will send to jihadis everywhere should make us all pause and reflect. Clearly, our military will feel vindicated in the double game it has played all along, and consider it has done well in backing the winner, albeit covertly. But an outright Taliban victory will cause a backlash in Western capitals where politicians, eager to find a scapegoat, will blame Pakistan. We have yet to consider the economic and political fallout of our military’s policy of running with the hare and hunting with the hounds.
Closer to home, a resurgent Taliban leadership will probably seek to help their Pakistani partners seize power. They will certainly not feel indebted to their supporters and handlers in the Pakistani establishment. Proud and prickly, they have resented ISI attempts to dictate, but have put up with it as they had little choice. But if and when they are back in power in Kabul, it is extremely doubtful that they will accept orders from Islamabad, any more than they did when they ruled Afghanistan before 9/11.
During the Soviet war, an Afghan warlord was asked by a journalist about the help the resistance was getting from Pakistan in terms of training and actual fighting. He replied haughtily: “Why should we, a nation that has never lost a war, ask for help from a nation that has never won a single one?” Although the story might well be apocryphal, it does convey Afghan self-confidence.
One reason the Americans joined in the anti-Soviet campaign in Afghanistan so enthusiastically was their desire to avenge themselves against the Soviets. They saw this as an opportunity to pay back their Cold War foe for the crucial help the Kremlin had provided the Vietcong in their valiant fight against the US army. When they leave Afghanistan, it will be after a military stalemate against a primitive and vastly outgunned enemy. In effect, this will be a defeat, no matter how it is dressed up. The mood in the Pentagon will be sullen and vengeful, especially if Pakistan has still not reopened its roads to Nato trucks. This would make a pullout more difficult and expensive, and will not win us any friends.
In the tricky period that lies ahead, our leaders need to make difficult choices. Let us hope they make the right ones, even though they have not shown a lot of wisdom thus far.