I HAVE to admit, I never got this ‘strategic depth’ thing. In my experience, strategic depth denotes an arena to which you can retreat, trading space for time as your adversary advances.

From my reading of history, Russia could choose a scorched-earth policy against the German invasion in 1941 — Moscow and the economic centres are situated well inside the Russian hinterland. It let the Germans stretch their supply lines which the partisans subsequently attacked till the Russian winter bogged down the German army. In our case where the population and economic assets are situated in a narrow corridor bound by the Indus River on one side and the Indian boundary on the other, how would this retreat work? I’m afraid, when meticulously interrogated, I have found ‘strategic depth’ to be an imposter.Below this inelegant construct in fact lies our insecurity surrounding the Durand Line. Afghanistan was the only country in the UN system to not recognise Pakistan. Successive Afghan governments refused to recognise the Durand Line. Then, in 1994 came our opportunity to even up. Mullah Omar, leading an obscure force calling itself the Taliban, punished an Afghan warlord by hanging for the rape of two minor girls. The body was left for two days, strung up from the gun of a tank. Mullah Omar became an instant hero and Pakistan dumped Gulbuddin Hekmatyar.

It wasn’t long before ISI’s operatives penetrated Mullah Omar’s force. Based on a quick-gap analysis this ragtag force was reinforced with madressah-trained cadres from Pakistan. Next the Taliban were trained in mobile guerilla warfare and equipped with 4 by 4 pickups with mounted missile launchers. Within two years, Afghanistan was overrun.

Now came the time for the Pakistanis to cash the investment. True to Afghan style, Mullah Omar refused to accept the Durand Line. Neither could Pakistani trucks roll across to Central Asia nor indeed could the gas pipeline from Turkmenistan be stretched across. It was clear that Pakistan’s investment had gone sour. Then came Bamiyan. Pakistan pleaded on behalf of the civilised world to spare Afghanistan’s pre-Islamic heritage. As this world heritage site was defaced with explosives, it became apparent that Pakistan had no leverage with the Taliban.

So much for strategic depth.

After being expelled from Sudan, it was Al Qaeda that instead found strategic space in Taliban-controlled Afghanistan. It was from here that the organisation orchestrated the bombings of the US embassies in East Africa in 1998. Once again Pakistan was caught completely clueless when Centcom chief Gen Anthony Zinni informed the Pakistan army chief that US Tomahawk missiles were over-flighting Pakistan on their way to targets in Jalalabad.

At the end of the day, strategy only has one purpose: to open up strategic space. On the other hand, our parochial and single-track approach appears to have delivered the exact opposite: closed options for us and created space for others. Then came 9/11.

As Kabul fell to the Northern Alliance and Pakistan made the U-turn its options further diminished. So today with all options closed what are we left with? Pushed into the corner, our poor excuse of a ‘strategy’ today is this: preserve the Haqqani network and other renegade ‘assets’ to unleash them on Kabul once the Isaf forces leave.

Let’s try to approach strategic depth from the economic prism. Military force is at best one ingredient of a strategy. At the present time and with the tools available, where would one start building a new strategy road map?

Bringing the Gwadar port into operation perhaps represents the best starting point. The economic utility of this port multiplies if a railway is put up to Kandahar and Afghan trade is allowed to flourish. A flourishing trade route creates economic opportunities; it will provide a stake in peace and stability to the Baloch youth that is today agitating for want of opportunity.

When coupled with our own Reko Dik copper deposit and Afghanistan’s anticipated $700bn iron ore and copper deposits located inside a $12bn economy, the whole endeavour is a strategist’s dream to create an electric effect.

Let’s also modify the jargon — strategic depth with strategic access. To reinforce this strategic access, the Pakistani NGO sector could have been encouraged to develop farm-to-market access for agriculture products, extend microfinance and technical skills and integrate these to markets and trade activities in Pakistan.

In the 1990s western businessmen who wanted to do business with China would find a conduit through Hong Kong. At a more modest level, conduits for international mining, construction, agriculture and energy interests into Afghanistan could have been provided from Peshawar and Quetta. This would have opened up space for a flourishing subcontracting sector in addition to transportation, hotels, restaurants, investment advisory firms, advertising agencies, representative offices, translators etc in our border cities.

All that may still be on the table but needs to be preceded by a top to bottom rethink of our objectives. What will it take to get us there? In one word: goodwill. It will mean that we should be able to do business with whatever government is in power in Afghanistan.

You do not build goodwill by unleashing brigands or by taking sides in other people’s internal conflicts. You build it by bringing them good things, widening their choices, by solving their problems and improving their lives. Trucks to Central Asia and pipelines from Turkmenistan will naturally follow, not precede, this outcome. But above all the new strategy objective must be to restore regional peace and help create a shared prosperity in which all sides are given a stake.

The writer is an international business strategist and entrepreneur.

https://moazzamhusain.wordpress.com/