BACK in 2000, when the then government embarked upon its province-to-district decentralisation plan, a wide range of enabling factors were readily available.
Several diagnostic studies exploring the possibilities of service delivery and efficiency dividends from empowered local governments had already been conducted by leading research outfits.
Many international development agencies were more than willing to own and champion the idea of decentralised local governance in which districts were expected to achieve administrative and financial autonomy.
A mammoth institutional framework in the shape of the National Reconstruction Bureau was also put in place at the federal level to convince, coerce or co-opt all stakeholders into furthering the cause of devolution. This organisation enjoyed political clout or decision-making hegemony apart from taking on a role as a reform focal point and powerhouse.
In terms of providing technical support for the devolution plan, the NRB was able to muster the services of a vast pool of professionals and consultants for devising the nitty-gritty of the proposed reform framework. Nearly all international development agencies were also prompt in designing and putting into operation comprehensive devolution support initiatives through technical assistance amounting to hundreds of millions of dollars.
Viewed in terms of the level of ownership by the then federal government and the robust resource mobilisation by most donor agencies, one would have expected the 2000 devolution plan to become a lasting success. But the fact that only 10 years down the road the Local Government Ordinance, 2001 has all but evaporated into thin air (for political reasons most recently seen in the case of Sindh that has gone back to the 1979 local government system) necessitates some deep and deliberate introspection for those who have stakes in the success of post-18th Amendment devolution efforts in Pakistan.
Listing enabling or positive factors supporting the 18th Amendment’s devolution from federation to provinces is rather simple. Unlike the lopsided 2000 devolution plan, which virtually thwarted provincial voices, the present devolution from federation to provinces is enriched and fully sanctified by constitutional legitimacy. Similarly, expected service delivery improvements at the provincial level in devolved subjects can massively reinvent and nurture the trust of common citizens in the whole edifice of the federation.
But it will be unfair to the spirit of provincial empowerment if the likely challenges for the ongoing devolution effort are not fully assessed along with requisite remedial strategies.
Although the thrust of the earlier devolution was from the provincial to the district level, administrative and fiscal dependence of districts on provinces continued unabated. In other words, the residual province-district relationship was strong enough to respond to eventualities that could potentially disrupt the reform processes within the districts.
But in the present case, only a vague functional relationship exists between federal government divisions and provincial government departments that could be relied on for addressing teething problems. There is legitimate apprehension that any federal government division on its way to being abolished may not be willing to provide the kind of technical support required by a provincial government entity in undertaking devolved activities in hitherto unknown sectors. This could have repercussions for the smooth transfer to provincial governments of material resources and the requisite technical capacities.
However, a more serious issue could be the whole gamut of restructuring and relocation costs. In all likelihood, provinces will be required to foot the bill of additional responsibilities or mandates from their own pockets, which might further exacerbate their resource limitations. What may come as a surprise to many is the fact that fiscal support for devolution has not been as forthcoming from international donor agencies as it was a decade ago.
What provinces need to design on an urgent basis is a clearly spelt-out action plan covering the areas of policy and legislative changes, operational processes, and resource mobilisation. Human resource requirements for devolved functions might be satisfied in the short run through federal government functionaries placed at the disposal of provinces. In the long term, provinces would need to address the challenge of quality service delivery by developing in-house human resource capabilities.
Based on the experience of the 2001 LGO, one of the most likely challenges for provinces could be devolved responsibilities in the areas of regulation and enforcement. While service delivery challenges could be addressed by prioritised investments in selected sectors, any disruptions in regulatory functions can typically lead to serious setbacks. The adverse effects of enforcement lapses in the municipal governance regime after the introduction of the LGO, 2001 can still be felt as lasting distortions.
As already mentioned, the challenges awaiting provincial governments in handling devolved portfolios could be more complex than those faced by nascent local governments during 2001. While areas of direct service delivery might be easy to handle, policy formulation entailing international partners or regulatory responsibilities could be far more difficult.
The urgency of successful transition becomes paramount with the realisation that for many ordinary citizens, the federal organisations being devolved also symbolised vague notions of federal government. Any haste or failure in successful implementation of these reforms has the potential to shake the very structure of the federation in Pakistan. It is therefore vital that a wholehearted and meticulous strategy for handling post-18th Amendment devolution is put in place as the best way to strengthen the cause of the federation in Pakistan.
The writer is a civil servant who has worked as a consultant on governance reform at the Asian Development Bank.