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CableText:
SECRET
SIPDISTELEGRAM July 28, 2004
To: No Action Addressee
Action: Unknown
From: AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI (ABU DHABI 2508 - UNKNOWN)
TAGS: PREL, PTER
Captions: None
Subject: CENTCOM COMMANDER DISCUSSES IRAQ, AFGHANISTAN, REGIONALTHREATS WITH SHAYKH MOHAMMED BIN ZAYED
Ref: None_________________________________________________________________S E C R E T ABU DHABI 02508
SIPDISCXABU:ACTION: POLINFO: RSO DCM P/M ECON DAO USLO AMB
DISSEMINATION: POLCHARGE: PROG
APPROVED: CDA:RALBRIGHTDRAFTED: POL:SRADDANTCLEARED: USLO:RSIMM
VZCZCADI844OO RUEHC RUCAACC RHEFDIA RUEKJCS RUEASRT RHMFISSRHRMDAB RUEADWD RUEAHQA RHEFDIA RUEHC RUENAAA RUCAACC RUCAACCRUEKJCS RUEAHQA RULSSAK RUEADWD RUCNRAQ RHEHNSC RUEAIIA RUEHBULRUEHDEDE RUEHAD #2508/01 2100903ZNY SSSSS ZZHO 280903Z JUL 04FM AMEMBASSY ABU DHABITO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5271RUCAACC/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FLINFO RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC IMMEDIATERUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC//USDP/ISA/NESA//RUEASRT/COMUSARCENT FT MCPHERSON GARHMFISS/COMUSCENTAF SHAW AFB SCRHRMDAB/COMUSNAVCENTRUEADWD/DA WASHINGTON DCRUEAHQA/HQ USAF WASHINGTON DCRHEFDIA/DIA WASHDCRUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 5272RUENAAA/CNO WASHDCRUCAACC/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL//CCJ1/CCJ2//RUCAACC/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL//CCJ3/CCJ4/CCJ5//RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC//J-5//RUEAHQA/OSAF WASHDC//IA//RULSSAK/NAVY IPO WASHINGTON DCRUEADWD/HQDA WASHINGTON DC//DALO-SA//RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVERHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DCRUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DCRUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL 0174RUEHDE/AMCONSUL DUBAI 4197" "S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 05 ABU DHABI 002508
SIPDIS
NOFORN
STATE FOR NEA/FO, NEA/ARP, AND NEA/NGA
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/25/2014TAGS: PREL, PTER, AF, SY, IZ, PK, TCSUBJECT: CENTCOM COMMANDER DISCUSSES IRAQ, AFGHANISTAN, REGIONAL THREATS WITH SHAYKH MOHAMMED BIN ZAYED
Classified by Charge d'Affaires Richard A. Albright,reasons 1.5 (b) and (d).
1. (S) Summary: CENTCOM Commander General JohnAbizaid on July 24 discussed regional security issueswith Abu Dhabi Deputy Crown Prince and UAE ArmedForces Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Shaykh Mohammed binZayed Al Nahyan (MbZ) in Abu Dhabi. Abizaid thankedMbZ for the UAE's strong support for coalitionoperations in Afghanistan. They discussed politicaldevelopments and military operations in Iraq andcounter terrorism efforts in Saudi Arabia, Syria andUAE/Oman. MbZ apologized for canceling the Seeker IIdeployment to Afghanistan on short notice, andreiterated his requirement for an armed Predator UAV,saying that he must make a decision on acquiring aforeign UAV system by February 2005 if the U.S. couldnot release an armed Predator to the UAE. Abizaid andMbZ shared security and public opinion viewpoints,including potential problems following the release ofGuantanamo detainees. End Summary.
2. (U) MbZ was accompanied by his half brother, Maj.Gen. Shaykh Saif bin Zayed Al Nahyan, Director Generalof Abu Dhabi Police and U/S of the Ministry ofInterior, and by UAE Armed Forces Deputy Chief ofStaff Maj. Gen. Hamad Thani Al Rumaithy, and AdvisorYousuf Al Otaiba. Charge, RADM Robb (J5), Brig. Gen.Custer (J2), Executive Officer Col. Reynes, USLO, andPoloff (notetaker) joined General Abizaid.
-----------AFGHANISTAN-----------
3. (S) Abizaid thanked MbZ for the UAE's strongsupport for coalition operations in Afghanistan,singling out the UAE special operations deployment forspecial praise. Both agreed that the drug trade,corruption, and warlords posed greater threats toAfghanistan's stability over the coming year than AlQaeda and Taliban remnants. Good cooperation withPakistan and Uzbekistan is putting the Al Qaeda threatto rest in Afghanistan, according to Abizaid, andseveral extremist leaders have faded from the picturedue to the pressure. Abizaid was encouraged by thepositive turnout of Afghan citizens registering tovote. Almost eight million Afghans have alreadyregistered, well exceeding the prediction of sixmillion voters or less. Abizaid said that theremarkable success in registering voters indicated astrong desire among Afghans for a normal state. Astrong turn-out at the polls would convey legitimacyto the Afghan government. MbZ asked if coalitionforces were finding Arabs in Afghanistan. Abizaidsaid no. MbZ responded that this was both good andbad - good because Arab extremists shouldn't be there,bad because we don't know where they are going andwhat they are doing instead. MbZ expressed his viewthat the Pakistanis were starting to do a better jobin controlling extremists.
4. (S) MbZ apologized for canceling the Seeker IIdeployment to Afghanistan on short notice, statingthat border security requirements mandated deployingthe Seekers at home. (NOTE: The commander of the UAESpecial Operations Command briefed USLO Chief July 17on the cancellation of plans to deploy its squadron ofSeeker II UAVs to Bagram, scheduled for late summer.In a very cordial meeting, Brig. Gen. Juma Ahmed AlBawardi expressed regret at the cancellation and alsocited ""operational requirements"" for border securityas the reason for the change. On July 19, thecommander of UAE Land Forces - Artillery told USLOofficers that the Seeker II was now being deployed inpatrols along UAE'S western border with Saudi Arabia.END NOTE.)
----IRAQ----
5. (C) Abizaid and MbZ discussed political changes inIraq since their March 2004 meeting. They agreed thatwhile the security situation remains extremelydangerous, Iraq's security forces have improved, sincethey are more motivated to fight for an Iraqi-ledgovernment than for the coalition. Abizaid expressedcautious optimism about the immediate future of theregion's security, emphasizing that the key tostabilizing the region was to ensure that the upcomingnational elections in Afghanistan and Iraq occurred asplanned. Abizaid thanked MbZ for the UAEG's effectivesupport, in particular for funding the transfer ofJordanian APCs to Iraq, in cooperation with KingAbdullah of Jordan.
-----SYRIA-----
6. (C) Asked by MbZ which Arab country was causing thegreatest problems for Iraq, Abizaid replied Syria.Abizaid told MbZ that Syrian President Bashar hadpromised Iraqi Prime Minister Allawi to increaseborder control efforts. But terrorists, includingsuicide bombers, are still regularly getting through.Abizaid said that he believes Syria is aware of theproblem but is not doing all it can to stop theincursions. Abizaid also told MbZ that Damascusappears to be home to a number of former regimeelements who may be supporting the insurgency and thatthe Syrian government is aware of these activities.
------------SAUDI ARABIA------------
7. (C) MbZ informed Abizaid that the UAE is watchingits border with Saudi Arabia very carefully. Hecredited Saudi efforts to arrest terrorists, butexpressed concern that the more effectively the Saudisclamp down, the greater the potential for theextremists to collect in neighboring countries. MbZcited Qatar, Kuwait and Bahrain as likelydestinations. Abizaid recalled MbZ's characterizationof this in an earlier conversation when MbZ comparedthe Saudi's moves to ""squeezing water"" - extremistsfind cracks and collect elsewhere.
8. (S) Abizaid contrasted his latest trip to SaudiArabia with a visit several months ago. In July,Saudi officials appeared much more confident abouttheir ability to combat terrorism. The amnesty wasproving effective, and raids have unraveled severalcells.
----------------OMAN/UAE ARRESTS----------------
9. (S) MbZ briefed Abizaid on the recent jointUAE/Oman operation, based on U.S. information, thatresulted in the arrest of 13 members of an Omaniterrorist cell. Those arrested included severalAfghans and one Emirati woman. MbZ claimed that thecell was planning an ""event,"" and expressed hissatisfaction at the cooperation between the Omani andUAE services.
-----------------SECURITY CONCERNS-----------------
10. (S) Abizaid told MbZ that he sees intelligencepatterns emerging that indicate one of three veryserious incidents potentially occurring before theNovember U.S. elections:
--A strike against one or more European allies toforce their retreat from Iraq, similar to the pulloutsof Spain and the Philippines. Abizaid listed Italy,Japan, Bulgaria and the U.K. as potential targets.
--Another major strike on U.S. soil, as damaging as9/11 or more so. However, rather than retreating,Abizaid predicted that this would cause an ""extreme""U.S. retaliatory reaction.
--A major hit against the oil manufacturinginfrastructure in one or more moderate countries inthe region. The economic impact could be global, and,like any of the above incidents, the effects could beintended to influence U.S. elections.
11. (C) MbZ agreed with Abizaid's concerns,particularly related to the oil industry. MbZ sharplycriticized the decision by the Philippines to withdrawits contingent in Iraq to gain the release of akidnapped citizen. This would embolden the terroriststo kidnap others. He said that the UAE had receivedchatter about potential terrorist activity, notingthat much of it originates in the U.S. He shared theconcern about the potential for an al Qaeda attack onregional oil infrastructure, noting that it would berelatively easy to destroy a refinery.
------------------------MEDIA AND PUBLIC OPINION------------------------
12. (C) On several occasions, Abizaid statedfrustration that the U.S. is losing the ""perceptionwar"" in Iraq and Afghanistan, due in large part to badmedia coverage. He stressed that the coalition hassuffered no military losses in Iraq, even at theplatoon level, yet the media, particularly Arab media,focuses on perceived U.S. failures. MbZ agreed thatthe Arab media will discredit anything favorable tothe U.S. He said that the U.S. needs to present itsside of the story more effectively. Citing the recentFallujah bombings, MbZ said that Al Jazeera aired anold woman in front of a bombed house saying that sheand her family were innocent civilians and that the UShad killed her sheep, goats and cows. This is veryhard to counter to an Arab audience. The only way todo so was to present the evidence and explain why U.S.forces attacked and what they achieved. Let thepeople see that terrorists have been killed. He alsourged the U.S. to better publicize the positivechanges the U.S. is bringing about. Abizaid said thatIraqi services and facilities, including schools, arebetter now than they have been for 30 years. However,these success stories are not getting out. MbZ agreedthat this is the story that the U.S. must tell tochange the world's perception of the U.S. role inIraq. MbZ's special assistant recommended that CENTCOMlet the Iraqis talk as much as possible. They willhave more credibility to an Arab audience.
----------GUANTANAMO----------
13. (C) MbZ commented that the release of theGuantanamo detainees had the potential to causeproblems. Citing the appearances of a releasedJordanian detainee named Rami on Arab talk shows, hesaid that these people are becoming heroes. In thefuture, some of them could be running mosques withthousands of followers, plaguing the region for yearsto come. Saying that this person, who was arrested byU.S. forces in Tora Bora, had certainly not been thereas a tourist, MbZ stated that it would have beenpreferable for these people to have been killed inaction.
--------PREDATOR--------
14. (S) Referring to General Yagi's visit, Abizaidasked MbZ for his views on Predator. MbZ said that heis seeking an armed Predator from the U.S. andexpressed disappointment that the U.S. appeared readyto offer only an unarmed version. MbZ confirmed that,while he strongly preferred the Predator, he waslooking at co-developing in the UAE alternative UAVsystems available from other countries. He said thatthe UAE required armed UAVs to control its long landand maritime borders and pointed out that they havebeen using UAVs since the first Gulf War. He stressedthe benefits of sharing information through a commonsecurity system with the U.S. and other allies.Abizaid said that he wanted to work with MbZ, andasked for some time to explore options and get back tohim. MbZ said that he could wait for a few months tohear from Abizaid before committing to another system.But he said that he planned to make a decision by theInternational Defense Exhibition (IDEX) to be held inAbu Dhabi in mid-February 2005. Both agreed that thePredator issue would not damage the strong U.S./UAErelationship.
15. (C) In closing, MbZ reaffirmed the strategic valueof the relationship and expressed his commitment notto let disagreements on some issues detract from closeand effective bilateral cooperation. General Abizaidagreed.16. (U) General Abizaid cleared this cable.
ALBRIGHT"