147015    3/24/2008 13:59    08ISLAMABAD1272    Embassy Islamabad    CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN        "VZCZCXRO2815PP RUEHLH RUEHPWDE RUEHIL #1272/01 0841359ZNY CCCCC ZZHP 241359Z MAR 08FM AMEMBASSY ISLAMABADTO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6061INFO RUEHKP/AMCONSUL KARACHI PRIORITY 9351RUEHLH/AMCONSUL LAHORE PRIORITY 5148RUEHPW/AMCONSUL PESHAWAR PRIORITY 3845RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITYRHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC PRIORITYRHWSMRC/USCINCCENT MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITYRUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITYRHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY"    "C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ISLAMABAD 001272

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/24/2028TAGS: MARR, MASS, PGOV, PK, PRELSUBJECT: CJCS MULLEN'S MEETING WITH COAS GENERAL KAYANI

Classified By: Anne W. Patterson, for reasons 1.4 (b)(d)

1.   (C) Summary: CJCS Mullen met with Pakistan's Chief ofthe Army Staff General Ashfaq Kayani twice March 3-4.  At aprivate dinner on March 3, they engaged in a discussion ofPakistan's new political landscape in the aftermath of theFebruary 18 parliamentary elections.  During talks on March4, Admiral Mullen briefed Kayani on the impact of U.S.domestic politics on our defense ties and engaged in a broadexchange on several important bilateral security issues.Admiral Mullen's visit, the second in less than a month, wasintended to demonstrate the U.S. government's conviction todeepen our engagement with senior Pakistani officials.  EndSummary

2.    (C) Admiral Mullen, Lieutenant General Carter Ham, J3Joint Staff and Major General James R. Helmly visited GeneralKayani's house for a private dinner on March 3.  Kayani beganby providing a thorough explanation of the politicalsituation including an analysis of the ongoing negotiationsover the makeup of the incoming government and a descriptionof the major political players.  The General acknowledged thestated desire of some newly ascendant politicians to impeachPresident Musharraf but said he did not think these effortswould succeed.   Discussing the military budget Kayaniacknowledged it had been controlled and ""protected"" byPresident Musharraf in the past but that it would now beexposed to the parliament and he was ready to ""appear inpublic to defend it."" After discussing national politicsKayani transitioned into a discussion of the unique cultureand history of Pakistan's FATA.  He explained how the legacyof the Frontier Crimes Regulation and the corresponding roleof the Pashtun Tribal Code impacted the FATA's system ofgovernance.

3.    (C) On March 4, Admiral Mullen and General Kayani metagain focusing their discussions on bilateral military ties.They were joined by Lieutenant General Carter Ham and MajorGeneral James R. Helmly for the U.S. side and LieutenantGeneral Satthar, Chief of the General Staff; Major GeneralAhmad Shuja Pasha, Director General Military Operations(DGMO); Major General Nadeem Ijaz, Director General MilitaryIntelligence; and Brigadier Zubair, Personal Secretary to theChief of the Army Staff.

4.    (C) Admiral Mullen began by telling Kayani that a U.S.SIGINT team had completed its initial assessment ofPakistan's requirements and that they intended to proposeoptions to assist them in developing a solution.  AdmiralMullen then asked Kayani for his help in approving a thirdRestricted Operating Zone for U.S. aircraft over the FATA.Regarding the FATA, Kayani spoke of a ""long range campaignplan"" to deal with Baitullah Mehsud although he provided noparticulars.  Kayani gave the impression that his strategywould focus on a defensive campaign for the foreseeablefuture.  This campaign would include the initiation ofdiscrete offensive operations in response to militantprovocations so as to protect his forces and blunt tacticalthreats.

5.    (C) He explained that his intent was not to ""hand theincoming government a problem"" but rather ""a stablesituation."" Kayani indicated he understood the frailty of thenew government and the need to prevent near-term challengesto it.  The U.S. interlocutors impressed upon Kayani toadvise the incoming government of the need to takeresponsibility for combating militancy rather than continuingto engage in rhetoric. Kayani said he needed the U.S.Ambassador to encourage those who might become Prime Ministerto ""establish the position and take responsibility.""

6.    (C) Kayani said statements in the Western pressregarding the deployment of U.S. trainers to Pakistan castthe Army in a poor light. He acknowledged the need forAmerican assistance but cautioned that it could not bepublicized because it implied that the Pakistani Army was notcapable of facing down the militant threat. He emphasizedthat he needed Admiral Mullen's help to ""manage perceptions""and that he would like the U.S. to provide train the trainertypes of assistance so that these responsibilities wouldultimately shift to the Pakistan Army.

7.    (C) Admiral Mullen raised the issue of CoalitionSupport Funds (CSF).  Admiral Mullen told Kayani that the

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U.S. goal was to move forward and that his help was needed infinding the best way ahead on this program. Kayani repliedthat the ""UN model"" for reimbursements served as a usefulbaseline for reforming CSF.  As to the performance of theprogram Kayani explained that the money went to the GOP butthat the Army only received a ""small percentage."" This waslikely due to the fact that there are no formal mechanismsfor ensuring that the reimbursements reach the Army.

8.    (C) As to allegations that claims are inflated, Kayanisaid the U.S. should recognize that not all of the Army'scosts are claimed and that it would be easier to account forif we could come to agreement on the types of costs thatwould be reimbursed.  He also indicated that he was awarethat there are some in the U.S. Congress that preferred an inkind reimbursement as opposed to a cash transfer.  Kayanireminded Admiral Mullen that the ""delay"" in processingreimbursement claims is a problem that requires resolution.

9.    (C) Kayani said that the U.S. effort to build thecounterinsurgency skills of the FC through the implementationSecurity Development Plan ""makes sense"" and that improvingits capabilities would help counter the spread of militantactivity in the FATA.  Kayani went on to explain that theFrontier Corps had certain discreet qualities that gave it""balance"" but that it also had certain limitations.Specifically, Kayani said the FC was incapable of ""holdingground"" or conducting offensive operations.  He cautionedthat the US should not expect them to do more than they werecapable of as it is simply ""not in their culture.""PATTERSON"