188670    1/24/2009 12:28    09ISLAMABAD155    Embassy Islamabad    CONFIDENTIAL        "VZCZCXRO4323OO RUEHLH RUEHPWDE RUEHIL #0155/01 0241228ZNY CCCCC ZZHO 241228Z JAN 09FM AMEMBASSY ISLAMABADTO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1144INFO RUEHKP/AMCONSUL KARACHI IMMEDIATE 0919RUEHLH/AMCONSUL LAHORE IMMEDIATE 6641RUEHPW/AMCONSUL PESHAWAR IMMEDIATE 5519RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL PRIORITY 9686RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 9477RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI PRIORITY 4323RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITYRUMICEA/USCENTCOM INTEL CEN MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITYRHWSMRC/USCINCCENT MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITYRUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITYRUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY"    "C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ISLAMABAD 000155

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/23/2019TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PTER, MAR, MOPS, PKSUBJECT: CENTCOM GENERAL PETRAEUS MEETS WITH PAKISTAN COAS KAYANI

Classified By: Ambassador Anne W. Patterson for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

Summary: (C) In a January 20 meeting with U.S. CENTCOMCommander General David Petraeus, Pakistan Chief of the ArmyStaff General Ashfaq Kayani reiterated his need for supportand asked for changes in the Coalition Support Fund processto allow for more rapid reimbursement. Kayani repeated hisconcerns about Pakistan's IDP situation, which wasundermining military operations, and described candidly thedeterioration in Swat and his ongoing operations in Bajaurand Mohmand agencies. Kayani repeatedly expressed concernabout the inability of the GOP to ""hold and build,"" whichGeneral Petraeus described as the ""always unsuccessful clearand leave"" strategy. Kayani said he was going to exerciserestraint with India, but would respond to an Indian attack.General Petraeus raised the likelihood of an alternativeshipment route for NATO through central Asia, stressed thecontinued need for the route through Khyber, and expressedappreciation for increased cooperation on the border withISAF forces.  General Petraeus indicated that he thoughtincreased measures to control population movements would haveto be put in place and assured Kayani of his commitment tosupport Pakistan military development.   Petraeus made clearthat the Pakistan military needed to focus on the extremistson the western border, instead of the Indian threat.  Endsummary.

1. (C) U.S. CENTCOM Commander General David Petraeus,accompanied by the Ambassador, J5 Major General RobertAllardice and POLAD Michael Gfoeller, met with Pakistan Chiefof the Army Staff (COAS) General Ashfaq Kayani on January 20.Kayani was accompanied by his Director General MilitaryOperations, Major General Javed Iqbal, his Chief of Staff,Lieutenant General Muhammad Mustafa Khan, and his SeniorAide, Brigadier Zubeir.

Musharraf's Situation---------------------

2. (C) In opening remarks regarding General Kayani,s likelymove into the official COAS residence,  Kayani observed thatformer President Musharraf,s situation  seemed to be fine,even though he had been concerned earlier about Zardari,sfailure to grant amnesty to Musharraf.   Kayani observed thatamnesty should have been granted immediately when Zardariassumed office, but it seemed as if the situation had settleddown and he was no longer as concerned about PresidentMusharraf,s legal situation. (Comment: Former PresidentMusharraf is visiting his family in the U.S. and alsoundertaking speaking engagements.   The construction ofMusharraf's house near Islamabad is well advanced, so he maybe able to move out of the COAS house in the next few weeks.End Comment)

Coalition Support Funds-----------------------

3. (C) Kayani spoke candidly about the process ofreimbursement of Coalition Support Funds (CSF).  He said itwas important to avoid the impression that the Pakistanmilitary is ""for hire."" Still, the military had littleincentive to provide the copious documentation, since only 40percent of the money had been returned to military coffers inthe past. Kayani said the money had mostly supported thefederal government's budget. The typical breakdown had beenabout 60 percent to the federal government, 40 percent to themilitary, but President Zardari had told him recently thatthe entire amount would be reimbursed to the military. Kayanisuggested that the CSF reimbursement amount ""mirror"" thesystem used for the UN's reimbursement of peacekeepingexpenses or establish a base period and estimate the increasein military activity from that base. Petraeus indicated thathe believed that the prospects for the ""Enhanced Partnershipwith Pakistan Act"" also known as the Biden-Lugar legislation,which would provide $1.5 billion for development activities,were positive, and there were plans underway to fundPakistan,s military needs.

IDPs: Humanitarian and Strategic Issue--------------------------------------

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4. (C) Kayani explained that his military budget had beenflat lined, and therefore had dropped sharply in real terms;military spending now represented only 16 percent of thegovernment's budget. He said the Pakistan military neededbasic equipment like helmets, protective gear, and personnelcarriers.  Kayani was particularly concerned about the statusof internally displaced persons (IDPs), who were displacedfrom their homes by fighting. This was not only ahumanitarian problem, but also a strategic one. Kayani saidhe had no capacity to compensate civilians who had beeninjured or whose property had been destroyed. ""If we don,tdo that,"" Kayani said, ""we will lose the battle for publicopinion.""  Kayani said that the provincial government lacksthe capacity to help the IDPs. He emphasized the importanceof carrying forward the Bajaur operation. Kayani noted thatat first he had thought the army ""should stay out ofpolitics,"" but it was increasingly obvious that the militarywould have to become involved in the IDP situation.Ambassador noted that the international community had alsodropped the ball on providing relief for the IDPs and was nowrushing to catch up.

Swat Valley-----------

5. (C) Kayani was clear that the GOP had lost control of theSwat valley. He said the police had no ability to come inafter the army to ""hold"" territory. He recounted that half ofthe 600 police officers, supposedly from the NWFP's elitepolice units, destined for Swat had deserted, largely becausethere was no command structure. Petraeus replied that theU.S. had confronted this same issue in Iraq, describing it asa ""clear and leave"" strategy, requiring the retaking of thesame ground multiple times. Petraeus observed that the policeare the most vulnerable, since they are exposed incommunities. Petraeus noted that increased measures tocontrol population movements would probably have to be put inplace throughout the country, which would requireconsiderable manpower.

Frontier Corps--------------

6. (C) Petraeus said that the Frontier Corps (FC) was workingwell with Special Operations Forces, largely because of theleadership of the Frontier Corps Inspector General MajorGeneral Tariq Khan.   Petraeus noted that the 11th CorpsChief of Staff Brigadier Amir was less cooperative with U.S.forces, and Kayani took note of that. Kayani said he hadconcentrated on improving the Frontier Corps and broughtsalaries and rations on a par with the regular army. He hadalso extended to the FC a benefit package for the families ofthose killed in the line of duty. Kayani added that FCsuccesses in combat had understandably increased morale.Kayani mused about the ""glorification of terrorism""(particularly the pictures of dead combatants in the press)and said Pakistan needed press laws similar to those in theUK.

7. (C) Kayani and Petraeus agreed that some of thecivilian/military projects, which had been impeded at the11th Corps, needed to be speeded up. Petraeus had giveninstructions that Special Operations Forces would be deployedregularly and constantly, and the U.S. ""needed to move theirsoldiers in here, so they could engage productively with theFC.""

Pakistan/India--------------

8. (C) Petraeus said the most important threat to Pakistanwas on the western border and internally. Terrorists were anexistential threat to Pakistan. Kayani agreed. However,Kayani observed that he had postponed a missile test. TheIndians, he said, in contrast, had conducted one just a fewhours before.    Kayani said he had no intention to resumemissile testing as long as the current tensions persisted.He promised to be transparent with allies about his plans andhad briefed us about his move of 6000 troops to the Indianborder. Kayani said he was determined to exercise restraintin his actions with India. He recounted that he had taken no

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action the evening that Indian External Affairs MinisterPranab Mukherjee had supposedly called President Zardari andthreatened to declare war. Kayani asked to be alerted if theU.S. had any warning of another attack - he understood thatthe Indians had been warned about the Mumbai attack. Hementioned that discussion of the consequences of a follow-onattack made both India and Pakistan hostage to extremists andincreased the likelihood of an attack. ""If there is any clueabout another attack,"" he said, ""please share it with us.""

Next Steps----------

9. (C) Kayani returned to the issue of CSF at the conclusionof the conversation, saying that he hoped to have the May CSFsubmission soon, but we needed to develop a simpler way ofhandling CSF claims.   Petraeus said he would look at optionsquickly. Kayani and Petraeus agreed that progress had beenmade on the Border Coordination centers and that additionalcommunications capacity needed to be added.  Petraeus pressedKayani on moving forward with setting up the additionalfacilities inside of Pakistan.

10. (C) Petraeus said he was looking forward to welcomingKayani to Tampa during his February 2009 counterpart visit.Kayani said he hoped, after consultation with the PrimeMinister and the President, to bring a roadmap forconsideration by U.S. officials.

11. (U) This cable has been cleared by CENTCOM.PATTERSON"