LAHORE, Sept 26: When the Lahore High Court full bench hearing petitions against the disqualification of PML-N leaders Shahbaz Sharif and Kulsoom Nawaz adjourned the proceedings on Thursday, petitioners’ counsel Ashtar Ausaf Ali had completed his arguments.
Deputy Attorney-General (DAG) Khwaja Saeeduz Zafar was on his legs when the proceedings were put off till Friday (today). Representing the state, he said the petitioners’ plea that the tribunal was bound to sign the written judgment within its life span under the provisions of Criminal Procedural Code (CrPC) was frivolous, as it neither had the status of a high court nor was it governed by the CrPC.
It was further submitted that as mentioned in the Representation of People’s Act 1976, the election tribunals were supposed to decide the appeals through a summary trial. He argued that by virtue of the powers granted for carrying out a summary trial, the tribunal was not bound to pass a written judgment on the day it announced the disqualification order.
It was submitted by the state that since the tribunal pronounced its judgment on Sept 12, which was carried by the papers the next day, the announcement made by the tribunal was to be considered as the final judgment even if it was not signed on that day.
Earlier, Mr Ausaf completed his arguments about the tribunal’s observation that Shahbaz Sharif was a director of Ittefaq Brothers Limited and Ittefaq Foundries Limited, which had acquired loans worth Rs355.463 million and Rs1072.227 million respectively. According to the tribunal, the companies had wilfully defaulted on loans, the repayment of which had been guaranteed by Mr Shahbaz.
The counsel contended that a compromise was made in the LHC in 1998, according to which the plaintiff took over the companies. It was further pleaded that the assets taken over by the bank, including 550 Kanals in Kotlakhpat area, were worth far more than the liabilities.
The petitioners’ counsel contended that Mr Shahbaz was not a director of the companies, as he had resigned on Sept 25, 1993. He had not even had any share in the two companies since 1996. However, the counsel conceded that he was a director as well as a shareholder in the companies when he acted as a guarantor for the loan agreement in 1990.
The bench observed that the tribunal’s observation that Mr Shahbaz was a guarantor of loans’ return on the date of his disqualification from election (Sept 12) needed to be scrutinized in the light of submissions made by his counsel.
The counsel pleaded that the petitioner was neither a guarantor nor a wilful defaulter since the liability had already been cleared with the consent of the plaintiff (the bank which provided the loans).
It was further argued that a loan agreement was different from a guarantee. Mr Shahbaz could not be regarded a loanee merely because he had furnished personal guarantees for the loan, the counsel maintained.