SIXTY-TWO years into independence and nationhood and we are still grappling with constitutional reforms in the apparent search for the ideal balance in executive-legislature relations.
The latest reforms, which will be passed as the Eighteenth Constitutional Amendment, are supposed to reverse the executive powers given to the president under the 2002 Legal Framework Order and 2003 Seventeenth Constitutional Amendment and restore parliamentary sovereignty under the 1973 Constitution.
The last time such a movement to restore parliamentary sovereignty occurred was in the mid 1990s which resulted in the Thirteenth Constitutional Amendment in 1997.
The latter amendment restored parliamentary sovereignty as provided for under the 1973 Constitution by reversing the executive powers given to the president under the 1985 Eighth Constitutional Amendment.
No nation has experimented with so many varieties of systems as we have - from the presidential system under which a powerful executive president was elected independently of the legislature (1962 Constitution) to the parliamentary system where the president had a ceremonial role and was required to act on and in accordance with the advice of the prime minister (1973 Constitution).
We have also experimented with a mixed presidential-parliamentary system under which the president was the executive head with the prime minister and his cabinet “aiding and advising” the president (1956 Constitution).
We also had two other variations of this mixed presidential-parliamentary system the one that was brought about by the 1985 Eighth Constitutional Amendment and the other provided by the 2002 Legal Framework Order and 2003 Seventeenth Constitutional Amendment.
Under both these variations - just like it was under the 1956 Constitution - the president was provided with powers which in effect made him the de facto ruler.
In 2003, a new variation of the presidential-parliamentary system emerged when the judiciary was given a share in the executive power.
As provided under the Seventeenth Constitutional Amendment, when the president dissolves parliament, he has to refer the matter to the Supreme Court within 15 days and the court's decision on the reference - within 30 days - is final.
The judiciary had earlier been given similar but somewhat lesser executive powers under the 1962 Constitution. Article 59 (1) of the latter Constitution stated If, at any time, the president considers that it is desirable to obtain the opinion of the Supreme Court on any question of law which he considers of public importance, he may refer the question to the Supreme Court for consideration.
The impact of the Seventeenth Constitutional Amendment has been that the country is being governed and state policies are being formulated more through presidential ordinances and Supreme Court suo motu notices than parliamentary legislation.
Pildat's first year performance report of the 13th National Assembly (March 2009) says that despite unprecedented legislative activism of members of parliament, especially private members, who submitted a record 104 private members' bills during this period, only four bills were passed by the National Assembly (three government and one private member bills) as opposed to 11 presidential ordinances issued in the same period (actually 12 in total with one being withdrawn on the advice of the prime minister).
The number of suo motu notices issued by the Supreme Court over the same period - numbering over two dozen - is much more than the presidential ordinances.
Such apparent subservience of parliament to the executive has thus raised demands for yet another round of constitutional reform to re-empower the legislature and make it sovereign again.
But our last era of parliamentary sovereignty lasted hardly two years from 1997-99.
Our very first era of parliamentary sovereignty didn't last long either from 1973-77.
This totals hardly six years of parliamentary sovereignty out of our 36-year parliamentary constitutional history (i.e., since 1973).
For this, parliamentarians who create or provoke the circumstances paving the way for military rulers to take over and eventually become executive presidents are as much to blame as the military rulers themselves.
Restoring parliamentary sovereignty - as we have seen by the Thirteenth Constitutional Amendment in 1997 - will be the easy part.
Much more difficult is taming our parliamentarians to put effectiveness and permanency of parliamentary rule, and thus stability and progress of the nation, above personal vested interests.