ISLAMABAD, Aug 28: Introspection of nation, region and ground realities as well as psychological and ideological factors, which are essential ingredients in state craft, is some times ignored and nations fail to achieve their objectives.
This was observed Dr Lubna Abid Ali, Professor of International Relations at the Quaid-i-Azam University, while speaking at a talk on "Research on 1965 War" organized by the Islamabad Social Sciences Forum here on Friday. President of the forum, Dr Inayetullah, presided over the proceedings.
Dr Lubna had made an empirical study of the subject and found that the 1965 war had not been well-researched in our country. She said Pakistan had lost the great initiative to secure Chamb sector during the 1965 war.
She said there were a number of misconceptions about the genesis and outcome of this major war between Pakistan and India, which needed a diligent study.
She said the genesis of the war lay in Operation Gibraltar, one of the two plans which the then president Ayub Khan had caused to be prepared for reactivating the Kashmir issue.
This could have been an after-thought since Pakistan had missed the most favourable opportunity of 1962, when India was embroiled on the China front.
According to Dr Lubna Pakistan began the 1965 war with operation grand slam securing Chamb on 1st September. However, the forward thrust was halted on 2nd September and the field commander General Akhtar Hussain Malik was replaced by General Yahya Khan. This led to a delay of 72 hours during which war gains tilted in favour of India.
She said the Indian General Herbaksh Sing had noted in his war dispatches that Pakistan had the upper hand until then. Thus the operation grand slam assumed a defensive shape.
Dr Lubna premised that some times the nation was fed on victories and fictitious enemies. In this regard she quoted the case of Major Raza Shah who had only one tank which he would manoeuvre sideways and in the direction he wished.
As for the opinion that India surprised Pakistan with its attack, she said this could also be a misconception since Pakistani troops were already on defensive alert on the night between 4th and 5th September.
As to the Tashkent Declaration, she said President Kosygin had secured President Ayub Khan's signature on the joint declaration by scheduling his visit to an armament factory and pleaded with him the follies of going to war, which he said, won't solve the problem.
She said the then Russian foreign minister Mikoyan had said that it would have been impossible to achieve success at Tashkent because of the presence of then foreign minister of Pakistan Z. A Bhutto who was always reminding his president that he bore responsibility to the people of Pakistan on those matters.
She said a number of external pressures were brought to bear upon President Ayub Khan and he succumbed to those pressures. Thus Ayub Khan fell in the scale of his people, while Mr Bhutto became a national hero.
She said the attitude of the people and economy were also important inputs in policy decision and war policy, which the nation and its policy planners had to pay attention to for avoiding pitfalls. She said wars did not achieve anything and we must always be a peaceful Pakistan for the sake of our children.
Dr Lubna explained that her studies were based on a number of documents related to 1965 war and were based on written materials authored by J. K. Galbraith, J. J. Syed, the official historian of 1965 war in the GHQ, Shaukat Raza, Asghar Khan, Altaf Gauhar, Z. A. Bhutto's memos written as the foreign minister, Lawrence Zirring, defence journals written at the Pakistan GHQ, and Jane's defence weeklies. Mine is an empirical study,' she maintained.