ISLAMABAD, Nov 8: The Dargai attack, because of its sheer enormity and the chosen target, has suddenly taken the bloody conflict between the Pakistani security establishment and the Fata-based militants to a new and, perhaps, a more dangerous level.

In some ways it’s a clear indication that for the new and more radical band of militants in the tribal region the ordinary Pakistani troops have become as much a legitimate target as some of the high-profile political and military figures have been in the recent past. Until now only the officers and soldiers deployed in the conflict zone along the border with Afghanistan and those taking part in the security operation against the pro-Taliban tribal militants had come under attack.

Since the start of phase two of the anti Al Qaeda operation, when Pakistan was tasked with eliminating Islamic extremists from its midst, the militants groups operating outside Waziristan had mostly gone for high-profile targets such as President General Pervez Musharraf, top military commanders, Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz and foreign nationals.

In the past, President Musharraf survived several organised, and some half-baked, attempts on his life, the two attacks in December 2003 being the most serious move to assassinate him. A few months later, one of his then corps commander in Karachi and now the vice chief of army staff, General Ahsan Saleem Hayat, miraculously escaped a major bid to kill him. Similarly, Shaukat Aziz remained unhurt when a suicide bomber blew himself up right next to his bullet-proof car when he was campaigning in Attock shortly before becoming the prime minister. Since then the security of the president, prime minister and a number of top officials has been enhanced considerably -- some moving with more than one identical bullet-proof limousine in a bid to deceive the likely assailants.

However, the latest suicide bombing has pushed the conflict on to an entirely different plane. It has made the common soldiers or anyone else associated with the state as vulnerable as the leadership and thus indicates that in the coming weeks and months it may turn into a real nasty conflict.

No matter how valid President Musharraf´s reasons for fighting the Islamic extremists, the growing perception among the people, and to an extent among some in the lower ranks of the armed forces, has been that his actions are all dictated by the United States.

The so-called war on terror, and the constant pressure from the Americans for quick results, has pushed the Pakistani military establishment deeper and deeper into a mess which is nearly impossible to manage. During this action the Pakistani forces have used even jet aircraft and helicopter gunships to — in George Bush’s parlance — smoke out the terrorists.

The difference is that while Mr Bush has been using his military might thousands of miles away from home in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Pakistani forces are being used to pound parts of their own territory. And this is making many Pakistanis, particularly the tribesmen in the border region, quite anxious.

Tall claims of winning the war notwithstanding, the latest attack clearly shows that the security establishment has continued to falter both in tactics and the overall strategy against the militants. Many analysts of the present-day tribal region insist that today the strength of those willing to fight alongside the Taliban, against both foreign and Pakistani troops, is many times more than what it was four years ago. Having no recollection of close and brotherly relations with the military establishment of yesteryears, the new recruits among the militants ranks felt no hesitation in targeting non-combatant Pakistani troops.

But what does it mean for the government (read: military’s) strategy to deal with the situation? Indeed it’s a complex issue and has its roots in the military establishment’s policy of the past to promote and nurture militants for domestic and regional goals. And the establishment’s seemingly half-hearted attempts to reverse the cycle of religious-conservatism have made the task even more difficult.

Of course, even if the authorities were to admit of the past involvement in fanning militancy for their political and diplomatic gains, it will not be easy to uproot the extremists who are apparently well-entrenched, not just in the tribal areas but many other parts of the country.

Court martial proceedings of earlier cases involving PAF and army soldiers show how the militants had, over the years, managed to create a level of acceptability for themselves among some of the lower-ranks. While there was a purge of sorts after the discovery that some forces personnel were involved in the two conspiracies to assassinate General Musharraf, its not clear whether a detailed study has been carried out of how deep-rooted the problem is, and if there has been any subsequent action.

One thing is clear. The Islamic militants regard President Musharraf and those associated with him as their enemy, and will do whatever is possible to get them out of the way. Time and again they have also proved that, no matter how misplaced their beliefs , they are capable of operating with lethal zeal. But, in their zeal to target and isolate President Musharraf, have the militants gone too far? In the past they have tried to drive a wedge between soldiers and their leadership but the Dargai massacre may prove to be a compelling rallying cry for the rank and file of the army - one that has been missing so far.