SOCIAL ignorance, historical margin-alisation and systemic neglect act as the primary fuel for anger in Waziristan. This anger morphs into a structured form of extremism when it becomes intertwined with a rigid ideology, leading to terrorism. In Waziristan, this evolution has been visible.
Radicalisation in Waziristan is not a linear process, but a multi-system pheno-menon active at multiple scales. It operates across psychological, social, educational, political and cultural systems, and it cascades from the individual level through the family and community up to the national and transnational stages. The breakdown of social institutions has led to a loss of control over individuals, particularly the vulnerable demographic of young, unemployed males who are most susceptible to extremist recruitment.
This is exacerbated by a lack of attach-ment, commitment, and belief in the governance structure, creating a vacuum that extremist groups fill with their own narratives of identity and justice. The challenge is compounded by the lack of economic opportunities, basic infra-structure and political representation that together create a sense of hopelessness, making the promise of purpose and provision offered by militant groups an attractive alternative.
Historically, Pakistan’s response in Waziristan has heavily relied on force to restore order. This approach has often proven counterproductive when not paired with robust political and social reconstruction. It alienates the local population, breeds resentment and fails to address the root causes of instability.
A stable political environment that fosters a sense of belonging and ownership among the local people is really critical. However, policies, including the National Internal Security Policy (NISP) 2018-23, risk becoming ineffective if they are not consistently executed and reoriented according to political shifts. A short-term, operation-focused mindset undermines long-term peace as communities perceive the state’s commitment as fleeting and conditional.
A successful strategy must move beyond a purely kinetic approach and focus on civic and peace education, empowering local elders, religious leaders and civil society to challenge extremist narratives.
The government must actively engage with local clerics to propagate a counter-narrative and must distinguish between various groups involved in terrorism. The focus must be on dismantling the extremist ideology itself, not just its foot soldiers.
Simultaneously, the government should engage with ‘sympathisers’ — political leaders and influencers who, while not active members, do lend legitimacy to extremist causes through their rhetoric.
Evaluating the impact of intervention in Waziristan requires moving beyond short-term metrics to long-term indicators of community resilience. This means re-establishing social institutions, providing meaningful economic opportunities for the youth, and creating a political space where grievances can be addressed through dialogue. This requires a fundamental reorientation of government policy — one that prioritises human security and community partnership over brute force.
Tufail Dawar
North Waziristan
Published in Dawn, July 17th, 2026