THE Stockholm International Peace Research Institute has published its Yearbook 2026. SIPRI assesses that India has now operationally deployed 12 out of 190 nuclear warheads on a single nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine conducting deterrence patrols. This is a major strategic shift: for decades, New Delhi had stored its warheads and delivery systems separately, a deliberate posture designed to prevent accidental use. This shift in nuclear posture will have far-reaching implications for strategic stability in South Asia.
While Pakistan’s Foreign Office has shown no surprise over the development, strategic thinkers in Islamabad have focused on certain issues. First, the shift in India’s nuclear posture has raised concerns about New Delhi’s declared no-first use policy. Indian Defence Minister Rajnath Singh publicly cast doubts on India’s long-standing nuclear NFU policy during an August 2019 visit to Pokhran. This aligns with the BJP’s 2014 election manifesto that promised to “study in detail India’s nuclear doctrine, and revise and update it, to make it relevant to challenges of current times”. Hence, India’s actions suggest a profound shift from NFU to ‘strategic ambiguity’ in New Delhi’s nuclear policy.
Second, while the number of deployed nuclear warheads may vary, India’s strategic posture shows aggressive intent. Since 2016, ties between India and Pakistan have been viewed largely through the lens of crisis escalation and political tensions. In the absence of structural dialogue, this altered strategic posture of New Delhi has understandably set off alarm bells in Islamabad.
Third, the development has compressed the crisis response window. Already, South Asia is witnessing accelerated crisis response due to AI-enabled command systems. New Delhi’s sea-based nuclear deterrence, with operational nuclear warheads can further increase the risk of miscalculation, accidental escalation and perhaps forced pre-emption in a nuclearised environment. Moreover, the primary challenge of deploying nuclear weapons at sea relates to the problem of command and control. Delegating authority to a submarine commander at sea could lead to the risk of unauthorised or accidental use.
In this hostile environment, the best, most practical option for Pakistan and India remains the resumption of dialogue.
Similarly, India’s strategic thinkers are largely referring to their country’s sea-based nuclear posture to deter Chinese threats. However, this argument stands in contrast to the current geopolitical environment and trajectory of Sino-India ties. Sino-India ties have improved significantly since the Modi-Xi Kazan summit in 2024. The two sides have signed a landmark border patrol agreement and improved bilateral trade of over $150 billion in 2026. On the contrary, India-Pakistan relations are going through the worst phase of their history in view of the absence of direct trade, a downgraded diplomatic presence in each other’s capitals, frequent armed hostilities and people-to-people disengagement. Islamabad believes that New Delhi is using China to please the West in the context of the US-China competition at the global level. Moreover, India has not publicly announced a bifurcated or separate deterrence posture or command-and-control framework for China and Pakistan. In fact, Islamabad believes that the operational deployment of New Delhi’s nuclear warheads is meant to circumvent Pakistan’s full spectrum deterrence. New Delhi, through these measures, is primarily challenging Pakistan’s traditional deterrence policy.
Although Islamabad does not want to get drawn into another arms race, the altered strategic realities will likely compel it to take several precautionary diplomatic and security measures, which may risk another arms surge in the region. Moreover, one of the more worrisome factors is that New Delhi’s sea-based nuclear capability coupled with operational nuclear warheads might incentivise Indian policymakers to engage in more frequent low-level crises or coercive diplomacy at the conventional level because of New Delhi’s confidence in ‘assured second-strike’ capability.
From Pakistan’s perspective, the international community has not taken serious note of this shift in India’s strategic posture. This is why, if the situation worsens and the pressure increases, Islamabad may see no option but to deploy nuclear warheads across its entire vector to deter India’s aggressive strategic posture. Similarly, the operational asymmetry will become more visible in the naval domain between Islamabad and New Delhi. Keeping in view the huge cost of naval nuclearisation, Islamabad will likely broaden and deepen its naval cooperation with likeminded friendly countries to fill the operational asymmetrical gap. Moreover, emerging technologies and semi-autonomous weapons systems have further given Islamabad options to improve its naval capabilities.
In this hostile environment, the best, most practical option for both sides remains the resumption of dialogue and ensuring stringent implementation of nuclear-related CBMs to minimise concerns related to the misinterpretation of intentions. Renewed dialogue between India and Pakistan on nuclear-related CBMs can help clarify intentions and reduce the chance of accidental or inadvertent escalation. The last round of dialogue related to conventional and nuclear-related CBMs between India and Pakistan was held in 2012.
While there is significant appetite in Islamabad to engage with New Delhi for meaningful dialogue on all outstanding issues and ensure smooth implementation of nuclear-related CBMs, the BJP-led NDA government’s policy of no structural dialogue with Pakistan remains a major stumbling block. From 2016 to 2026, two main trends can summarise Pakistan-India ties. First, the two sides have been witnessing an era of eroding bilateralism, where already settled issues such as the Indus Waters Treaty have become victims of political tensions and right-wing populism. If this trend of erosion of bilateral ties continues, it could ultimately hit other settled issues including nuclear-related CBMs. Second, every military crisis from 2016 to 2025 has been bigger and broader in scale and scope.
In order to reverse these two trends, it is important for New Delhi and Islamabad to re-engage in meaningful dialogue. Ultimately, strategic thinkers and policymakers in New Delhi must understand the primary concept of armed conflict between two nuclear states, ie, victory is impossible and defeat is unthinkable, hence strategic sanity must prevail for the sake of peace in South Asia.
The writer is a strategic analyst of international security. The views expressed are his own.
Published in Dawn, July 17th, 2026