Return of Al Qadir pleas by SC office challenged

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ISLAMABAD: Former prime minister Imran Khan and his spouse Bushra Imran on Monday filed a chamber appeal before the Supreme Court (SC), challenging the SC Registrar’s office order that returned petitions seeking suspension of their sentences in the £190 million Al-Qadir Trust case.

The chamber appeal was filed against the SC’s registrar office order issued on June 29, 2026, which returned two separate petitions, stating that they were not entertainable.

The office observed that since the Islamabad High Court (IHC) had passed the April 30, 2026 order while exercising jurisdiction under Section 32 of the National Accountability Ordinance (NAO) 1999, the available remedy lay before the Federal Constitutional Court (FCC) under Section 32-A of the ordinance.

The appeal, filed through Barrister Salman Safdar under Order V, Rule 3 of the Supreme Court Rules 2025, argued that the registrar’s office had exceeded its administrative authority. The office of the Registrar was vested primarily with administrative and procedural powers relating to the filing and processing of cases, the chamber appeal said, adding that such powers were limited to ensuring compliance with procedural requirements, including scrutiny of form, limitation and other prescribed defects.

It further argued that determining maintainability, particularly where constitutional or statutory interpretation was involved, was a judicial function requiring legal reasoning and consideration of rival submissions.

Such jurisdiction, it said, exclusively rested with the SC and could not be exercised by the registrar in an administrative capacity.

The appeal also maintained that the registrar failed to consider that, under Article 175A(1)(a) of the Constitution, an appeal to the FCC against a High Court’s judgements, decrees, final orders or sentences lies only where expressly provided by statute.

Petition states Section 32-A of the NAO 1999 provides a second appeal to the FCC against a decision of the High Court under Section 32 of the ordinance.

However, it argued that the law does not expressly provide an appeal against an order passed on an application for suspension of sentence arising from an appeal under Section 32. The appeal stated that no appeal was available under the NAO 1999 against an order passed on a bail application under Section 9(b) of the ordinance read with Section 497 of the Criminal Procedure Code.

Consequently, in view of the limited appellate remedy provided under Section 32-A of the NAO, 1999, the order dismissing the appellant’s application for suspension of sentence under Section 426, Cr.P.C. was assailable before the SC under Article 185(3) of the Constitution, the appeal stated.

Published in Dawn, July 14th, 2026