GEN Z, the generation that introduced us to ‘skibidi’ and ‘6-7’, now makes up a massive share of Pakistan’s youth population. Born between 1997 and 2012, they are currently navigating the transition from adolescence to adulthood, shaping trends and public discourse through online platforms. However, despite all their ‘rizz’, the economic reality of these young Pakistanis is far from giving ‘main character energy’. Their integration into the education system and labour market remains limited and uneven, raising concerns about their long-term economic prospects and the country’s ability to harness its demographic dividend.
The latest Labour Force Survey 2024-25 shows that nearly three-fourths of the population aged 15-29 is not enrolled in any formal educational programme. Predictably, literacy levels remain low, with nearly a quarter of the segment unable to read or write simple statements with understanding. This educational exclusion poses serious long-term implications for their overall productivity and employability.
Beyond ‘aura farming’, these young Pakistanis have few productive endeavours to engage in. Access to skills development opportunities remains particularly weak with nearly nine out of 10 young individuals reporting having never received any form of vocational, technical or professional training. Due to the lack of structured programmes, many resort to unpaid and informal apprenticeships with limited prospects of progression.
In the absence of effective transitions from learning to work, large segments of the youth population are absorbed into informal, low-productivity activities that offer neither stability nor upward mobility. According to data, only about one-fifth of the young population is engaged in paid work. The nature of jobs available is also highly concerning as most of the work does not qualify as decent employment. A large share of this population is engaged in informal agricultural work, or employed in small, unregistered private enterprises.
Policymakers must give serious consideration to youth pathways.
More than 80 per cent of these young workers are employed without any written contract, and nearly a quarter work on a daily-wage basis. According to data, more than three-fourths work beyond the 48-hour workweek, with some even working up to 98 hours. This translates into an average of 14 hours a day, seven days a week. Despite such long working hours, returns remain low, with nearly 94pc earning less than the minimum wage of Rs37,000 per month. In many cases, workers are exposed to hazardous conditions, and routinely endure physical and verbal abuse, while wage payments are often delayed.
Among the working youth, the benefits of economic participation are unevenly distributed in favour of males. Females account for only about 13pc of the employed youth population, highlighting the persistence of social and cultural norms that constrain women’s access to economic opportunities. Despite the perception of this cohort as the most ‘woke’ generation to date, data shows that many of the barriers faced by women in previous generations remain firmly embedded today, highlighting the urgency for targeted policy action.
The role of social and cultural norms in defining gender roles is further reflected in labour market participation, where the proportion of females seeking paid work is roughly half that of males.
With a NEET (Not in Employment, Education, or Training) rate of 54pc, policymakers must give serious consideration to youth pathways beyond token schemes and rhetoric. Rather than reflecting a lack of willingness among young people to engage productively, this figure points towards the absence of viable channels for quality training, and a smooth transition into decent employment.
Ultimately, this is not merely a youth issue, but a structural one rooted in a persistent lack of prioritisation, underinvestment in human capital, and weak alignment across relevant government departments, particularly provincial education, skills development, labour and youth departments. While many provincial policies and schemes are designed in the name of youth development, they are backed neither by budgets, nor political will. An effective response would require centring youth development across public policy design and implementation, with particular focus on decent employment generation.
Briefly, as long as marginal returns to public expenditure are measured in votes and political popularity, social sectors will remain underfunded and fragmented, risking the loss of an entire generation.
The writer is a development economist and policy consultant.
X: @AroojWDar
Published in Dawn, July 13th, 2026