• Regional actors, particularly Gulf states, stopped US from ‘walking away’ after Iran insisted on changing venue, limiting agenda
• Kushner’s inclusion means ‘direct line to Trump’; Araghchi, Larijani also have ‘full institutional backing’

AFTER weeks of uncertainty, indirect talks between Iran and the United States are set to open today (Friday) in Oman’s capital, Muscat. The very survival of the process is notable, even though expectations of a breakthrough remain low.

The road to these talks has been uneven; plans were repeatedly disrupted by military incidents, disputes on the venue and disagreements over the scope of engagement.

At one point, Washington was said to have walked away altogether. Each time, the process was revived. Not because of confidence, but because the alternatives appeared to be far riskier.

From what we know so far, Washi­ngton’s attempts to expand the agenda was one of the straws that nearly broke the camel’s back, so to speak.

While Iran had agreed to discuss its nuclear programme — given its stance that it isn’t interested in nuclear weapons — the US instead insisted on putting ballistic missiles, regional proxies and internal governance on the table.

For Tehran, this confirmed long held suspicions that diplomacy was being used to extract concessions, rather than resolve a specific dispute – in this case, nuclear weapons.

It responded by hardening its position. Talks, Iran said, could only be indirect. They could only be held in Oman and not in Turkiye, as the Americans wanted. And they could only focus on the nuclear issue. Anything beyond that was declared ‘a red line’.

Washington initially resisted, only relenting after sustained intervention by regional actors, particularly from the Gulf region. Their interest was not ideological, but purely pragmatic — any conflict between Iran and US would be fought in their neighbourhood, and they would have to absorb much of the fallout.

On the face of it, President Donald Trump’s team appears to have listened to the regional stakeholders.

US Vice President J.D. Vance has, meanwhile, expressed frustration over Washington’s inability to directly talk with Ayatollah Khamenei calling Iran a “a very weird country to conduct diplomacy with”.

American officials had assumed Iran would bend under pressure. The assessment in Washington was that Tehran had been weakened by war, domestic unrest and economic strain.

More importantly, perhaps, Hezbollah’s loss of strength and the fall of Syria’s Assad regime were seen as a weakening of Iran’s influence in the region.

Shashank Joshi, defence editor at The Economist, argues that Iran’s leverage had narrowed sharply. He notes Tehran long relied on two main instruments: its missile programme and regional allies, from Hamas to Hezbollah.

But a diplomatic onlooker based in Isla­mabad disagrees, saying that Washin­gton’s assumptions had proven to be misplaced.

The Israel factor

Since Oct 7, 2023, regional anxieties have deepened because of Israeli military actions in the region. There is a growing view in the Gulf that an emboldened Tel Aviv would be antithetical to regional stability.

Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei has also repeatedly warned that a regional conflict would spare no one. That assessment is quietly shared across several Gulf capitals, and in the broader region.

Trita Parsi, executive vice president at the Quincy Institute, notes that while the US may not formally pursue regime change in Iran, Israeli pressure has kept Tehran at the centre of Washington’s security thinking.

The memory of the 12-day war of June 2025 also shaped American calculations. That conflict demonstrated the limits of military action. Iran took damage, but it was not neutralised and retained the capacity to respond and to impose costs.

While the conflict had ended in a stalemate, it reinforced the risks of escalation.

Nevertheless, Israel remains the main proponent of confrontation. It continues to press the US to entangle itself in a military conflict with Iran. Its influence is evident in the steady expansion of American demands. What began as a nuclear concern has gradually widened to missiles and regional proxies.

In Parsi’s assessment, the US will have to make a choice, whether it wanted to “pursue Israeli interest or American interest”.

Tehran’s scepticism

Privately, Iranian officials insist that the difficulty does not lie in the choice of venue, but in what they describe as a “pattern of shifting US positions”.

In effect, Iran has refused to engage on the agenda proposed by US. It has agreed to talk about nuclear issues while rejecting discussion on missiles and regional alliances. These, it said, were integral to national deterrence. The view in Tehran is that any concession would invite further pressure.

Trita Parsi, agrees with Iran’s reading, saying: “If the nuclear programme is eliminated, [pressure] will shift to missiles. If the missiles are dealt with, there will be a new excuse”.

The resistance from Tehran not only surprised US officials, it also narrowed Washington’s choices. Esc­a­­­­­l­ation remained an option, but an expensive one as a war with Iran would risk regional instability, ene­r­gy disruption and political costs at home.

American journalist and author Max Blumenthal notes that “Trump was pushed to deploy a naval Armada to the Persian Gulf, which he has done and now he risks humiliation if he stands down without an attack.”

It was either that, or “attack and risk a total regional war with Iran, activating all of its assets which it had not done [even] during the 12-day war”, Blumenthal says.

Reasonable expectations

The alternative was to step back and accept talks on Iranian terms. For now, US has chosen the latter.

Oman was accepted as the venue and the agenda appears limited to nuclear issues. Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi’s public statements suggest no expansion. That may keep the process alive, but it does not resolve the deeper mistrust. This is why expectations for Muscat remain modest with both sides taking the talks as a tool to manage pressure, but not a path to resolution.

Iran’s approach to the talks is cautious. Officials describe negotiations as a tactical move in a long rivalry and not an endpoint. Expectations are being kept deliberately low. Talks may stall or collapse and Iranian officials, in their private conversations, say they are prepared for all outcomes.

Both sides are nevertheless sending negotiators with authority. On the Iranian side, Abbas Araghchi and Ali Larijani enjoy institutional backing. This gives them room to explore limited compromises. On the American side, Steve Witkoff is again leading, this time accompanied by Trump’s son-in-law and adviser Jared Kushner. His presence suggests direct access to President Trump.

This line up may help avoid procedural delays, but it will not bridge the deeper divide.

Published in Dawn, February 6th, 2026