Sindh was the worst hit where more than 30 per cent cultivable land was saline and about 43 per cent waterlogged. The measures worsened the problem due to bad design, corruption and inefficiencies. In 1998, the government embarked upon the $785 million worth National Drainage Programme. The project began in January ‘98 and was to finish by December 2004.
Even after eight years, very little could be translated into action. Ideas envisaged have evaporated. The government had extended the programme till December 2006. The ADB and the JBIC also extended their funding but the World Bank (IBRD) did not. Since it was the main financer, therefore, progress on the NDP was halted. The sudden stoppage of funds left the Sindh Irrigation and Drainage Authority (Sida) in a dilemma. It also crippled the overall process of participatory management since the formation of farmers’ organizations and their capacity building too, stopped.
Institutional Reforms: Although, the participation and decentralized management were the founding pillars of the NDP, yet its internal structure was centralized and the Lahore-based Central Cell was exercising authority on various accounts.
For decentralization of Irrigation Department, provincial irrigation and drainage authorities were formed. In Sindh, the bureaucracy within irrigation department never owned these reforms. Water bureaucracy proved inefficient and corrupt. The Sindh Irrigation Department was responsible for the dilapidated infrastructure and non-judicious water distribution.
To protect the water-empire, the provincial water bureaucracy in connivance with the anti-reform waderacracy undermined the reform process. In April 2004, a retired Chief Engineer was appointed as the MD of Sida. During his tenure not a single farmers’ organization was formed, although a budget of Rs20 million was available for it. The MD was not appointed through Sida Board but landed through an executive order from the Sindh government.
Now, again a new MD has is brought from the irrigation department with dual charges. He is a Chief Engineer of Kotri barrage, with obvious working priorities. According to the NDP documents and the Sindh Water Management Ordinance 2002, the MD for Sida is to be hired from the open market through a competitive and transparent process. In six years, about eight MDs occupied the chair with only one from the open market who was forced to quit since he was inclined towards the reforms.
Reforms in Sindh made headway but due to certain powers, transition could not be effective and the IBRD supply line was disconnected in 2004, though the Bank has appreciated the progress. This also reflects on the seriousness of donors for reform agenda.
According to the Staff Appraisal Report, the Institutional Reforms component had two sub-components focusing on reforms in the Water Wing of Wapda and the provincial irrigation departments (PIDs). The Water Wing had allocations of $31.4 million against $26.3 million for the PIDs. Yet, hardly any reforms were reported. Like the PIDs, Wapda authorities too, were reluctant to implement reforms.
Investments: Discontinuation of finances also brought investment component at halt. Again the Sindh government’s bureaucracy made the mess. The federal government mobilized alternate funding line for ongoing and pending schemes. The decision was taken in January 2005 and all provinces were asked to redeploy engineering, design and supervision (EDS) consultants.
The Punjab and the NWFP governments immediately redeployed their respective EDS; however Sida remained adamant to take a long route of repeating the whole process of hiring. Under alternate funding, Sindh was provided Rs1,396 million to carry forward the investment component by December 2006. One can easily guess that the bigger portion of this amount is bound to go unutilized since only 10 months are left and the process of approving and implementing the schemes is too cumbersome.
Currently, seven schemes are waiting for about Rs121 million to get completed. Likewise, eight others could not takeoff due to want of Rs1,134 million. No one knows what will be the fate of these schemes and overall reforms after the expiry of the revised timeline.
The finance department is also responsible for this delay. Under the alternate funding arrangement, Sindh government was supposed to fund Rs70 million through its annual development plan for 2005-06.
However, it declined to release the fund for not having a clear decision from the federal government on the extension of the NDP till 2006. Hence, the blockade of funding halted all NDP activities in Sindh from July 2005, including the stoppage of staff’s salary.
The issue was taken before the Prime Minister’s Monitoring Committee’s meeting held in Karachi in December last. Though, the finance department committed to release the funds within a day as Ecnec’s decision on extension of NDP was conve-yed to them, yet the fund release orders came after three weeks.
Research: This sub-component was part of the Sector Planning and Research component with an allocation of Rs15.3 million. Sindh has been the worst victim of drainage related problems. Not only the physical issues of water distribution, water logging and salinity are more prevalent but the institutional mess is also more concentrated here. The list of research projects shows very little research support went in Sindh and the bulk of the projects went to the Punjab-based and federal institutions mostly associated with Wapda.
Sindh being at the lowest end of the Indus Basin is considered as conduit for drainage for the upcountry. The environmental consequences could be horrible considering the institutional inefficiencies. It is pertinent to dedicate a significant portion of research component on studying long-term environmental impacts.
Since Sindh is taking lead in reforms, therefore, there is a need to understand the social aspects of participatory irrigation and drainage management. No significant social research was conducted in Sindh on the participatory management aspects. Reason for this neglect was due to the managing of the research component directly from the central cell of the NDP in Lahore, while provincial cells had very little role in decision making.
Representation was not fair as a Sindh-based Institute for Drainage Research Centre (DRC) was given representation but the person who sat on the DRC’s behalf was not from the Sindh.
Public Information: The most important aspect of the NDP was making information available to the targeted beneficiaries. A wide range of steps were committed to ensure that the stakeholders were abreast with all progress taking place. Annexure seven carries a brief note on “Public Information Centre and Library”. It was committed that Wapda’s Water Wing would establish and maintain a Public Information Centre and Library in its Lahore-based and all regional offices in addition to other public access offices such as PIDAs, the area water boards etc. No such arrangement was made under the NDP. Farmers hardly got any access to information. No periodical reports or other material ever reached the masses.
Here we can not imagine discussing the arrangements of information sharing committed under the “Project Information System” (Article 51, Annex.7). The project completed its life but no public statement was issued to tell people what eventually the project achieved and why some promised dreams could not come true.
The National Drainage Programme is now moving towards its final stages and very soon its managers will call it a day. It was high time that all stakeholders took an honest stock of the programme. The least one should do is to establish the factors responsible for less-than-the-expected rewards against huge investment. The donors should at least incorporate this learning in their other programmes.
A special reference could be the failure of the attempted institutional reforms since some donors are also proposing and implementing these in other sectors. A more fundamental question needs to be probed. Are our institutions able to undertake mega commitments?
The institutions like Wapda are not capable of being entrusted with large-scale projects, particularly those which involve highly sensitive social and environmental dimensions. These institutions might be very fast in building structures and spending money but they have minimal capacity to ensure equitable benefits to all segments.
Projects like large scale drains and dams need more competent systems to address the complex matrix of stakeholders. It requires not merely the engineering excellence but the heart of success lies in objective decision making and a genuine consideration for the potential affectees of mega projects.