FIRST a few words, by way of an obituary, regarding the dolt (no other description fits him) who took a step too far and who had not the wit to understand that it is only so much incompetent audacity the furies can stand.
There could not be a sadder commentary on the Pakistani ethos than that a person such as Nawaz Sharif, with his limited ability and unbounded greed for money and power, should have risen to the highest position in the land. In few other democratic dispensations would this have happened.
The army's hand was forced. If it had not done what it did it would have stood condemned before the bar of history. The Sharifs were wanting to do to the army what it had done to the Supreme Court: sow the seeds of dissension in its higher echelons so as to render it ineffective as a check on their ambitions. Had the Sharifs succeeded in their designs they would have had two Rana Maqbools in their service: one as the IGP Sindh and the other, in the form of Lt Gen Khawaja Ziauddin, as head of the army.
To most Pakistanis all this is very clear but the Americans are having a hard time understanding it. Or rather accepting it because the Sharifs, as their internal difficulties mounted, had started clinging to America's coat-tails, in the process becoming the greatest lackeys of the Americans that we have ever had. Benazir too kowtows in that direction and thinks nothing of exchanging inanities with second-ranking officials in the State Department. But the Sharifs beat her hollow. They bartered national self-respect in a bid to seek American support.
It takes no special wisdom to see that the condemnation of the Taliban by the two Sharif brothers in the week before their ouster was the quid pro quo for the State Department statements issued earlier in their support - statements warning the army against any extra-constitutional steps.
It is now coming out in the American press that during their visits to Washington Shahbaz Sharif and Gen Ziauddin had informed the Americans about the action contemplated against Gen Parvez Musharraf. Had the coup against Musharraf succeeded, the Americans, who consider the Pakistan army an obstacle to how they want to see Pakistan behave, would not have been displeased. The successful sacking of Musharraf would have diminished the army by dealing it a blow to its self-esteem and confidence. No wonder the Americans seem unhappy with the coup. This is not what they had been banking on.
As for their protestations about democracy, not much attention need be paid to that. When it suits them, the Americans can go along readily with coups, as in Algeria, and with unrepresentative regimes, as all over the Middle East. Since when were Egypt, Morocco and Jordan, not to mention the monarchies of the Arabian peninsula, democracies? But the Americans have not the slightest problem there. Had Sharif been anti-American and Musharraf a willing toady, the American attitude would have been vastly different.
This does not mean that any government in Pakistan should bait the US. That would be foolish. Only this that American sensitivities should be considered only up to a point and even then when they do not conflict with our own view of things - that is, in the limited number of instances when we do have an independent viewpoint. God knows we are a subservient and begging nation but there should be limits to the extent we allow ourselves to be kicked.
But more important than dissecting the past is to consider the present. What now? Already there has been too much dithering and too much want of clarity on the army's part. On the evening of the coup the army's handling of the public relations front was dumb. Admittedly, it had its hands full with other things but even so it should not have been too difficult to send someone on television to reassure a very confused nation about what was happening. On the day following the coup there was still no attempt to take the public into confidence. It is always better to treat such matters with more openness because then you take the people with you. But this lesson has yet to be learnt in Pakistan.
The army basically has two options: to fall into the clutches of lawyers in an attempt to square its constitutional difficulties or, riding the elan and momentum of its coup, deal swiftly and energetically with the confusing situation before it.
The first course would dissipate the army's energies. Legal niceties are important but the army should avoid getting bogged down in them. Whatever its reasons, the army has mounted a coup. In other words, it has overthrown an elected government by force, a government which had not lost its democratic mandate. There is nothing constitutional about this step. But it has been taken and, what is more, it has been welcomed by the people and tacitly accepted by many of the parliamentarians of the erstwhile ruling party who, far from joining any protest, are eyeing their chances in the next government. So much for party loyalty in this country.
This is the real situation on the ground as opposed to the constitutional scenarios which Pakistani lawyers are so good at making. Constitutional propriety is of importance in a country where the rule of law in the right sense of the term prevails. In Pakistan the Constitution has been violated more often than the honour of a woman who regularly walks the streets. So what are we talking about? Since the logic of the bayonet has prevailed, it is by the sharp edge of the same logic that the army should cut through its present difficulties. Told by the Oracle of Delphi that whoever opened the Gordian Knot would conquer the world, Alexander simply took out his sword and cut it. He did not go about opening it with his teeth. An example to follow in the present circumstances.
The imposition of martial law should be out as an option. It would do incalculable harm to the country and the army and turn Pakistan into another Burma (Myanmar). The army should make up its mind about who would be the best choice as prime minister (leaving this to the National Assembly would be like opening a can of worms). Then a session of the National Assembly should be summoned and with a crack guard surrounding the building, the honourable members of the august house should be told what is in their best interests: anoint the army's choice and have done with the sorry business or have themselves dissolved to fight another election.
This should take place in just one sitting. As soon as the prime minister is 'elected', a bill should be placed before the National Assembly granting immunity to the army for the actions it has taken. This too should take place in the same sitting. This Sharifian assembly has had ample experience of working at a furious pace. On at least two occasions it amended the Constitution in a matter of a few hours. It can work at the same speed again.
If need be, the Supreme Court could also be asked to provide its blessings. It will never be said of Pakistan's highest court that it has not risen to emergencies. Justice Munir's Supreme Court justified the dismissal of the constituent assembly in 1954. The same Supreme Court sanctified Ayub Khan's martial law in the Dosso case. Justice Anwar-ul-Haq's Supreme Court gave its seal of approval to General Zia-ul-Haq's martial law and even empowered the general to amend the Constitution. All these judgments were delivered at the altar of the doctrine of necessity and in the larger public interest. There is no reason to think that the apex court will not rise to the occasion once again and see which way the winds of pragmatism blow. But the army must do this its own way and not get caught in lawyers' arguments.
Having done this, the army should flee to its barracks and let the new leadership that emerges grapple with the nation's problems. Governing the country, or cleaning up WAPDA, is not the army's business. Nor its forte.
As for President Rafiq Tarar, on no account should he be touched. He is the mirror to the Pakistani soul and to look at him is to get an immediate idea of what we have done to ourselves as a nation. In lonely and isolated splendour let him stew in his own juice and let us, by looking at him, take warning for our sins.
If the army is not to be trapped by lawyers' arguments or by the prospect of another martial law, it should also not be tempted by the vision of accountability or a caretaker government for two years or more. The army is not a body of angels or reformers. It is not the Bolshevik Party of Lenin or the Communist Party of Mao. It does not have any Mustafa Kamal in its ranks. Therefore accountability of the kind that Pakistan stands in need of is beyond its capabilities. The Sharifs went after Benazir Bhutto and Asif Zardari both of whom were corrupt to the bone. It should now be the turn of the Sharifs, the Chaudries of Gujrat, the Saifur Rehmans, the Humayun Akhtars and the other fat cats of the Muslim League who have robbed the public sector banks. If the army can manage just this, it should be sufficient. It should not bite more than it can chew.
The army should specially beware of fly-by-night reformers, ex World Bank executives who, in speaking of turning the country around, are the greatest exponents of a prolonged caretaker regime. In resisting their advances the army should bear in mind that the best technocrats, when working on their own and not under some sort of a political direction, as in the times of Ayub Khan and Zia-ul-Haq, have invariably brought disaster to the country. Ghulam Ishaq Khan, Mahbubul Haq, Sartaj Aziz all worked on General Zia's behalf. What good did they do? The 1973 Constitution has proved a remarkably flexible document. It can be stretched this way and that but it probably will not recover from a prolonged caretaker experiment.
In any event, the army should not dither. It may have been forced into a situation not of its own choosing but it should get out of it quickly without getting caught in the smooth talk of would-be reformers salivating at the mouth as they look for jobs. No martial law, no prolonged caretaker set-up, only a quick session of the National Assembly under the shadow of bayonets (the only language our political class understands) to ratify the army's choice as prime minister and give the army constitutional indemnity for the actions it takes.
All this within a week, or at worst a fortnight but not more, for the army must not outstay its welcome. During this period the American ambassador should be kept at arm's length. No interference should be allowed from that quarter. When the return to barracks is complete he can be summoned and informed that whatever has happened was strictly in accordance with the spirit of the Constitution and the greater good of the Pakistani people.