We have always been good at the minor forms of cleverness. Siding with the United States and indeed often acting as its puppet in pursuit of a larger objective but exercising an element of freedom in tactical matters.
We did it under General Ziaul Haq, going the whole hog with the US in Afghanistan, and often in our zeal exceeding the call of duty. But at the same time insisting that it would be the ISI and not the CIA which would handle actual assistance to the Afghan 'Mujahideen'. We were thus able to be very much our own masters in picking and dropping Afghan favourites, in this manner proclaiming our tactical independence.
We are doing it again under another general who too is aligned with the US as far as the larger picture is concerned but who too in some areas of tactical importance is cultivating an independent style.
Becoming partners (or stooges?) in the war against terrorism inevitably meant forswearing the policy of 'jihad'. September 11 made our old Taliban policy no longer affordable. So compelled less by home-grown wisdom than by the crushing weight of the new reality, we cut links with the Taliban and gave every assistance asked for when America started bombing Afghanistan.
Seeking to make the most of the situation, India invoked the spectre and logic of terrorism in Kashmir. Responding sympathetically to Indian concerns, America put pressure on Pakistan, compelling General Pervez Musharraf to declare war against religious extremism at home and assure the US that Pakistan would stop aiding the Kashmir 'jihad'.
For these twin turnarounds - first the Taliban, then Kashmir - Musharraf was roundly denounced. But with distance lending perspective, it is increasingly clear that Musharraf has been less blind or a mindless puppet and more of a smart operator. 'Jihad' or whatever you call it in Kashmir hasn't come to an end and in Afghanistan the Taliban, far from being a spent force, are a rising challenge to American interests and the stability of the Karzai regime. The Bush White House may be worried the most about Iraq but Afghanistan isn't helping either.
On both fronts Pakistan is playing a deft game. American concerns about ending support to the Kashmir 'jihad' - in Indian parlance, "cross-border terrorism" - have been met, perhaps halfway. But this hasn't meant the end of militant activity in Kashmir.
Worse from India's point of view is the fact that with the United States more preoccupied with Afghanistan and Iraq, it has less time to worry about Indo-Pak relations. Tellingly, during the recent visit to Islamabad of Deputy Secretary of State Armitage and Assistant Secretary Rocca, with Centcom commander Gen Abizaid also in Islamabad at the same time, the subject most discussed with the Pakistani side was Afghanistan.
Not long ago Armitage was acting as high peacemaker between Delhi and Islamabad and applying not a little muscle to Pakistan to make it more amenable to Indian wishes. With the US focus now concentrated on Afghanistan and further afield on Iraq, not any more. The US-India 'strategic' relationship may be growing but the Kashmir-specific pressure on Pakistan would appear to have eased.
This puts in perspective Mr Vajpayee's peace initiative proclaimed earlier this year in Srinagar. As long as the US was an interested mediator (facilitator?), things looked promising, pundits on both sides expending an ocean of ink analysing the road ahead.
But with US interest engaged elsewhere and not likely to return until the presidential election is out of the way, all those high hopes have evaporated, leaving India and Pakistan in the familiar mode of sullenness and suspicion. Tinged with not a little hysteria. Perhaps one more proof of the proposition that left to themselves, both countries are incapable of acting in a sane manner.
What remains of that high season of hope is the lonely bus service between Lahore and New Delhi (four times a week both ways), a journey I propose to make later this month.
Regarding the fight against what the Americans choose to call "the remnants" of Al Qaeda and the Taliban, Pakistan could scarcely cooperate more, guarding the porous Pak-Afghan frontier and helping chase and catch the elusive Taliban. Another sellout, thunder the zealots of the religious right now in power in the Frontier province and with a commanding influence in Balochistan, the two Pakistani provinces which border Afghanistan.
This cooperation should attract unqualified approbation. Instead, either because the Afghan situation is going badly for the Americans or picking scapegoats is a convenient exercise, Pakistan is drawing criticism for lending covert support to the Taliban.
But with Pakistan still the lynchpin in the war against the Taliban, it becomes difficult for the US to make too much of its Pakistani suspicions. As Ahmed Rashid (journalist and Taliban authority) puts it: "Musharraf is playing a deft game, exploiting his leverage over the Americans while doing just enough to curtail overt US criticism."Just days before his arrival in Pakistan, Armitage voiced his doubts about Pak policy in these words: "I do not think that affection for working with us extends up and down the rank-and-file of the Pakistani security community." Questioned about these remarks in Islamabad, he did some quick on-camera backtracking by declaring that the Pakistan armed forces were 200 per cent behind General Musharraf. What else could he say?
Behind such equivocation are the Americans taking cover. Perhaps it's also a way to keep the pressure on Pakistan. Milking its support for what it is worth and yet asking for more. Or perhaps it is genuine frustration born of the resurgence of the Taliban. The Taliban were supposed to have been annihilated by the 'daisy-cutters'. Just as the Baathists were supposed to have been vanquished in Iraq. In these circumstances, the Americans have little choice but to smother any suspicions they may have of Pak policy.
Strategically, then, the US may be leading Pakistan on a puppet-string. Tactically, it is Musharraf who seems to be leading them by the tail.
The question to ask is whether over the long term such games are worth playing. We played them before in Zia's time and thought no end of our cleverness. Look where that cleverness got us. Our military jehadists saw Afghanistan through eyes misted by visions of Islamic glory. They thought they were gaining 'strategic depth'. What they got was a can of worms.
The real game, bleeding the Soviet Union, was played by the US and when its purposes were achieved it walked away, leaving Pakistan stuck with the wreckage. Fifteen, twenty years on, we are still living with the gifts of that conflict: guns, drugs and an ever-spiralling cycle of religious extremism. Some things are best left alone. Afghanistan is one of them.
Kashmir policy too needs a rethink. Not about its fundamentals - the right of self-determination - for no one has the right to alter that. Indian independence and partition itself were expressions of the right of self-determination. The Kashmiris were promised that right but have been denied it. Another fifty or a hundred years may dim the memory of this fact but will not alter the fact itself. A rethink of militancy, however, is called for. Can it bring India to the negotiating table or freedom to the Kashmiri people? If not, what then its purpose?
The larger picture, that's what Pakistan needs to get right. How much energy to set aside to foreign policy adventures and how much to devote to the more pressing task of putting own house in order. Strategic depth at home: once we have that we'll have all the depth we'll ever require.