SO Musharraf has achieved the hung parliament he desired. But one thing that must be a cause of some concern at GHQ and the presidency is that the numbers just do not add up.

Simple arithmetic tells us that with a house of 272 directly elected members (some elected more directly than others, but that is another story), a coalition of at least 137 is needed to form the government. On paper, the easiest and quickest way to achieve this is for the PPP (63 seats) and the PML (Q) (77 seats) to join hands. Others would jump on the bandwagon, willy-nilly. Such expediency would keep the extremist Muttahida Majlis-i-Amal (MMA), out in the cold, at least at the national level.

One suspects this could be a preferred choice with the establishment because whatever they may say, they are very uncomfortable with having to deal with the group of mullas with a mandate. While trying to fine-tune the run-up to the elections to ensure that neither Benazir Bhutto's PPP nor Nawaz Sharif's faction of the Muslim League performed too well, the government's team of fixers forgot about the threat from the extreme right. But now it has to live with a fundamentalist government in the Frontier province, with at least a strong presence of the same elements in Balochistan.

One school of thought believes that it would be better to let them have a share in power at the centre as well with a view to having a better handle on them, and avoid tension between Islamabad and the two provinces under their control. But there are other issues at stake here: most of the components of the MMA want a more militant policy on Kashmir, for example. Then they want the government to reverse its present policy on Afghanistan, denying support to the American war against the Taliban and Al Qaeda. Internally, they want to do away with the universal practice of interest rates, apart from imposing the Sharia and scrapping the system of civil law.

In case they acquire a major voice at the centre - as they would if they are a key component in the ruling coalition - their policies would be disastrous for the economy and our external relations. Other repercussions would include a further erosion of the rights of women and the minorities. Foreign investments, already down to a trickle because of the recent attacks against western interests, would dry up completely if banking practices are made to conform to an interest-free regime. Foreign loans from both private and institutional sources would be similarly disrupted.

Their hard-line views on Kashmir would make any future negotiations with India next to impossible. For years many of the components of the MMA have collected funds and sent volunteers to fight in Kashmir; if they become a part of the federal government, they are unlikely to soften their stance. Indeed, their presence will strengthen the hands of the faction in the high command that favours a riskier Kashmir policy.

But it is our relationship with the West that will be most severely affected by the inclusion of the MMA in the ruling coalition at the centre. Already, voices in Washington and London have accused Pakistan of not doing enough to rein in local Islamic militants, and allowing them to shelter elements of Taliban and Al Qaeda who have infiltrated into the country. Once the MMA is in a position of authority in Islamabad and Peshawar, it will be difficult, if not impossible, to control the movement and activities of the extremists, or to deny the charge that we are 'soft on terrorism'. In addition, the proximity of Islamic holy warriors anywhere near our nuclear programme would be perceived as a major threat abroad.

While the MMA has surprised all observers and pundits (including this one) by the sheer magnitude of its electoral success, we must not let the numerical results disguise the fact that to a large extent, its success is as much an ethnic as an ideological one. Many Pakistanis, particularly those in the Pakhtoon belt or their cousins living elsewhere in the country, felt a great deal of sympathy for their fellow tribals in Afghanistan who have been subjected to very heavy and occasionally ill-aimed bombing by the Americans over the last year.

The government's support for the Americans has been hugely unpopular with those who voted for the MMA that became the beneficiary of this backlash. Thus the votes they received for their one-point, anti-West agenda should not be interpreted as a mandate for a radical, ideological overhaul of internal and external policies.

Many of us had pointed out that the real problems for the military-led regime would begin after the elections when even a hung parliament and a docile prime minister would be forced to demand that the army hand over some real powers. The dynamics of the situation would change, and elected representatives would want a share in the pie. However, the changes and surprises thrown up by the recent elections are of a totally unexpected nature as the MMA represents an ideological force that will be harder to fob off by cosmetic changes.

But in addressing the issues they will raise, it would be useful to remember that this is the first time the components of the MMA have joined together, and chances are that it will not be a very cohesive coalition. Once power-sharing raises its divisive head, there is no telling how these groups will be able to function in harmony.

Unfortunately, given Pakistan's fractured political history, politicians have little experience at running complex coalitions, specially with the army looking closely over their shoulders. It is tempting to suggest that all democratic forces join hands in and out of parliament to demand the withdrawal of the generals from politics. However, many of the politicians who now grace the National Assembly owe their success to the patronage they have received from the government and are unlikely to be ungrateful enough to bite the hand that fed them.

In a talk arranged by the Commonwealth Society in London to discuss the prospects of democracy in Pakistan after the elections, speakers politely addressed the problems facing the newly elected parliament, and the chances of democracy finally taking root. A couple of members also asked about the role of the army and how it was possible to discuss democracy in Pakistan with the army so heavily entrenched in the system.

In the present scenario, however, the army needs to realize that its institutional interests lie in supporting secular elements and not the forces of darkness.