Resignation: what other posture to adopt when Pakistan's saviours insist on listening to nothing but their own wisdom? Gen Musharraf says that for the state's efficient running there must be 'unity of command' - a delightful phrase that could issue only from the lips of a military thinker. There has been total unity of command since he seized power. What miracles have been wrought during this period?
From a Maoist point of view the situation is excellent. The Pakistan army and its para-military auxiliaries are fighting somebody else's dirty war in the tribal areas bordering Afghanistan. We don't know why we are in this fight and are not even receiving too many thanks for our loyal contribution. All we know is that we are in waters too deep for us. Meanwhile, even as American commandos (the famous special forces) lead us by the nose in our own tribal belt, American policemen (which is what the FBI is) roam all over the country. For this exalted role what do we get? More kicks and more lectures.
Islamabad is the hottest point on the global lecture circuit these days. Any American and British official with a day to spare makes a detour to it to read Pakistan's military leaders lectures on responsible behaviour and the necessity of complying with Indian demands. Our generals, impressive and even formidable in their uniforms, look like lambs being led to the slaughter as they take in these lectures.
Not for nothing has an Ambassador-of-the-Year award been conferred on our spear-woman in Washington (by a hitherto hidden organization, Women Ambassador Foundation). No country has done more for the US in its war on Afghanistan than Pakistan. No country has been a more willing ally. No country has received so little for doing so much. Who more deserving of this award than the ambassador who helped sell such a policy to her military bosses in Islamabad? Not that her military bosses needed much persuading. Still, the soup Pakistan is in was a team effort. As such, our mission in Washington is entitled to claim its share of the honours.
The kicks we are receiving are being delivered from two sides, by the US and India. What if Jahangir Ashraf Qazi, our returning high commisssioner from New Delhi, had been given an ambassador-of-the-year award in the Indian capital? We would have thought there was something wrong. Washington, however, is a different proposition. What might be considered questionable zeal elsewhere qualifies for the highest accolades there.
But to add to our confusion, not only has India emulated America's example in subjecting us to pressure. It is also proving as fickle and hard-to-please as the US. Forsaking the freedom struggle in Kashmir we have virtually accepted yesterday's freedom fighters as today's terrorists. Of all our U-turns this has been the most dramatic. That on its merits our Kashmir policy was unsustainable is beside the point. This consideration would have been relevant had we decided to reverse this policy on our own. This we did not do. We reversed under pressure: from a combination of the same American and Indian arm-twisting that has been our lot since the US recruited us in its holy war on terror.
Yet India is not satisfied. Despite all of Pakistan's exertions, it continues to accuse Pakistan of bad faith. In his very first remarks as India's new foreign minister, Yashwant Sinha has accused Pakistan of reneging on its commitment to end infiltration across the Line of Control. For good measure he has cast aspersions on our leadership: "We need to be very, very careful in our dealings with General Musharraf...He tried to escape from (his promise) not once but three to four times." India never liked our hostility. It is not satisfied with our appeasement. Compliance is a slippery slope. Once on it there is no end to the demands made on a country's patience and flexibility.
This was the external side of our excellent situation. Matters are not much different on the internal front. Looking beleaguered and wounded, the military government has boxed itself into a corner. To all appearances, it is the government versus the rest of Pakistan (with only the district nazims on the government's side). This too because the nazims will swim or sink with their masters, the mutuality of interests here being closely inter-woven.
For the rest even the military's supporters in the Q (as for Quisling) League are looking wan and dispirited. Indeed they look about the unhappiest people in the political arena. Hoping to ride to glory on the military's coattails, they have ended up being identified with the military's failures. Carrying the charge of toadyism for something in return - proximity to power, the crumbs of office - is a bearable undertaking. But incurring this charge without compensation of any kind is a heavy cross to carry. Such has been the lot of the Q League.
It might have been supposed that with the October elections approaching the political landscape would be getting clearer. Instead, thanks to General Naqvi and the hard work of the National Reconstruction Bureau, it is shrouded in more mist and confusion than at any time since the military takeover. National Demolition Bureau would have been a fitter name for this construction company.
Will the military government get away with its plans? Will it be able to conduct elections on its terms minus its two nemeses: the PPP and the Nawaz League? It's hard to say. The government seems very determined but then it's been determined about so much before only to make the most dramatic U-turns under pressure. What are the pressures it faces on the domestic front?
Anyone talking of the masses pouring into the streets is talking through his hat. Having gone through a rough school of cynicism, the people of Pakistan have lost all appetite for the politics of agitation. They have been resigned to so much: tough economic conditions, turnarounds on the external front, national humiliation in its different varieties. They are unlikely to show much anger over Gen Naqvi's constitutional proposals or the one-sided traffic Gen Musharraf and his team are looking for in the October elections. So no fears from that quarter.
There is, however, such a thing as a spiritual or moral reverse. Gen Musharraf may push through his constitutional proposals - which are more a multi-layered insurance policy than anything to do with stability or checks-and-balances - and he may well be able to hold the kind of elections he desires. But these strategems will leave his already beleaguered government looking more impoverished and isolated than ever.
Take the example of the referendum. It has caused no physical damage but it has left the government looking hollow - the emperor revealed without his clothes. This is not a fruitful path to pursue. Gen Musharraf's advisers haven't shown themselves to be the smartest men around but if they are not totally dumb, or not entirely adrift from reality, they too must have a sense of the dire straits the regime is in.
Why then is the situation excellent? Because it can't get any worse than this. When things are in such a mess they can only improve. Or so at least one would hope in a rational setting. But what if the setting is not rational? What if army and government persevere with their self-defeating plans? What if the itch to foist another disastrous experiment on the country proves too strong to resist? It takes no seer to conclude that we'll then be in for a greater mess.
Pakistan cannot afford the NRB's harebrained constitutional schemes. It cannot afford a less than fair election. It cannot afford doctored attempts to perpetuate the legacy of authoritarianism. It needs to turn a clean face to the future. But will its iron controllers let it?