Once again a successful attempt is afoot to confuse the Pakistani public. It is being told that the military government has made a brave and correct choice in not siding with the Taliban and in agreeing to assist the United States in its still fuzzy war against 'global terrorism'. This proposition is worth examining, if only briefly.
Regardless of the guilt or innocence of Osama bin Laden, only a Pakistani government gone mad could have sided with the Taliban at this juncture. And if a mad Pakistani government had taken such a step it would have faced the wrath of the Pakistani people first before facing anything else from the US. The common Pakistani would have been appalled at such a decision. So what is the military government taking credit for? That it did not go down the path of madness?
The real choice before it was either to go the whole hog with the Americans, without asking any questions, or to preserve a semblance of calm and while offering assistance question the Americans on specifics and the likely fallout of future events on Pakistan. Would Washington have considered such a demarche as rebellion?
All this talk of Pakistani installations being wiped out in four days by American military might, and of an American-Indian nexus developing to punish Pakistan, is not so much counsel of fear as of outright absurdity. We wouldn't have been telling the Americans to go to hell. We would merely have been trying to see through the haze. This might have provoked American bluster but for how long? American rhetoric is already toning down (not that CNN or other TV channels are greatly helping this process). So it would have been in our case, without our precious 'nuclear strategic assets' facing the threat of instant annihilation.
But we sought wisdom in panic and promised the Americans everything they asked for. If this was the brave and correct choice made by the military government then it is a matter of opinion that no other course was available.
While military specifics are blanketed in uncertainty one thing is for sure: after the storm passes Pakistan will be left alone holding a flood of refugees. We can't cope with our own problems. How do we cope with the problems of a war brought to our doorsteps? Debt rescheduling and the partial lifting of US economic sanctions will provide us much-needed relief. But are these rewards adequate to the problems that we are likely to face?
Far from focusing on the refugee question, Pakistan's diplomatic and military bonzes are still pursuing the chimera of a pro-Pakistan regime in Afghanistan. For 22 years, no less, we have played this game, now supporting one faction or leader, now another. To no avail. From Hikmatyar, once the ISI's darling, to the Taliban, our king-making efforts in Afghanistan have come to haunt us. But we refuse to learn and even at this time Foreign Minister Sattar is warning the world about the consequences of supporting the Northern Alliance.
Why can't we get over our Afghan obsession? It has distorted national thinking more than any other issue. Sectarianism, the militarization of religion, the spawning of a maulvi and 'jehadi' culture, the spread of madrassah education and the besmirching of Pakistan's image abroad are all offshoots and consequences of this.
Something else too. The lines between domestic and external policies have become blurred as a result of this involvement. The forces of religion which should have been confined at home have become regional players. The intelligence agencies whose role should be confined to external vigilance have spread their wings to dabble in domestic politics. Therefore while the spirit of jihad has distorted foreign policy priorities, the spirit of intervention and guidance has destabilized national politics. Getting out of this mess is a more pressing necessity than shoring up our sinking finances.
The present moment brings with it an opportunity. For the first time since 1978 - when after the Taraki coup we got involved in Afghan affairs - the nexus between home-grown fundamentalism and the military has been broken. The clerics are on one side, the military commanders on the other. This is the real godsend for Pakistan, even more than the lure of economic benefits. The people of Pakistan were helpless before this alliance and on their own could never have ruptured it.
But for Pakistan to fully recover from the effects of this alliance, this rupture has to be made permanent. Putting the religious parties in their place is not a problem. They have always lacked popular support and still do. Which is why their calls to the public have largely gone unheeded. The more important task is to eradicate the maulvi or fundamentalist mindset from the intelligence agencies. If one of the spin-offs of the present crisis is this, some of the irrationality dogging national policy these last 20 years will be removed. As Ardeshir Cowasjee has aptly put it, the enemy is within. Let us look to it rather than to demons such as the Northern Alliance.
As to the expected bonanza from dancing to America's tune, let us put it in perspective. Money is one thing, the ability to use it another. For our services in Afghanistan during the eighties we got plenty of money. Where did it all go? Where has Indonesia's oil wealth gone? Or for that matter, Nigeria's? In both cases pilfered by a corrupt oligarchy.
This is where self-respect and national dignity come in. The work ethic, without which no development is possible, is closely linked to such intangibles as dignity, honour and the ability to look adversity in the eye. The notion current in Pakistan that we have no dignity and therefore should not worry too much about how we get some economic advantage is little different from the mentality of the street-walker. Allied to this notion is the belief that showing the faintest streak of independence is akin to national annihilation. National weakness can't get purer than this.
Look at neighbouring Iran, a terrorist state in American eyes. The British foreign secretary comes to pay a visit and inclines his body ever so slightly when he meets the Iranian president. The two sides hold useful talks but soon after Jack Straw's departure the Iranian spiritual leader, Ali Khamenei, delivers a blistering attack on the US and says that Iran will not be part of any coalition against the Taliban (even though, let us bear in mind, there's no love lost between Iran and the Taliban). No one is talking of flattening Iran. Agreed, our economic difficulties are greater. But then the economic argument, stripped to essentials, underlies the philosophy of the street-walker.
Clarity is the first casualty in such a situation. If one talks of national pride, it is taken to be jingoism. If it is said that we explore details with the Americans and seek guarantees for the problems that are bound to arise, it is read as support for the Taliban. If military wisdom - which, after all, is responsible for our Afghan imbroglio - is questioned in any way, we say national unity is threatened. It is a time for unity but also a time for scepticism because once events are on the march it may be too late to ask any questions.
Another thing. When US anger is assuaged after punishing the real or imagined perpetrators of the recent terrorist attacks, Pakistan will still be left with the necessity of living in peace with its neighbours. There will still be an Afghanistan to our right and an India to our left, and an unsettled Kashmir on the roof of the world. Now that we are riding high on the tide of world opinion it would be especially becoming on our part to renew the invitation to the Indian prime minister to visit Pakistan. What if India tried to embarrass us during the present crisis? Must we play tit-for-tat with it always? To do something not out of compulsion but free choice will make us look good and lend an aura of statesmanship to our diplomacy.