The canker in an ideal relationship What could be more enduring or stable than our friendship with China? Yet somehow we still end up protesting too much about it. Basking in the glow and warmth of an old and trusted relationship is one thing. But acting in a manner that at times comes suspiciously close to hysteria only goes to reveal a sense of insecurity.
For a government that is read lectures in democracy by the West it is no doubt tempting to play up the iconic status of its ties with China, especially a China whose shadow looms ever larger on the world stage. Even so, it helps to remember that while China fills a vital space in Pakistan's quest for international support and sympathy, it is in no position to cover all of Pakistan's needs.
The relationship between Israel and the US is strategic in every sense of the word. The US makes sure Israel enjoys military preponderance over its neighbours. When Israel goes to war US support is automatic and comprehensive.
There is a material aspect to the relationship between Pakistan and China. But its essence is emotional and sentimental, fulfilling Pakistan's psychological need for an external anchor to shore up its position against India. This need was first met by the United States which not only helped build up the Pakistan military but also, in lieu of Pakistan's client status in the cold war, strengthened Pakistan's self-esteem as it sought equivalence with India. When the US disavowed this role, Pakistan sought to fill the breach by turning to China.
To be honest, Pakistan with its constant and reiterative whining over Kashmir and other problems can test the forbearance of friend and foe alike. But China has conducted itself in exemplary fashion, much like a patient psychoanalyst, lending a sympathetic ear to Pakistan's often baffling troubles and proffering, when the occasion arises, calm and soothing advice. But it is in no position to act as nanny to Pakistan as the US acts towards Israel. Not so much from want of inclination as for lack of means. China has not the wherewithal - or, to be fair, the reasons - to support us the way the US reinforces the bastion of its interests in the Middle East.
Chinese weapons we buy out of poverty or necessity, not as a matter of first choice. When we have the money, we do our arms shopping in the West: F-16s from the US, Agosta submarines from France, even tanks from the Ukraine, and so on. Our trade is with the West, our sturdy begging bowl tipped in that direction. With China we discuss project aid, undoubtedly useful but not urgent. With the IMF we talk economic survival. In Chinese company we are infected with Maoist enthusiasm and in that mood even dyed-in-the-wool mandarins talk sternly of self-reliance. But when the moment passes, as it soon does, and grim necessity takes hold, the same mandarins open their account books to inquisitors from Washington.
Not to forget an important point, our much-vaunted nuclear programme also has a western parenthood. Dr Khan, our Oppenheimer now mercifully put out to pasture by the military government, got his blueprints from Holland, not from any university in China. And over the years most of the components that have gone into the creation of the Kahuta complex have originated from western countries.
None of this is to decry our China friendship. Far from it. But we need not to be victims of our own rhetoric. The Pakistani establishment has always been fixated on foreign policy and has been slave to the belief that triumphs abroad (most of them painfully short-lived) can make up for failures (some of them painfully enduring) at home.
In the 50's and 60's the forging of the American connection made us neglect more urgent duties of nation-building and constitution-framing. In 1971 the role we played in opening bridges between the US and China was partially responsible for General Yahya's arrogance and his belief that he could bypass the necessity of seeking a political settlement in East Pakistan. In the 80's the role we played in Afghanistan to further American interests made us turn a blind eye to our own national interest. The dangers we courted then have become more intractable with time while the rest of the world has moved on to other things.
In 1965 China issued an ultimatum to India, something which we tend to believe prevented India from making any move against a defenceless East Pakistan. But Chinese leaders, veterans of the Long March, were baffled by our inability to even consider prolonging the war beyond 15 or 17 days. In 1971 the Chinese leadership advised moderation in East Pakistan. But General Yahya Khan was somehow persuaded that China would intervene militarily on our behalf. In 1999 when fighting flared over Kargil China counselled us to step back. All in all then, a restraining influence on our exuberance. But we have always tended to read more into this relationship than warranted by the facts.
So we come to the present. Just a day or two after Premier Zhu Rongji left Pakistan, General Musharraf at the Institute of Strategic Studies in Islamabad said: "Pakistan's security interests lie in maintaining regional balance..." While there can be no quarrel with this he went on to say: "...and in this (that is, in maintaining a regional balance) it would desire an active Chinese role...This role will remain vital, specially so in the changing geo-strategic realities. The end of the Cold War has led to a change in global equation, leading to emergence of regional hegemons or countries with hegemonistic tendencies. South Asia is a victim of regional hegemonism. This creates regional imbalance which, in turn, threatens peace." In plain language this means that China should to step in to balance India's growing clout in South Asia.
Quite apart from the circumstance that whoever is responsible for this tortured syntax deserves a spell in the stocks, the thinking behind these words is flawed. A regional imbalance anywhere - East Asia, the Middle East, South Asia - is a recipe for instability. But whereas in East Asia - Japan, China, the Koreas - the balance of power is maintained by the US, and whereas in the Middle East the imbalance in Israel's favour is promoted and sustained by the US, in South Asia the role or interventionism of no outside power, not even China's, is needed to redress any imbalance. If it is, then Pakistan's nuclear arsenal and its large army make no sense.
Let us rid ourselves of the notion that South Asia is a victim of hegemonism. India is not that powerful nor Pakistan that weak for hegemonism to flourish. True, India tends to be overbearing while dealing with its neighbours - a tendency arising as much from its size as from its parvenu status which goads it to prove that it is a great power. But Pakistan needs no outside help to offset this tendency or stand up to India when the occasion demands.
If anything, any high profile foreign role in South Asia will exacerbate not check instability for it will spur India to spend more on defence and missiles. Which in turn will prompt Pakistan to match India bomb for bomb and missile for missile. Stability in the sub-continent lies in two things: limiting and then downscaling the military competition between India and Pakistan; and finding a modus vivendi (as opposed to the chimerical notion of an outright solution) over Jammu and Kashmir. But this has to be a native endeavour. The wisdom to live as good (and wary) neighbours will have to come from within the sub-continent, not outside it.
As for Pakistan, it must learn to take its own decisions without knee-jerk reflexes to external stimuli. What if the Vajpayee government is currying favour with the Bush administration by making supportive noises over the bogey of missile defence? It doesn't mean we swing immediately in the other direction. Nor should it mean we get upset by some ill-judged remarks of a second-tier State Department official like Richard Armitage. It should take more than this to upset our equanimity.
Pakistan must learn to get out of its Indo-centred mode of foreign policy. While what India does matters to us, every foolish word uttered in New Delhi should not call for a matching Pakistani response. Consider the harm we did ourselves when we fell for Indian sabre-rattling after India's nuclear tests and went for tests of our own. If only we could have checked our horses then.
The best answer to Indian hegemonism is not a China active in South Asia but a Pakistan at peace with itself and strong at home, something that can only come from its own efforts. If there is one thing China's example has to teach us it is this.