FORGET about large corporations. Try running a corner retail store part-time. You'll have a job on your hands balancing the books and running up a profit. Yet is it not a little strange that ordinary rules of prudence which would apply to any business are regularly disregarded when it comes to the running of Pakistan's premier institution: its puissant army?

In recent times no professional army of such size and standing has had so many part-time chiefs who have dabbled in politics as much as they have devoted time and attention to their own calling. Those who rode off into the sunset when their time was up are the timorous exceptions in this story; the part-time generalissimos who commanded the army, ruled the country and presided over some of its more epic disasters the dispiriting norm.

Now with General Musharraf saying that come October when his term as army chief expires he will not be retiring, thus confirming what has been suspected for some time, the norm once again is set to take precedence over the exceptions. Of the two roads before him Musharraf has chosen the one taken not by Karamat, Kakar and Tikka Khan - the on-time retirees and in Karamat's case the premature retiree - but by his more illustrious predecessors: Ayub, Yahya and Zia.

Maybe it is necessity (another name for the Fates) which is determining his course. After all he finds himself in power much as the afore-mentioned caesars did. And the retention and preservation of power puts a premium on sound insurance policies. While elected leaders look to their approval ratings, un-elected leaders have other priorities. Turning the Christian doctrine of reciprocity on its head, they try to ensure that what they have done unto others happens not to them. In other words, that they are not hoisted on their own fire-engines. That is why in a setting such as Pakistan's they try to provide for themselves by riding two horses at the same time: that of the army and political power.

But a pressing question arises. If in this one particular General Musharraf is taking out the insurance policy of his predecessors, what makes him so sure he will remain immune to their example or fate (take your pick) in other particulars?

Ayub and Yahya came to sticky ends. So in a manner of speaking did Zia. Eventually, all the insurance policies in the world could not save them. Why? Because the very fact that they rode two horses, and no Roman slave was around to whisper into their ears that they were mortal, befuddled their vision and undermined their horsemanship. As Plato instructs in the Republic, don't mix professions. Stick to what you know best. As any barman will tell you, don't mix your drinks.

As president, Ayub had a nominal C-in-C in the loyal Musa Khan (there being no running away from Khans in Pakistan). But Ayub in everything was very much his own master and it was he not Musa who took the fateful steps which led to the futility of the 1965 war. Yahya of course was architect to Pakistan's greatest humiliation. Zia's baleful legacy continues to haunt the nation. What will Musharraf's contribution be to the sum of national achievement?

If only the army was clear about its priorities. We have the examples of Thailand, Burma and Indonesia where the army is a domestic player, keen on politics and corporate business and not driven by extra-territorial aims. In Pakistan it is altogether different: domestic and external ambitions impinge upon each other. The army's star status at home encourages it to adopt brave postures abroad. Hence the involvement in Afghanistan and Kashmir. Hence also the confusion surrounding our nuclear doctrine.

It is a case of one fallacy leading to another. In Afghanistan all the strategic gains went to the US. We only acquired a set of problems - guns, drugs, refugees - which continue to bedevil us till today. In Kashmir tactical engagement has become an end in itself with no strategic purpose, at least none readily identifiable or consistent with reality. As for our nuclear toys, the fallacies they helped breed led directly to Kargil. This is not to say we should not have acquired a nuclear capability. India perhaps left us with no choice in the matter. But what ill wind drove us to ape India's example and test our nuclear devices?

Over-extended reach, over-extended lances, that's our predicament: the tilting at windmills in the distance when more pressing problems nearer home call for attention. Taxes the state cannot collect, law and order it cannot maintain, or at least not adequately. But it must be prey to grandiose if not farcical ambitions. Of course Pakistan is better off than many countries. Of course its people, or most of them, have enough to eat. But that is not the point. Why is its potential lying unfulfilled? Why is the machinery of state stricken by paralysis? Why can't simple things be done? We are not a nation without talent. We don't deserve to be at the bottom of the league. Why then are our affairs so mismanaged?

Musharraf is doing the familiar thing, anointing himself pope (wait for Tarar's exit), emperor and warlord. It is as if we have learned nothing from the past. If after all our travails the only solution to hand is the Ayub Khan, Yahya Khan or Zia-ul Haq way of doing things it does not say much for our political ingenuity. Never reinforce failure is a military maxim. What about not following bad examples?

At present too much is being taken for granted. Agreed that Nawaz Sharif pushed the army command into taking precipitate action. In trying to remove Musharraf in a manner that can only be called cavalier he no doubt over-reached himself. But then the army's response should have fitted the provocation, not exceeded it. Maybe General Musharraf had to become Chief Executive: a compulsion of the situation he was in. But what is the compulsion in playing Napoleon (who crowned himself emperor with his own hands) in October? If he achieves nothing in two years what does he hope to achieve thereafter?

In the wake of such a decision come a hundred other compromises. Because Zia kept extending his term as army chief he had to humour his fellow generals. Thus in his time we had a surfeit of four-star luminaries: Iqbal Khan, Sawar Khan, Rahimuddin, Akhtar Abdur Rehman, K. M. Arif. Grand admirals without ships, air chief marshals without adequate aircraft, full generals more adept at politics than the requirements of command.

Riding double horses is dangerous for you can fall in between. A political leader who has the army as his real constituency loses suppleness: knowing he can count on the army's support he acts rigidly when he should be flexible. On the other hand, an army chief who is also political satrap compromises his professionalism. It was not boozing or womanising which did us in in 1971 but a sclerotic high command whose exposure to wealth and power had left it unfit for war.

But is wailing or breast-beating going to make the slightest difference? It never has in the past and will not do so now. We are set on a course and must gather its fruits before we can move on to anything else.