GENERAL Musharraf's refusal to meet Sheikh Hasina Wajid, the Bangladeshi prime minister, in New York recently came as a rude shock to those of us who thought relations between our two countries were cordial.
Just last month she had sent a personal envoy to the Pakistani Chief Executive with an offer to mediate in the dispute between Pakistan and India. The sudden freezing of relations occurred because in her speech at the UN General Assembly, Sheikh Hasina had suggested that action should be taken against military regimes that overthrow elected governments. Although Pakistan was not directly mentioned, our diplomats took umbrage and presumably advised General Musharraf to 'postpone' the planned meeting with the Bangladeshi prime minister.
Big mistake. The fact is that military juntas and coups d'etat are now very unfashionable, and the latest one in Pakistan was universally condemned. Indeed, we were thrown out of the Commonwealth, and yet its secretary-general was given a red carpet treatment when he came calling recently. If we are so touchy about Sheikh Hasina's remarks at the UN, then surely we ought to have snubbed the Commonwealth secretary-general. The fact is that in today's scenario, we need all the friends we can get instead of distancing ourselves from the few we do have left.
Both regionally and globally, we are more isolated today than ever before, and this is not just because the generals have taken over. A number of policies spanning the last two decades have contributed to our current isolation. Turn by turn we have offended friends and refused to stay in step with the far-reaching geopolitical and economic changes that have been sweeping the globe. As a result, we are virtually alone in the world today.
Ever since Pakistan's creation 53 years ago, we have been preoccupied with the threat we perceived from India, and virtually our entire foreign policy since then has been directed towards neutralizing this threat. To some extent, this was and remains a legitimate concern: every state has the right and the duty to protect its frontiers. But this preoccupation has become the be-all and end-all of successive governments, and support on Kashmir is the yardstick by which our relations with other states are measured.
Our Afghan policy was largely driven by the concept of 'strategic depth' dreamed up by General Zia who saw a grateful and pliant Afghanistan becoming a sort of client state that would give Pakistan the kind of defensive depth denied us by geography. After the soviet pull-out, we have continued playing favourites in the subsequent civil war that has devastated our neighbour for the same elusive goal. By our open-ended support of the Taliban, we have antagonized Iran, a traditionally close friend. The fallout of this policy has also caused deep resentment in the Central Asian Republics - countries that we had hoped to engage in lucrative commercial deals.
The efforts of well-heeled religious groups to export militant Islam and to support Islamic movements elsewhere have not been kindly received abroad. The Russians are furious with us, accusing us of sending armed militants to help the rebellious Chechens. While we may well sympathize with the embattled Chechens, the fact is that sending armed men will naturally be seen as a hostile act. The Chinese are upset over the activities of Pakistani fundamentalists in Xingjiang where Muslim separatists are waging a low-intensity struggle for their own homeland. The recent lethal explosion in Urumqi has been attributed to them. And although these actions have largely been undertaken by private groups and militias, the Pakistan government has been perceived as turning a blind eye to these hostile and subversive elements.
The nuclear devices that were exploded two years ago did not add to our international popularity either. Granted that they were triggered by India's earlier tests, the fact is that we had a real opportunity to occupy the moral high ground and isolate our neighbour by foregoing testing at that time. The rewards for such a bold act of statesmanship would have been large, but Nawaz Sharif had neither the vision nor the courage to seize the moment. The result of our knee-jerk reaction to the Indian tests was international condemnation, the disastrous freezing of foreign currency accounts and its resultant loss of confidence and crippling economic sanctions.
Kargil was a defining moment for Pakistan in many ways. Internally, the brief but bitter fighting had the effect of driving a wedge between the army chief and Nawaz Sharif, and led inexorably to the latter's ouster. But externally, the fallout was equally severe: the world saw Pakistan as an irresponsible nation that put regional security at nuclear risk by launching a military adventure without provocation. And when the perceived author and executor of the Kargil plan took power through a coup, Pakistan was well and truly in the doghouse.
Right or wrong, the world now sees Pakistan as a dangerous country that has nuclear capability and is governed by irresponsible leaders; a country where armed militias roam around under different religious banners without being stopped by the government; a country where women and the minorities are second class citizens; and a country where neither local foreign currency accounts nor foreign investments are safe.
Indeed, our isolation is not just diplomatic: the way the previous government and this one have mishandled the Hubco issue has made Pakistan a bad word in international financial circles. Here is a showpiece power project - one of the largest in the private sector anywhere - that is financed by a consortium of prestigious multinational banks and guaranteed by the World Bank that has been vilified and squeezed for the last three yeas and its executives treated like criminals. Although General Musharraf had promised that the problem would be resolved in a month soon after he took over, the fact is that after endless meetings, the only concession the company has received is that criminal charges against its officers have been withdrawn. How the government expects any foreign investment after all this is difficult to understand. The signal that has been sent out is that contracts and agreements have no sanctity in Pakistan, and courts here will side with the government to the extent of not permitting international arbitration.
By our own actions and policies, Pakistan is now isolated as never before. But instead of recognizing this and doing something about it, we behave like a flock of ostriches, content to bury our heads in the sand.