When protest is possible

THE recent war in Gaza provoked a series of protests across Pakistan. Vigorous street demonstrations and parliamentary resolutions denounced Israel’s actions and expressed sympathy for the Palestinians.

Simultaneously, sceptical voices in the media questioned why it is so easy for us Pakistanis to censure what goes on in Gaza and ignore the suffering closer at hand. Is it hypocrisy, laziness or ideological blind spots on the part of the protesting crowd? What makes some wars and tragedies easier to mobilise around than others?

Public attention does not automatically accompany the size or scale of a crisis, but is generated through committed and sustained activism. In this mobilisation around the Gaza war, Pakistani actors were merely adding their voices to a movement that has matured over three decades. Palestinian human rights organisations and their international partners have been active since the 1970s, especially following the 1987 Intifada, in shaping global opinion against the illegality of Israel’s occupation and in support of Palestinian rights. The counter-narrative of the pro-Israel lobby has influence within powerful American circles, but has won few followers in the rest of the world.

Social movement support gets revived with each new dramatic event. This time the opening came with the Israeli air strikes and invasion of Gaza, resulting in a large number of civilian casualties. Many of the protesters were probably unaware of the complicated history of the dispute, the torturous twists and turns of the peace process, or the many UN resolutions. But they saw the vivid images of destruction on their television screens and kept track of the daily death toll. The goal of protest in this case was clear and potentially achievable through international pressure: to get Israel to stop its aggression and bring an end to the urgent humanitarian crisis.

In Pakistan, as in some Middle Eastern countries, the human rights discourse around the Israel-Palestine issue is joined by another that casts the Palestinians primarily as Muslims. The call to action by religious parties places this struggle alongside those in Kashmir, Bosnia and Chechnya. From a liberal humanist perspective it is certainly problematic to make one’s sympathy for victims of violence conditional upon their being our co-religionists. Sadly, such tricks to conjure up feelings of solidarity are common in social movement mobilisations.

The failures of US policy in the Middle East, especially under the unpopular Bush administration, have also been under attack in these protests and we — who love to blame US imperialism for every ill — have been keen to join in. A similar dynamic was at play in the massive series of demonstrations around the world in early 2003 against America’s push for war in Iraq. Then, as now, Pakistani participants could feel the exhilaration of joining in a global wave of activism that stretched from Argentina to France to Egypt to Australia. It’s a low-risk form of involvement that carries with it the emotional rewards of belonging to a moral majority.

The situation in Gaza certainly merits the kind of outrage Pakistani protesters have been willing to put on public display. The critical question, however, is this: what will we learn from participating in a well-organised international movement that can help us develop similar campaigns at home?

The war within Pakistan has spread from Fata to the NWFP and all those cities where explosions and suicide attacks occur regularly. Large swathes of territory in the northwest of the country have become no-go areas for state functionaries, civilians and even security forces. Residents of those regions face systematic campaigns of repression and lack basic necessities like food, heating, power and healthcare. This is surely a political and humanitarian crisis worth sounding the alarm bells for.

How have Pakistani political parties and civil society activists responded? The religious and right-wing groups remain reluctant to strongly condemn suicide bombings and armed militancy. This stems from their long history of ideological and material support for global jihad, and a belief that the Taliban of Afghanistan and Pakistan, as well as Al Qaeda, are fighting the good fight in the name of Islam. The secular activists find it easiest to criticise institutions of the state, including the military, whether for their inaction or for the violence they perpetuate. Both the left and right also converge in their understanding of the situation in Pakistan as being part of the US-led war on terror.

There is resistance and activism within the communities affected by this conflict, such as Swat, but they cannot have much success without influential allies from the government and civil society. Those who join must understand that the campaign to mould public opinion against militancy will risk violent reprisals and tough battles. The Palestinian movement too had its share of confrontations and sacrifices as it gained momentum and gathered recruits.

The first step in creating awareness about a cause is to have a clear sense of who the victims are and to build an emotional bond with them. Dramatic images of suffering are a great catalyst for sympathy and outrage. Pakistanis can relate to the residents of Gaza better than they can to their own compatriots up north, because television cameras provide them with vivid, detailed access to their horrific conditions. We need to see and hear more about who the victims of the bombings in our cities are and how their families are affected. Accounts of daily life in places like Swat, Bajaur and Parachinar by the survivors themselves need greater publicity. Commentary and analyses need to drive home a simple point: that the victims of this violence are peaceful citizens of Pakistan, who are as much Muslim as the militant aggressors.

The current muddled state of the discourse means there is no clear way for the Pakistani public to comprehend these images of death and destruction. Is our military out to bomb its own citizens? Is it a fight between infidel invaders and an Islamic resistance? Which is the right side to take? The task of a viable social movement will be to remove this ambiguity and create a moral consensus on the unacceptability of militant violence. Many still believe the militant groups are targeting the American presence next door rather than citizens and institutions of the state in Pakistan. Let us highlight the atrocities: girls’ schools and music shops being blown up, men forced to grow beards and women to give up their jobs, brutal punishments dispensed, the rule of law thrown aside, Pakistani soldiers and tribal elders killed. It should not be too hard to convince most Pakistanis that these are not the costs they want to bear.

The writer is a doctoral candidate in sociology at Northwestern University, US.

PDH survey and status of women

WE as a nation shy away from the specifics. That is why numerical data is not our forte. We generalise the information available and reach sweeping conclusions.

This also explains why holding a census or organising surveys is never the first priority of governments even though policymaking tends to be lopsided without accurate statistics.

With the national census — it should have been held last year — in the doldrums, the findings of the Pakistan Demographic and Health Survey 2006-07 should normally come as a boon to the planners. The PDHS report has now been made public and contains a wealth of information not only on the country’s demographic and health profile but also other related issues. True, it cannot replace the national census but conducted by the National Institute of Population Studies with assistance from USAID, Unicef and UNFPA, this survey should somewhat help fill the gap in knowledge in vital areas.

But as is the case with many surveys of this nature in Pakistan, can one vouch for the accuracy of all the data so assiduously collected? Not that the survey was not conscientiously conducted. The problem would lie at the respondents’ end. Given the low level of literacy, absence of a tradition of documenting and maintaining records and a disinclination to share personal information with strangers, the interviewers’ task would not have been an easy one, especially when gathering information through verbal autopsies — a new device to authenticate data on maternal mortality.

Hence it becomes difficult to determine which information contained in the report should be accepted as valid and which should be received with healthy scepticism. What is perplexing is the basic contradiction between the dismal picture of the status of women that emerges from the survey and the rosy findings about the falling birth rate and increasing contraceptive use. Normally an improvement in the standing of women leads to a slowdown in the population growth.

According to PDHS, the population growth rate has declined to 1.9 per cent (from 2.4 per cent in 1990), total fertility rate — that is the average number of children a woman has in her reproductive years — stands at 4.1 (from 5.4 children in 1990), and the contraceptive prevalence rate is 30 per cent (up from nine per cent in 1990). Infant mortality rate has declined to 78 deaths per 1,000 live births (86 in 1990) and under-five mortality stands at 94 per 1,000 births (103 in 1990).

But the flip side is that the data does not indicate any convincing evidence that the status of women in Pakistan has improved substantially. With a sex ratio of 102 men to 100 women Pakistan cannot really claim to have given a fair deal to its female population. Biologically, women are known to outlive men if they enjoy in equal measure the quality of life available to men. That is why in all developed states where gender discrimination is minimal women outnumber men and have a longer life expectancy.

In terms of education, it is true that more girls are now being enrolled in school today than before. But progress is slow and two-thirds of them still remain out of school. The authors of the survey categorically state, “Education can redirect the attitudes and behaviours of population towards improvement in the quality of life … Therefore its relationship to population growth cannot be underestimated.”

It is now well established that education is inversely linked to the number of children a woman has. The longer the period a girl spends in school, the smaller her family size. The PDHS states the TFR is 2.5 children lower among women with a higher education level than their uneducated sisters.

Employment is another major determinant of family size. Women who work outside their homes receive wider exposure and have a steady income that gives them a sense of control over their own lives. The survey found only a quarter of women in employment which again is a low labour participation ratio. It has improved over the years — several decades ago it was barely three per cent — but is still not really something to write home about.

The key chapter in the context of the status of women is the one on adult and maternal mortality. Written by Farid Midhet and Sadiqua Jafarey (the latter an experienced and senior gynaecologist) this section observes, “MMR is believed to be the most sensitive indicator of women’s status in a society and the quality and accessibility of maternal health services available to women. A maternal death is not merely the result of treatment failure; rather it is the outcome of a complex interplay between a myriad social, cultural and economic factors…. [it] reflects the failure of society to look after the life and health of its mothers.”

It is significant that these two writers question in couched terms the MMR of 276 per 100,000 live births cited by the survey. “It is possible that the above factors have resulted in an underestimate of maternal mortality,” they write. Many cultural factors could account for underestimating the MMR. Given the fact that an overwhelming majority of births are not attended by a skilled birth attendant, most expectant mothers do not receive antenatal care, and death resulting from abortion by unskilled practitioners is not reported correctly, it is difficult to believe that the maternal mortality ratio has registered such a steep fall from the 500 being cited a few years ago.

The gender-specific preference of women for children — very few women without sons wished to limit their family size — is a major indicator of where we stand. Boys are still the first choice of an overwhelming majority of parents. This accounts for the many large families.

Can society claim to care for its female members when women giving their reason for not using contraceptives say, “up to God” (28.4 per cent), “husband opposed” (9.9 per cent) and “religious prohibition” (three per cent)? The most telling statement on the status of women in Pakistan is the pattern of contraceptive use. Against 8.2 per cent female sterilisation only 0.1 per cent men opt for this method.

zubeidam@gmail.com

How to rectify matters

OUR famous former Citibank finance cum prime minister made a mess of the economy through liberalisation, deregulation and privatisation i.e. selling the family silver.

He was high up in the bank but as it turned out he was no better than his colleagues in New York who have had to be rescued by the US government.

Governments in Pakistan have never known how to operate government-owned projects. They are simply regarded as channels for patronage. Appropriate people are rarely appointed, or removed as soon as possible, or their good performance is ignored as meaningless. Therefore, privatisation can be defended in principle. Unfortunately, it also provides scope for corruption on the part of decision-makers.

One hopes that the current Citibankers in charge of economic management will try and achieve savings and investment in industry and services, reduce the current account deficit and the fiscal deficit, and at the same time encourage the private sector to invest in projects which will reduce the current account deficit. These include export-promotion as well as import-substitution projects. It is a tough job because the IMF will be breathing down their necks to reduce inflation. The causes of inflation along with their contribution need to be analysed. I have been given to understand that we are using a wrong set of figures.

The whole issue of growth is much more complex. It involves education both at the top and the bottom if labour productivity is to be improved. The education policy of creating PhDs out of nothing was hardly sensible. We should produce good graduates and to do so we must improve the quality of our existing universities. At the lower level we also have to improve literacy and provide technical schools to improve the quality of the workforce.

Because of lowering the fiscal deficit there will be little or no investment in the public sector. Reduction in current expenditure is normally resisted by all governments. Because of reduction in the rate of growth, tax revenues are not likely to rise. On the other hand, rising interest rates and lack of liquidity will discourage private investment. Interest rates are supposed to reduce inflation.

Incidentally, transporters have not reduced prices although petrol and diesel prices have been reduced. Food prices in developing countries are very difficult to handle. Raising interest rates is not likely to have any effect. The depreciation of the Pakistan rupee against the dollar has raised import prices considerably. The price of imports is part of inflation. On the other hand our current account deficit of imports minus exports is still very high. It has to be brought down. Given the general condition of the global economy our exports are not likely to rise much in spite of the depreciation of the Pakistan rupee. It is obvious that in the short run consumer imports have to be reduced by raising import duties and increasing credit restrictions. For the medium term appropriate import-substitution industries have to be encouraged.

Export promotion is a much more difficult exercise because commercial banks are not focused on project finance. How are we going to manage future growth? The previous government’s policy for economic growth was not based on projects which would involve the transfer of technology. According to information available it is estimated that 75 per cent of Pakistan’s exports come from only four commodities — leather products, rice, sports goods and textiles and clothing. Approximately 60 per cent of Pakistan’s exports are cotton-based and more than 80 per cent of its manufactured exports consist of low-tech textile and clothing goods. That is where we are stuck. How do we move on?

What serious people think should happen is:

(a) product diversification such as electrical consumer goods, pharmaceuticals, appropriate agricultural products and suitable services, etc.

(b) destination diversification i.e. we should try and find many more countries to which we can export.

This means that the Export Promotion Bureau must try working on this. Unfortunately, the officials posted abroad for this purpose report to the commerce ministry. This has always been absurd. They should be part of the Export Promotion Bureau. The commerce ministry should audit the performance of the bureau on a monthly or at least quarterly and annual basis. The bureau is not simply about marketing; it is about recommending new products, improving knowledge of manufacturing or services, improving labour productivity.

The government departments involved in this are finance, planning, industries, commerce, agriculture and education. There is also the State Bank. According to my experience the most useless is agriculture. There is no effective agricultural extension service. When I moved from information to finance, we were facing a problem. The farmers refused to use fertiliser to increase the yield per acre for wheat. I was advised not to waste money on fertilisers. On enquiry it was revealed that our wheat was rather tall with thin stalks. When fertilisers made the ears fatter the plants would collapse reducing wheat yields.

Subsequently, when Mexipak was introduced the plants were shorter with tougher stalks and fertiliser helped to increase yields. The issue is that the extension service should understand the problem the farmers think they are facing.

While dirigeste economic management has been run down by free marketers, there is a problem that if we try and promote some forms of investment, some may succeed and some may fail. We need good quality public service i.e. we must try and recruit some of our brightest people who currently prefer to do something else rather than join the civil service. There has been a steady decline of competence after 1972 caused by our ‘great leader’. All subsequent lesser leaders have been unconcerned. They have all believed in command and control rather than a more open system where people feel free to express their honest opinions without causing serious anger at the top.

Footing the bill is not enough

SHORTLY after I became a European commissioner in 1999 I visited Gaza and the West Bank to see how the European commission, under strong international pressure, could speed up disbursement of development assistance.

I recall in particular visits to Gaza airport, subsequently ploughed up by the Israeli army, and to a general hospital. I visited the morgue that was under construction. It must have been badly overloaded in recent years.

After the second Intifada began in the autumn of 2000, Israel stopped the transfer of tax receipts owed to the Palestinian Authority. In the following summer the commission began payment of direct budgetary assistance to the authority. There were tough conditions, overseen by international financial institutions.

The infrastructure built by European money on the West Bank and in Gaza was systematically trashed by the Israeli Defence Forces in 2002. They were responding to horrific suicide bombings in Israel. Anything that might be seen to provide the sinews of government was destroyed — including the land registry, courts and police stations. This did not obviously advance the prospect of a two-state solution.

Throughout the period when budgetary support was provided, the European commission was accused by some Israeli lobby groups of bankrolling terrorism and corruption. We just about achieved our aim and managed to keep the Palestinian Authority afloat — even to reform it. As the responsible commissioner, I was privately encouraged by senior US State Department officials to continue the support, and was never asked by Israeli officials to stop it. Europe was in effect fulfilling its now historic role of financing the terrible failure of policies laid down not in Brussels, but in Tel Aviv and Washington. Doubtless Europe is getting ready to do the same again.

From 2000 to 2008, European commission funding to Palestine totalled nearly three billion euros. In the last couple of years, about half the funding went to Gaza, for example in fuel for the power plant and help for impoverished families. Over the last 10 years about 50 million euros has been spent in Gaza on physical infrastructure work, part of a much larger sum committed but not spent. To all these figures should be added the development assistance paid for directly by member states. After the recent assault on Gaza, the collecting tin is once again being passed round. Leaving to one side the controversy over the BBC’s lamentable failure to air an appeal by Disasters Emergency Committee, on a state and European level we should be generous in giving humanitarian relief. But it is worth questioning the point of further development assistance in the absence of political progress.

With no political movement, and with a ban on any contact at all with Hamas, Tony Blair’s purported role as Palestine’s George Marshall — bringing peace through development — has been totally irrelevant. Forgive the question, but isn’t this the same Tony Blair who rightly used to talk to Gerry Adams and Martin McGuinness in the pursuit of peace; the same Tony Blair who released terrorist murderers from prison in the same cause? If Europe is to write more cheques, surely we should insist on some political movement.

The first step would be to respond positively to the call from Mahmoud Abbas, the Palestinian Authority president, for the formation of a unity government. There was one after Hamas won a majority of seats in the 2006 parliamentary elections. After active diplomatic efforts by Saudi Arabia, Hamas and Fatah were locked into an uneasy truce which was split asunder in part by the US and European refusal to deal with Hamas.

Presumably any unity government formed today would require another Fatah-Hamas deal. But would the world then deal with the government that emerged? Without Hamas, how would any peace deal be sold to the Palestinians? The diplomatic trick is not how to justify the isolation of Hamas but how to ease them out of their isolation.

Progress also requires recognition of the way that all the dots join up in the Middle East. Iran, Syria, Lebanon and Hezbollah will all be part of any hopeful way forward. Washington needs to talk to Iran and to engage Syria. It should also encourage the diplomacy of Turkey and Qatar, which have become increasingly helpful in recent months.

So much of the focus in the Middle East is on process. We should go back and look at the content of a deal to produce lasting peace and security for Israel and a viable Palestinian state. There will be no resolution while there are so many Israeli settlements on the West Bank. Will the Obama administration say that loud and clear to Israeli politicians?

Before Europe does the easy bit — even in these financially straitened times — and writes more cheques, we should at least ask ourselves what exactly we are buying with our money. It would be a real breakthrough if the answer was peace.

The writer, a former chairman of the British Conservative party and European commissioner for external relations, is chancellor of the University of Oxford.

— The Guardian, London