The Bhutto death probe

IT’S a shame that the probe under way by Scotland Yard into the murder of Ms Bhutto should have become so controversial even before it began. The slain leader’s party has rejected the investigation by the British agency, demanding instead a UN-backed inquiry. The party obviously feels slighted if not cheated; it had requested a probe into the Oct 18, 2007, attempt on Ms Bhutto’s life in Karachi which the government had swiftly denied it. The findings, if any, of the government’s own investigation into that fatal attack which claimed dozens of lives never saw the light of day. As for the Yard itself, it does not have much fruitful experience of conducting probes into murders of Pakistani politicians. The reluctantly ordered inquiry by British investigators into the murder of Pakistan’s first prime minister, Liaquat Ali Khan, in 1951, came to naught when the then government asked the investigators to leave for reasons never made public. The findings, if any, were never disclosed. Then, closer to recent times, it was the late Ms Bhutto who had invited the Yard to investigate her brother Mir Murtaza Bhutto’s killing in Karachi in 1996. But soon thereafter, Ms Bhutto’s government was dismissed, and the Yard was ordered out of the country. Therefore, this time round, if there is cynicism attached to the inquiry in question it is perhaps understandable. One says this because Scotland Yard experts, working at the behest of the Pakistan government, do not have the mandate to make their findings public independent of the government, which remains their tasking authority.

Regardless of the controversy as to which organisation should be assigned to probe the death of Ms Bhutto, the fact is that there remains precious little of the ‘crime scene’ evidence the presence of which is a prerequisite for a more credible inquiry. Yet, one would insist that the investigation should be as transparent and above board as possible and the government should cooperate fully with the probe team.

On another note, it is revolting to see the Chaudhries of Punjab, the erstwhile ruling party bigwigs who love to flag themselves about as President Musharraf’s most trusted political allies, start the blame game by insinuating that certain opposition politicians may have benefited from Bhutto’s murder. The sitting caretaker government, which is more than a shadow of the outgoing ruling coalition, too, lies rather low on the credibility graph. Under the circumstances, preclusions by the president that Al Qaeda or their local sympathisers have killed Ms Bhutto, while advising all others to refrain from jumping to any conclusions pending a probe, is contradictory, to say the least. Nothing that this government has done since the murder of the PPP leader has left anyone concerned over the tragedy with any confidence in its conduct of affairs. If the independence of the judiciary had not been compromised as a result of the extra-constitutional measures taken by President Musharraf on Nov 3, perhaps that institution could have stepped in to bridge the credibility gap that the government so desperately needs to be filled today.

Violence in Kenya

POST-ELECTORAL violence in Kenya has left more than 350 people dead, shattering all perceptions of the country as an oasis of calm amid politically fractious neighbours. Tragically, for all its appearance of comparative peace, political stability and economic prosperity, Kenya has proved no different from many other African states caught in the maelstrom of electoral fraud and ethnic/tribal rivalries that all too frequently result in bloodshed. With the simmering ethnic tension in Kenya finally coming out into the open, it will not be easy to curb hostilities unless the main players appeal to their respective communities to halt the violence. In this case, the re-election of President Mwai Kibaki — whose Kikuyu community is the largest of the country’s 42 ethnic groups — has been challenged by political rival Raila Odinga, who in addition to the backing of his Luo clan also has the support of other tribes. That after years of living together in mixed settlements, there should now be fighting among different groups bodes ill for the future of the country, especially when memories of the ethnic conflict during the Rwanda genocide are still fresh.

At this critical juncture, it would be in the interest of President Kibaki and Mr Odinga to cooperate in defusing the tension. While Mr Odinga has to put a stop to instigating street protests, it is Mr Kibaki who must step up efforts to make amends for what many international observers say was a flawed election. General corruption and electoral irregularities have been part and parcel of Kenyan politics for several years. But there was hope after Mr Kibaki’s previous election in 2002 that Kenya would make a fresh start under him, especially after years of plundering of state assets by the president’s predecessor Daniel arap Moi. This has not proved to be the case, and although the Kenyan national economy has done well, a host of woes continues to dog the population, including rampant poverty, a wide gulf between the incomes of the rich and the poor, and little power-sharing in political circles. Suggestions ranging from a presidential admission that the polls were not transparent to a vote recount to installing a coalition government have been put forward. These must be seriously considered for anger to subside in the country. Otherwise, continued political instability — and with it worsening socio-economic conditions — will drag Kenya to the level of many other African states where tribal divisions have hampered national unity.

Chinks in Karachi’s armour

LITTLE else can be as disconcerting as escalating statistics of human and material loss caused by the tragic absence, and hence failure, of law-enforcement agencies. A demonstration of this came on Dec 27, when Karachi turned into an inferno and its citizens were left to fend for themselves as the police, it seemed, was playing safe. Rampant pillage and arson spread through the metropolis like a pandemic; it was almost as if the miscreants were certain of escaping the long arm of law. However, as cries of criminal negligence reach a crescendo and the magnitude of the loss comes to light, the police department has finally announced a probe into the lack of vigilance. Now the careers of at least seven police officials, including those in the SSP cadre, reportedly hang by a thread. According to top police officials, the unnamed officers either failed to take swift action or fell short on the efficiency level required in such dire circumstances. Chances are that police personnel in charge of volatile localities such as Gulshan-i-Iqbal, Lyari, Landhi and others are in for some serious comeuppance.

However, it can safely be assumed that, both in the case of the May 12 carnage and that which followed Ms Bhutto’s murder, the police proved ineffective in acting promptly. It clearly requires effective monitoring systems to ensure that protection is not only rapid but also reliable. There is also the urgent need to address the fact that there is not much in the way of incentives, such as pay raises and rewards, for an indigent police force to perform its duties with alacrity and commitment. Nevertheless, the fact that Karachi’s foremost need is a fortified, ably monitored and bolstered police must not be lost to hysterical oratory. Lastly, a city of such magnitude can no longer afford to rely on either army or Rangers intervention, but requires its own police force that inspires trust and confidence in its people.

Who killed Benazir Bhutto?

BENAZIR Bhutto is dead, martyred by a hired assassin’s bullets in the cause of the struggle for the rights of the people and in challenging the hegemony of a coterie of vested interests that is feeding itself off the sweat and blood of the people.

State minions have blamed the attack on Baitullah Mehsud, the Taliban Amir in Pakistan, a charge that has been duly denied. Clearly, one side is lying and, under the circumstances, the Musharraf regime’s spokesmen do not command any more credibility than Baitullah Mehsud’s spokesmen.

However, it cannot be disputed that it is the duty of the state to protect every citizen. And the state failed to protect a citizen who a vast multitude of people regarded as their leader and saviour and who was under threat — by official accounts as well. To this extent, at the very least, the Musharraf regime is responsible and liable. However, the direct responsibility of state functionaries cannot be ruled out altogether. The pattern of attempts at concealment, diversion, contradictions and concoction in the official responses to the October carnage at Karsaz in Karachi and the subsequent murderous attack at Liaquat Bagh in Rawalpindi constitute disturbing pointers.

One clear case of concoction is perhaps discernable, namely the transcript of the ‘conversation’ between Baitullah Mehsud and his ‘maulvi’ field commander. Technology exists to trace calls to its location within seconds. Israel routinely uses such technology to locate Hamas freedom fighters and surgically target the particular vehicle, even while it is moving. It appears that the Pakistan military possesses this technology, as shown by its ability to pick up the ‘conversation.’ That they were not able or willing to locate either the ‘maulvi’ or Baitullah Mehsud during their alleged minute-long conversation smacks of incompetence or connivance.

Incompetence and/or connivance has now emerged as a hallmark of the Musharraf regime in different areas of policy. Most recent is the case of Mullah Fazlullah in Swat. Media reports of the operation of an illegal radio station by the mullah had been appearing for more than a year. No attempt was made to jam the broadcasts, although the technology to jam radio signals — used even during the Second World War — was available to Pakistani authorities. Possession of this technology is now proved, given that such radio signals have been jammed since the launch of the military operation in Swat. The question arises: is the Swat episode indicative of incompetence or connivance?

Earlier, Pakistani forces battled militants entrenched in the Lal Masjid/Masjid-i-Hafsa complex, suffering several casualties and causing between several score to several hundred deaths among the students. The Lal Masjid episode too simmered for more than a year before coming to a head. The question that arose then, and which no state functionary has cared to answer to date, is: how is it that the Ghazi brothers were able to amass sophisticated weaponry in the heart of Islamabad — a city where it is said that the number of intelligence operatives outnumber the total number of janitors, gardeners and taxi drivers combined? Once again, the question arises: is the bloody Lal Masjid episode indicative of incompetence or connivance?

Earlier still emerged the affair relating to Dr Abdul Qadeer Khan’s clandestine international operations in smuggling contraband nuclear equipment and material. The exposure of his illicit activities was made not by Pakistani authorities but by the United States. The official Pakistan explanation was that he was alone in running the smuggling ring and that Pakistani officials were neither involved nor aware.

Dr Qadeer Khan was a high-value national asset, protected by more than one high-powered security agency. Those who have experienced even one day of police escort know that the facility is double-edged. While the escort ostensibly provides protection, it also deprives the protected individual of a degree of privacy. That the nuclear scientist was able to carry out an international operation involving highly sensitive material — and allegedly use Pakistan Air Force C-130 planes to freight his wares around the world — without drawing the attention of his ‘escorts’ is inconceivable. Once again the question arises: is the Qadeer Khan episode suggestive of incompetence or connivance?

The issue of both, incompetence and connivance, is of critical importance. If incompetence is attributed to the above three cases — and they are by no means exhaustive — the implication is that the country has crossed the threshold of what defines a failed state. The government is unable to enforce its writ; it is unable to control illegal broadcasting stations; it is unable to stop the accumulation of weaponry at any location; it is unable to control individuals engaged in smuggling of dangerous materials; it is unable to protect the life and property of the citizens. By inference it should be considered unable to carry out the assigned task of assisting the United States in its war against terror.

Attribution of connivance is more worrisome. If the events of Swat, Lal Masjid and nuclear smuggling have been allowed to simmer or continue with the connivance of state functionaries, the implication is that there is a coterie of powerful individuals within the corridors of power who consider themselves above the law — national or international — and unaccountable to any principle or institution save their own definition of interests.

The demand for an international investigation into Benazir Bhutto’s assassination needs to be viewed in this context. It would be irresponsible to suggest that extra-legal operations are carried out under formal governmental auspices. However, the repeated and prolonged suspension of constitutional processes and the rule of law have created extra-constitutional and extra-legal power centres. These shadowy centres, embedded within and around the state apparatuses, have spawned a wide network of criminal and terrorist cells.This is an extremely dangerous situation. If the state allows itself to be manipulated outside the bounds of law, the implication is that it has allowed itself to be criminalised. If such a state closes its eyes to some of its functionaries — or those outside but close to power centres — collaborating with international or local smugglers, criminals, militants or terrorists, it can be suspected that this collaboration will at some future date extend to a wider range of criminal and terrorist activities in the country and abroad. The dangers inherent for civilised society in Pakistan and for the world community at large need to be recognised.

Clearly, substantive remedial measures are called for. If the murder of Benazir Bhutto is attributable to incompetence, there emerges an urgent imperative for correcting the failed state syndromes. If it is attributable to connivance, the corridors of power need to be cleaned up. In particular, the cobwebs shrouding sinister Ziaist forces in secret cells have to be cleared and the extra-constitutional and extra-legal power centres dismantled.

Full restoration of the rule of law is in the interest of the political community and civil society in Pakistan if other political or civic leaders are not to be subjected to the threat of elimination. It is in the interest of the international community to help the people of Pakistan restore the rule of law if Pakistan is not to become the focal point for lawlessness, criminality and terrorism worldwide.

OTHER VOICES - Indian Press

Typically police

THE two women NRIs (Non-Resident Indians) who were molested by a group of more than 70-odd sadists when they were walking towards Mumbai’s Juhu beach after celebrating a New Year’s Eve party might be blaming themselves for having ventured out on a night known for drunkenness in the name of celebration, but they could never have imagined [the reaction of] a metropolitan police authority like D.N. Jadhav in the civilised democracy that we claim ours to be.

Reacting to the molestation of the two women by a drunk mob on that night of ‘celebration’, Mumbai Police Commissioner D.N. Jadhav said that he “can’t keep police behind every man” and that “such things happen”. He has asked the media not to “create a mole... mountain out of a molehill”.

So we are to take it in our stride that “such things” happen in Mumbai and the media is “blowing it out of proportion”. Well, such things can indeed happen in a city with a police mindset as the one guided by D.N. Jadhav. We would also like to know if Mr Jadhav would have used exactly the same words — “such things happen” — if, God forbid, someone known or related to him or his political masters had met the same fate as the two NRI women. — (Jan 4)

Square one in Lanka

SRI LANKA’s decision to scrap the February 2002 ceasefire agreement with the Tamil Tigers formalises an undeclared war that has been going on for the past two years in which over 4,000 combatants and civilians have been killed. Though the agreement had become a farce since 2006 … the decision to formally abrogate it will lead to a full-scale war and end all hopes.

The Sri Lankan government has linked its decision to the latest bomb attack on an army bus in Colombo and the earlier parcel bomb attack on the outskirts of Colombo … But it is obvious that hawks like the president’s brother and defence secretary Gothabaya Rajapakse feel that the time has come for the armed forces to go for the final push. The reason for their optimism is the accurate air strikes in November which killed the rebel group’s political wing leader S.P. Tamilselvan and reportedly injured its chief V. Prabhakaran.

The all-party committee set up to work out a package is in limbo.

The merger of the east with the north, a key feature of the Indo-Sri Lanka agreement, has been undone through a judicial decision and an executive fiat. Surprisingly, India has not protested. — (Jan 4)