Likely result of next polls

WE discussed the 1988 election results last Sunday. Let us restate the figures for the sake of continuity, and recall also that until 2002 the National Assembly had 207 general seats, of which Punjab had 115. The PPP won 94 seats, including 52 in Punjab, whereas PML (N) got 58 seats overall and 49 of them from Punjab. Thus, PPP won only three more seats in Punjab than did PML (N).

In 1990 PPP won a total of 46 seats and only 14 of them in Punjab. PML (N), in concert with Jamaat-i-Islami, won 106 seats of which 92 were from Punjab. We need not say more about this election, for by most accounts it was rigged on a large scale. Suffice it is to note that according to some analysts at the time the PPP would have won 28 more seats in Punjab if bogus votes in favour of PML (N) candidates had not been added. But note that its performance in Punjab would still have been worse than that in 1988.

The election in 1993, conducted while Moeen Qureshi served as the caretaker prime minister, was considered reasonably fair. The PPP won 86 seats in the National Assembly of which 47 came from Punjab. PML (N) won 73 and of these 52 in Punjab. The PPP got 24 seats in central Punjab (Gujranwala, Lahore and Faisalabad divisions minus Jhang), 12 and 19 respectively in the southern and western regions, and only one in the northern (Rawalpindi division). It did poorly in the cities of Punjab, winning only one of the major urban constituencies in 1993 (against 12 in 1988).

PML (N) did extremely well in northern Punjab with 10 seats, about as well as the PPP in central Punjab (24 seats), but less well in the southern and western regions where it got 10 and seven seats respectively. It demonstrated considerable strength in the cities, taking 17 urban constituencies (compared to five in 1988).

Researchers who have studied this election (for instance, Andrew Wilder in Asian Survey, April 1995) report also that conservative and religiously inclined voters, who did not want to go all the way to one of the Islamic parties, favoured the PML. In addition, the party maintained strongholds in northern Punjab, in urban areas, among women voters (contrary to the more common assumption), voters in middle and upper class neighbourhoods, and government employees.

The PPP used to be regarded as the party of the poor. This perception was now open to question. A survey of the results in lower class neighbourhoods in several cities in Punjab showed that in 1993 the PML (N) had received the same percentage of votes among the poor as had the PPP. Second, the PPP had become the party of the far fewer poor than it had been in 1988, and third that more men than women among the poor voted for the PPP.

The election in 1997 turned out to be an entirely different ball game. Various government agencies and functionaries were believed to have intervened to the PPP’s detriment. Voter turnout in this election fell lower than that in the previous elections. Many more of the PPP voters than those of PML (N) would appear to have stayed home on election day.

The PPP emerged from this election greatly diminished, and it got wiped out in Punjab. It won no more than 18 seats in the National Assembly, and initially none in Punjab. (I have a vague remembrance that it did win one seat in the province in a subsequent by-election.) By contrast, PML won 137 (that is, a two-thirds majority) of the general seats. It took almost all of the seats in Punjab.

It is generally believed that the 2002 election was also rigged. Yet, the PPP came out of it as a force to be reckoned with. The total number of seats in the National Assembly had now increased to 342 and Punjab’s share of them went up to 147. The PPP won 81 seats overall, whereas PML (Q) won 118, and PML (N) got 19. Their winnings in Punjab were as follows: PPP: 34; PML (Q): 63; and PML (N): 12.

It may be useful to have a quick look at the performance of some of the smaller parties. It went something like this: 1988: JUI: 8; MQM: 14; ANP: 3; National Alliance (NA): 3; 1990: JUI: 6; MQM: 15; ANP: 6; (NA): 8; 1993: PIF: 3; MQM boycotted this election and I don’t have figures for the others; 1997: JUI: 2; MQM: 12; ANP: 10; 2002: MMA: 60; MQM: 17; and NA: 16.

Reports of the election results vary slightly as we go from one source to another. A small margin of error may then be allowed in considering the above figures.

We may now try to identify the trend that the election results indicate? In reckoning the PPP’s prospects, we can set aside the elections of 1990 and 1997 because these were probably managed with the deliberate design of ravaging this party. The election of 2002 did not hurt the PPP as badly, and its results may then be considered along with those of 1988 and 1993.

In its two best elections (1988 and 1993) the PPP won approximately 47 per cent and 43 per cent respectively of the general seats (207) in the National Assembly. The number of seats had increased substantially in 2002, and the party’s 81 seats formed no more than 25 per cent of the total. It follows that in the best of circumstances the PPP won a plurality, but not a majority, in the Assembly. In 2002 it did not have even a plurality. If all goes well, it may once again win a plurality in the next election, meaning that it will have to look for partners to form a coalition government. Alternatively, it may become a junior partner in a coalition organized by another party or it may play a leading role in the opposition.

The PPP’s fortunes have been dwindling in Punjab as shown by the percentage of the National Assembly seats in the province it has taken in the successive elections: (approximately) 1988: 49 per cent; 1990: 12 per cent; 1993: 37.5 per cent; 1997: 0.9 per cent; 2002: 23 per cent (34 out of 147). Even if we take the party’s two best years, we see in 1993 a decline of 11.5 per cent from 1988, and a decline of 38 per cent from 1970 (when it had taken 75.6 per cent of the seats in Punjab).

Punjab has changed greatly since 1970 and so has the party. I see little prospect of its present leaders being able to devise a strategy that will bring a majority of the Punjabi voters back under its banner. One of the party’s more difficult problems arises from the fact that the promises calculated to please the Punjabis may alienate its Sindhi supporters (for instance, those on sharing of water resources and central government’s revenues).

If by the time the next election rolls along the Punjabis have forgotten, or are inclined to overlook, the mismanagement and corruption associated with Ms Bhutto’s two terms in office, and if they are disenchanted enough with Musharraf and PML(Q), the PPP may do as well in the next election as it had done in 1988.

The prospects of the PML (Q) and PML (N) are a lot more difficult to fathom. Much will depend on whether PML (Q) is still General Musharraf’s chosen instrument when the next election is held, and whether he will let government agencies and functionaries tamper with the electoral process to aid this party. If he decides that the election must be honest, those in PML (Q) who have independent support in their respective constituencies will probably still win. I don’t know what their number is but it is bound to be less than the number of seats the party won in 2002.

The prospects of PML (N) depend, first and foremost, on whether, and when, the Sharif brothers (both Nawaz and Shahbaz or at least the latter) are allowed to return to Pakistan. If they do return but make it to Pakistan, let us say, only about three months before the election, they will not have enough time to reorganize their party, bring some of their former associates back, and run an effective campaign. Without them, but perhaps even with them, the party may not do a whole lot better than it did in 2002.

The fortunes of both PML (N) and PPP will, to some degree, depend also on the composition of the caretaker government in Punjab. Judging by the severe persecution Mr Pervez Elahi’s government is currently visiting upon the PPP, we may be sure that if he and his team are in control during the months preceding the election, they will find ways and means of disrupting the campaigns of their major adversaries, notably the PPP and PML (N). General Musharraf will have to appoint a different set of caretakers if he wants the election in Punjab to be fair and honest.

Unless fundamental and enduring changes in the attitudes of the people in NWFP, Balochistan, and elsewhere in the country have occurred, the Islamic parties, taken together, will probably return to their normal status in the next round, that is, between three and 10 seats in the National Assembly. The MQM has usually won around 15 seats and it may stay at that level.

In conclusion it may be said that, as in the last several elections (other than the one in 1997), no party is likely to come out of the next election with a straight majority in the National Assembly. We will have to settle for a coalition government at the centre. There is considerable likelihood that such a coalition will include the PPP. I will not say more on the likely alliances and coalitions before and after the next election, for that is a subject I remember having discussed in an earlier article.

The writer is professor emeritus of political science at the University of Massachusetts at Amherst, USA. Email: anwarsyed@cox.net

Differing faces of Karachi & Delhi

IN the midst of poverty and corruption, brawls in parliament and many conflicts raging far afield, India is able to project its more positive and tolerant image to the world through catchy slogans and symbols. Most to win acclaim, of course, is “the largest democracy in the world”. Then come the symbolic facts that the country’s president (Abdul Kalam) and its richest man (Azim Premji) are both Muslims.

A visitor to Delhi is struck by yet another earthly claim-to-fame emblazoned across every bus of the city’s transport corporation: “The operator of the largest CNG bus fleet in the world”. It is not just the 3,000 public sector buses but all of the 15,000 private buses, 4,500 mini-buses, 5,000 taxi-cabs and — just imagine — 55,000 auto rickshaws that run on CNG (compressed natural gas) in the Indian capital.

Through a formidable combination of a judicial order, political will, executive enforcement and popular support, it is not just that every public service vehicle in Delhi has to be powered by CNG but also that no smoke-emitting vehicle is allowed even to enter the city limits.

By comparison, Pakistan is a loser both in the projection of its image and, if Karachi were to be equated with Delhi, in providing transport services to its citizens. In today’s world, a secular and democratic society would always make a better image than the one which is Islamic and authoritarian. Both, however, may conceal unpleasant ground realities. In the case of India, the glamour and success associated with celebrities like M.F. Husain, Irfan Pathan and Shahrukh Khan overshadow the perplexing fact that the representation of the Indian Muslims in the public services is barely one-third of their 13 per cent share in the population. In Pakistan, it may be no worse for the minorities but the impression of the world is, undoubtedly, much worse.

A more practical reason for us to worry is that the utilities as well as public transport have deteriorated under the pressure of population much more in Pakistan than in India. That edge still enables India to advertise that it operates the world’s largest railroad network. Pakistan’s railway too could, at one time, lay some claim to quality and size. No longer. Over the years it has become a byword for inefficiency and losses.

What is said about the railways of the two countries holds true for their urban transport as well. Karachi and Delhi are almost equal in size (Delhi is a bit more populous), but look at the difference in the number of public vehicles that serve their large sprawls. Delhi has 18,000 buses against Karachi’s less than 3,000. The difference is somwhat made up by Karachi having about 10,000 mini-buses, Delhi has half that number. Delhi’s bus fleet is supplemented by 55,000 auto rickshaws which are all over to be hailed. Karachi has only 5,000 of them. So the fare and destination both have to be negotiated with the driver and he has the right of refusal.

The difference lies not in numbers alone but more in quality. The use of CNG minimizes noise and smoke. The buses follow the routes assigned to them and take or drop passengers only at the designated stops. The rickshaws and taxis go by the meter and pick up passengers at the wayside without wanting to know where they want to go and how much they want to pay.

Conscious of the quantity and quality of public transport in our cities, both going down fast, Nawaz Sharif’s government announced two incentive-oriented schemes at intervals. The first one which primarily covered taxi-cabs fell victim to cronyism and racketeering; the second aimed at improving bus services in cities and still remains in force. Its implementation, however, was first delayed by official red-tape and is now all but defeated by wrangling between the provincial and district governments.

The red-tape and rivalries have hurt Karachi much more than Lahore and other Punjab cities. The urban-bus incentive scheme was announced in 1998. Within a year Lahore had 120 buses on the road. The number there now is in the region of 900. Those responsible for its introduction in Karachi — in the province and in the district — dithered and quarrelled till the year 2003 when the city — where a bus ride is a nightmare — got its first 50 buses. The total number today is under 300. Even Faisalabad for its need and size acted faster. Today it has about the same number as in Karachi.

The urban bus scheme is subsidized by the federal government. The Punjab government adds an extra bit for its transporters. Sindh gave no help whatsoever, only delayed till the waiting investors walked away. Here, for once, Sindh has itself, and not Punjab, to blame for this deprivation. Regrettably, Hyderabad has made no use at all of this scheme till today.

Delhi is now building its rapid transit rail and road system — a part of it will go into service within this year. Karachi has been contemplating one of its own for more than a generation now. The first presentation on the subject was made (where this writer too was present) way back in 1971. Those very planners are still making presentations.

Over the past three years the city nazim has signed countless MoUs for underground, elevated, magnetic-levitation — you name it — railroad systems. They are no more than scraps of paper. As things stand today, there is no hope for Karachi to get a decent bus service leave alone mass transit corridors.

There are reasons for this misfortune that befalls the whole country but Karachi gets more than its share. First, our management in general and more particularly of fast expanding, slum-ridden cities is inadequate and incompetent. Let us look at the administrative setup of Karachi and compare it with that of Delhi. Surely it cannot be similar for Delhi is a federal territory while Karachi is but a district of Sindh. Yet it is preposterous to treat it administratively at par with a rural district.

A locally and indirectly elected nazim assisted by a coordination officer (who has no executive authority) provides both the brain and leadership for a city of 15 million people with its myriad problems. The provincial ministers and bureaucrats alike loathe the nazim and control his establishment too.

Delhi, by contrast, has a lieutenant governor who is an administrator of high stature and diverse experience, an elected chief minister, with her own cabinet, who can defy the central authority as well as enlist its support when needed. A chief secretary who stands on the same footing as secretaries of the federal government controls the establishment.

Surely, Karachi needs an administration which is autonomous and yet is trusted by the province. The mischief of the local government laws which has made the provincial government and city government rivals of each other with the federal government growling over both needs to be undone.

Yet another, and more important, reason is the shared urge of our elected representatives and officials to stage spectacles and raise monuments rather than to meet the basic needs of the people and augment resources. India has no motorway and Delhi’s airport is old and decrepit but its rail and road transport systems work and its economy is growing faster than Pakistan’s. Karachi’s budget in 2005-06, the nazim says boastfully, would go up to 35 billion. Delhi’s already is 115 billion (Indian rupees) — of that 74 billion are the city’s own tax receipts.

Humanitarian norms on sufferance

THERE is one breach of international law that really is at stake in the upcoming election in Britain— and it has nothing to do with Iraq. It is threatened by the Conservative manifesto promise to withdraw from the 1951 Geneva Convention on the status of refugees. No other UN covenant has made so many lives worth living or protected desperate people so effectively against torture and death.

Britain was among the first of 145 countries (including the US) to ratify this convention and protocol, which it helped to draft; elect Mr Howard, and Britain will be the first to renounce it — with consequences that his party does not appear to understand.

The convention does no more — but no less — than establish in international law the most basic principle of humanity and of every faith. This principle is, quite simply, that no state can expel from its territory any persons likely to be murdered or maltreated at their destination for reasons of race or religion or politics.

How could any responsible political party denounce that law? The convention does not protect suspected criminals or terrorists, who are excluded. It does not allow refugees to come to Britain from abroad; it applies only to those who are already here and who deserve sanctuary. They must prove, and the burden is both heavy and objective, that their fear of persecution is well founded and that they are not “economic immigrants”. At present, asylum claims are running at about 2,000 a month, and only one in five will be upheld. So what is the problem, of principle or practice, which is so serious that Britain must pull out of the convention?

Mr Howard complains about an untold number of asylum seekers who stay after their applications are refused. But that is not the result or the fault of the convention: if all those who fail its test are not deported, that is because of administrative inaction, not our UN obligation. Mr Howard thinks that refugees are acceptable in small and precise numbers and envisages that his government would set an “annual quota”; once it is filled, any genuine refugees who arrive will be summarily extirpated. Men, women and children, gripped by genuine and well-founded terror, will be forcibly taken to planes and trains and ferries and sent back to countries where they will, in many cases, not be heard from again.

This is, of course, a wretched prospect: think of the Cossacks after Yalta and the Jewish children entrained at Drancy. The refugee convention makes it unlawful. The convention and its protocol have been ratified by so many nations that the rule now qualifies as a “norm” of international law, applicable to every country in the world. It is arguably a crime against humanity, today, for a government minister to order status-confirmed refugees back to a place of persecution. The worst consequence of UK withdrawal from the convention would be to undermine the binding quality of this international norm — removing from it the consensus of civilized states, so that refugees throughout the world would be placed in greater peril.

But there are more direct consequences. Britain is bound by an EU regulation which sorts out responsibility for asylum applications made to EU countries and which incorporates the Geneva convention. There is no mechanism for pulling out of this regulation, or from other EU measures premised on the convention, short of unilateral withdrawal from the EU.

Moreover, the forced removal of status-confirmed refugees would be a breach of article 3 of the European convention on human rights (which prohibits removal to a country where there is a real risk of inhumane or degrading treatment). That article permits no derogation, which means that the UK would have to withdraw from the European convention. We would be required to withdraw from the convention against torture as well, which likewise prohibits deportation to countries where torture awaits. As membership of the Council of Europe carries an obligation to remain a party to the ECHR, that too would fall with the domino effect caused by withdrawal from the Geneva convention.

It may be, of course, that these consequences are part of some hidden agenda, although the probability is that the Tories have not thought them through. To risk exclusion from the European Union, the Council of Europe and the European court seems a momentous price to pay for denouncing the refugee convention. Especially since denunciation — the formal act of withdrawal, which requires one year’s notice — is a draconian and unnecessary step that no other state has yet taken. Any party “may request revision of the convention at any time” by notifying Kofi Annan; Mr Howard is not, apparently, even prepared to discuss his concerns with the international community before making the UK a pariah state.

Bizarrely, the media has largely blamed not Mr Howard or his front bench but Lynton Crosby, their hired hand from the Australian Liberal (i.e. conservative) party. That nation has a long history of worker concern over Asian migration (it was a Labour party leader who defended the “white Australia” policy on the basis that “two Wongs don’t make a white”). The recent advent of boats of Middle Eastern refugees was exploited in the nation’s last election to play on that insecurity, much heightened by September 11.

But Mr Crosby, in his campaign ads, never suggested that Australia should withdraw from the Geneva Convention. Indeed, his government took enormously expensive steps to stay within the convention, by directing refugee boats to other island nations for processing. The point about this (admittedly unattractive) expedient is that it was premised on the inviolability of a convention that Australian conservatives, at their time of greatest electoral need, thought it morally wrong to denounce. Their English equivalents are much (or even) less principled.

It is poignant to recall the history of how international law came to offer special protection for victims of state persecution. It was in 1938 that an international conference first began to focus on the casualties of fascism — specifically, republican refugees from Franco and Jews fleeing from Hitler. The Holocaust was much in the minds of the drafters of the 1951 convention, as were all the dissidents who escaped from eastern Europe as the iron curtain fell. The convention is the finest monument we have to those who did not get away. All governments in the civilized world — except, apparently, a government led by Mr Howard — respect its promise of “never again”.

It is instructive to note the non-governmental organizations credited for their contribution to the convention in 1951: Christian churches and Catholic fellowships, the World Jewish Congress and five other Jewish groups. One of the most striking features of this election campaign has been the silence of the leaders of all those religions on this subject.

There is still time for charities and churches and the Board of Deputies of British Jews to send Mr Howard a message to withdraw his threat to tear up the convention. Failing that, the decent people of this country might prefer to elect a leader who occasionally lies rather than a leader whose policy will hurt so many innocent victims of circumstance.—Dawn/The Guardian News Service

Mr Fox’s decision

MEXICAN PRESIDENT Vicente Fox has taken an important step towards preserving, and even strengthening, his legacy as a political leader who pioneered democracy in his country. Five years ago, Mr Fox became the first opposition candidate to win a Mexican presidential election, ending decades of one-party rule by the Institutional Revolutionary Party as well as the rigged ballots that perpetuated it. On Wednesday Mr Fox made a courageous commitment that the election of his successor next year will also be free and fair, and he backed his words by ousting his attorney-general and promising a review of the controversial prosecution of Mexico City Mayor Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador.

Mr Lopez Obrador, a leftist populist, has been the front-runner in the presidential race; his prosecution for contempt of court in a minor municipal zoning matter threatened to force him out. That would have benefited the former ruling party and Mr Fox’s own National Action Party, which combined in Congress earlier this month to strip Mr Lopez Obrador of his immunity. But it also would undermine Mexico’s political system and possibly destabilize the country. Last Sunday hundreds of thousands of the mayor’s angry supporters gathered in the capital to protest his prosecution, and polls showed the overwhelming majority of Mexicans agreed with them.

In his televised address Wednesday, Mr Fox sounded all the right notes. He said that defending democracy was his government’s most important responsibility, that he wanted to guarantee that next year’s elections would be fair, and that he was “open to dialogue, and not duels.”

It now only remains for Mr Fox to act on those words by ordering that the case against Mr Lopez Obrador be dropped or otherwise ensuring that he will be eligible to run.

—The Washington Post

When small is powerful

LUXEMBOURG’S Foreign Minister Jean Asselborn is an easy-going man with a ready smile and few pretensions. Currently in the European Union’s hot seat — Luxembourg is president of the 25-nation EU until the end of June — Mr Asselborn also has the rare gift of showing grace under fire.

At a meeting of EU foreign ministers in his tiny but picturesque country last week, the 56-year old former trade unionist was in his element. Monday, April 25, was a typically hectic day. Mr Asselborn chaired tough talks on the EU’s new financial blueprint, trying desperately to stop rich and poor members of the bloc from fighting over the new EU budget for 2007-2013.

Discussions then turned to problems in the Middle East, a region where the EU is determined to play a key peace-making role despite continuing Israeli wariness.

By the end of the afternoon, the focus had shifted closer to home, with EU ministers lining up to sign the EU accession treaty allowing Bulgaria and Romania to join the club in 2007 — or 2008 if they fail to fight corruption and implement much-needed reforms.

A day later, Mr Asselborn was at it again. There was some hard talking with Turkey’s Foreign Minister Abdullah Gul on making sure that Ankara does not slow down its political reform efforts ahead of entry talks set for October 3 this year.

Attention then moved to another EU candidate country, Croatia, with the Luxembourg Foreign Minister conferring with the United Nation’s chief war crimes prosecutor Carla Del Ponte on whether or not Zagreb was cooperating with the international war crimes tribunal in The Hague.

He then met and lectured Croatian leaders on their failure to apprehend and transfer war crimes fugitive General Ante Gotovina to the UN court, warning again that the EU would only start membership talks with Zagreb if it could prove it was fully cooperating with Del Ponte’s tribunal.

It was a tough two days. But there was more to come. On Wednesday, Mr Asselborn was at Senningen Castle just outside Luxembourg city for talks with Pakistani Foreign Minister Khurshid Mehmood Kasuri on upgrading EU ties with Islamabad. And, despite the demanding schedule, he was still smiling.

Just as well. As the EU tries to spread its wing as a global power, rapidly forging a network of ties with an array of countries across the world, EU policymakers like Mr Asselborn have to juggle a host of complex international issues — and the sometimes contradictory demands of nations seeking closer ties with Europe.

EU foreign and security policy chief Javier Solana and his colleague at the European Commission Benita Ferrero-Waldner are equally busy promoting the EU as an emerging super power which could one day rival the US.

But Luxembourg’s role is especially significant since the country — along with newcomers Cyprus and Malta — is among the smallest in the EU. Despite its small size and a population estimated at just over 400,000, Luxembourg, however, as current EU president is in the EU driving seat — with a vengeance.

It was Luxembourg’s anti-Iraq war Prime Minister Jean-Claude Juncker who chaired a fence-mending summit with US President George W. Bush in February this year. Mr Juncker also succeeded in clinching a hard-sought deal on reforming the eurozone stability pact earlier this year, defying sceptics who said agreement on the issue was unlikely.

Luxembourg’s moment in the EU sun is due to the bloc’s current system under which all countries get a turn to steer the good ship Europe for a period of six months. The rules are set to change when — or rather if — the new EU treaty is ratified by all 25 states. The new EU constitution provides for a permanent president of the EU council and a first-ever EU foreign minister. But it may never enter into force if, as many fear, French citizens reject the treaty in a referendum set for May 29.

Even if the regulations change, however, there is no denying that Europe’s success in building a club of equal nations — where each voice and each vote counts — can and should be an inspiration for other regions. The EU’s role as a model for other countries which are seeking to bury past animosities was highlighted at the EU-Pakistan meeting by Mr Kasuri. But as Mr Kasuri also pointed out, regional cooperation and integration of the kind achieved by the EU is only possible if bigger and more powerful nations take account of the interests of smaller countries in their region.

While France, Germany and Britain certainly have prestige and clout on the global stage, many in Brussels believe that the best EU presidencies are run by smaller nations. Recent history proves there may be some truth in this. Belgium was in the EU hot seat right after September 11, 2001, and successfully managed to keep EU relations on an even keel with Islamic nations despite growing anti-Muslim sentiment in the US.

Ireland as EU president finalized negotiations on the bloc’s new constitution after Italy — a big EU country — failed to secure agreement on the treaty. And as far as Pakistan is concerned, Luxembourg has certainly proved to be instrumental in ensuring the success of the recent EU-Pakistan ministerial talks.

The discussions, taking place only days after Islamabad’s strong protest at the European Parliament’s mistreatment of Senator Samiul Haq, managed to steer clear of acrimony as a result of skilful handling of the issue by both sides. Mr Kasuri repeated his criticism of the incident at the start of the talks but Asselborn quickly defused tensions with an apology, stressing that the episode was “just a blip against the generally bright background of our improving relations.”

The meeting certainly did spotlight a renewed EU interest in Pakistan, with key officials like Mrs Ferrero-Waldner highlighting Islamabad’s “key role” in South Asia. The commissioner said she also recognized the “strategic importance of Pakistan’s role in maintaining regional stability and in the fight against terrorism.”

Such words are music to the ears of policymakers in Islamabad who have long been struggling to secure a stronger EU commitment to Pakistan. But while the meeting marked an important step forward in EU relations with Pakistan, with EU officials lauding rather than (as many times in the past) criticizing Islamabad’s policies towards Afghanistan and India, a great deal of work still needs to be done.

Pakistan remains unhappy at the EU’s refusal to give its textile and clothing exporters zero-duty access to European markets. Islamabad is also demanding a review of the anti-dumping duty imposed on Pakistani bed linen exports to the EU.

The EU, meanwhile, is just as adamant that Pakistan must sign up to a so-called “readmission agreement” allowing the expulsion of any Pakistanis found to be residing illegally in the EU. EU diplomats insist that the deal will not result in airplane loads of Pakistanis being deported back to the country. Instead, they say, it will facilitate the delivery of Schengen visas to “genuine” Pakistani travellers and, once the EU has developed a real immigration policy, may help in the granting of economic migrant status to some Pakistani citizens.

Discussions on the trade and immigration issues may not produce a breakthrough under the Luxembourg EU presidency. But the meeting in Senningen is proof that when it comes to global diplomacy, smaller nations like Luxembourg can be just as effective in making friends and influencing people as many of their bigger partners.

This is winning?

PRESIDENT Bush offered a rosy assessment on Thursday of developments in Iraq, but the reality is that Iraqi politicians spent most of the nearly three months since their widely hailed national election settling old scores and manouevering for sectarian gains. They dithered as insurgents regained their momentum. The declaration by Air Force Gen. Richard B. Myers, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, that insurgents are as able to wreak havoc now as a year ago calls into question the credibility of his other assertion that the United States and the Iraqi people are “winning” this fight. More than 100,000 American troops patrol the nation and more than 100,000 Iraqi security forces have supposedly been trained, yet guerrillas show increasing coordination in their attacks. We’d hate to imagine what “losing” this fight would be like.

With Iraqis soured on their government, Prime Minister Ibrahim Jafari finally announced a cabinet on Thursday, yet even then key portfolios were filled by temporary ministers and other posts left vacant. Jafari kept the ministry of defence for himself. The United States took pains after the Jan. 30 election not to pressure Iraqis on the formation of their new government. But in the end, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and Vice President Dick Cheney felt compelled to lobby for an end to the stalemate. That’s hardly shocking; the paralysis was helping the guerrillas. It was also necessary for Defence Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld to warn the new leaders during a quick visit to Iraq this month not to purge each and every Baath Party member from the security forces. The United States erred greatly at the outset of the occupation by removing many Baathists from government ministries and abolishing the security forces. That put thousands of people with weapons onto the streets, without jobs but with great anger for the invaders.

On Wednesday, guerrillas shot to death a National Assembly member, one of the 275 elected in January. The list of horrors for April alone includes staggered car bombings in Baghdad, scores of corpses found in the Tigris River and the downing of a commercial helicopter.

Regardless of what the Pentagon maintains, this does not make Americans feel like they are “winning.” Keep in mind that these insurgent attacks aren’t merely important for their shock value. The general lack of security is impeding the important work of rebuilding Iraq, and is draining resources from that task.

Saturday marked the 30th anniversary of the end of the Vietnam War, a conflict that officials continually said was going well, even when, as they later admitted, they knew it was unwinnable. As we have said before, Iraq is not Vietnam. Most Iraqis are glad to see Saddam Hussein gone, and are still hopeful that their nation can become a tolerant democracy. It’s for their sake that Washington needs to avoid repeating its Vietnam-era mistakes.

— The Los Angeles Times