Takeover and after

FOUR years ago this day, and for the fourth time in Pakistan’s history, the army dislodged an elected government against a background that needs a brief recapitulation. The county was in the midst of a political and economic crisis, with the political scene characterized by erosion of the authority of the state, civilian despotism and a devastating feud between the two mainstream political parties that was causing untold damage to the values of democracy. Several key amendments to the Constitution were rushed through parliament in violation of fundamental parliamentary norms, while one of the amendments barred the criticism of the government by ruling party legislators on pain of disqualification. The opposition was being persecuted by means of an accountability process of dubious validity; ethnic and sectarian forces and religious militants were mounting a serious challenge to civil society and public order; and the sanctity of the Supreme Court was violated. Sindh province, in particular, was condemned to extra-constitutional rule. The political process was close to being pulverized. There was talk in the foreign press of Pakistan being a failed state. Against this background came the sacking of the chief of the army staff, and the armed forces moved in and overthrew the elected government. After that take-over, the military government unfolded the agenda made quite familiar by its predecessors — the pursuit of accountability, economic reforms, re-discovery of local self-government and the painting of politics as a demonic force. But an item was added — an attempt to take on religious extremism and sectarianism.

Since October 12, 1999, there has been a visible improvement in our economic fortunes. Foreign exchange reserves have gone up, the export sector is showing some vibrancy and internal and external debts are being managed imaginatively. The threat of dollarization has been neutralized. In the realm of foreign policy, Pakistan has broken out of its isolation and is now an active member of the US-led war on terror, with a new economic and political relationship with the US, the European Union and Japan. However, these positive developments have proceeded less from our own efforts and more from the events that have unfolded since 9/11. The September 11 terrorist attacks also ended Pakistan’s liaison with the Taliban and focussed the military government’s attention on domestic terrorism and on the religious militias that had turned Pakistan into a headquarters for exporting their misconceived notions of jihad.

But the four years have also been marked by major failures on the political front, largely if not solely because of the army’s obsession with its own way of looking at national affairs. The biggest failure has been the military’s inability to develop a national consensus on a workable political and constitutional framework. The presidential referendum of April 30, 2002, was thoroughly spurious and did not serve to bestow legitimacy on President Musharraf’s position as head of state. The military also chose to make fundamental amendments in the Constitution on the eve of the general election, even though some parts of the Legal Framework Order would have had a better chance of acceptability and survival if the LFO had been presented to the elected parliament for approval. The deadlock over the constitutional package shows no signs of breaking, and — one year after the general election — parliament is yet to start functioning normally and the president is unable to address a joint sitting of parliament.

More regretfully, the military continues to give an impression that it is not prepared to share power with civilians. The number of military officers heading civilian departments and public corporations has reached unseemly proportions. Since some of these jobs involve contacts with the public, it exposes military officers to influences and temptations that should be foreign to a professional army. This is in addition to the military’s spreading involvement in land development, housing and other commercial ventures.

Over and above these political and constitutional matters, the nation has been shaken by a wave of terrorism that shows no signs of abating. This is a sad commentary on the working of a government that claims it is paying undivided attention to the “war on terror”. Among acts of terrorism that took place in Pakistan and made headlines the world over were the bombing of the US consulate and the murder of 11 Frenchmen — both in Karachi. Other incidents have included the attack on a church in Bahawalpur, the killing of worshippers in a Quetta Imambargah, the murder of six Suparco officials in Karachi only the other day, and the assassination of MNA Azam Tariq. All this is in addition to the tense situation in the tribal areas where the army is involved in operations against Al Qaeda. The military regime’s failure, thus, to contain terrorism, establish the rule of law and provide a sense of security to the general populace is obvious. The government quite often seems unable to enforce its writ and restore public order and respect for the law. It would be futile to believe that acts of terrorism and sectarian violence can be crushed only through military and administrative means. Ultimately, these are political problems and owe their origin to the absence of a political culture where society’s contradictions and problems of dissent could be sorted out within a democratic framework. This makes us think about the future of civil society. By its very make-up, the army is incapable of solving political problems. Its frequent intrusions into the political arena have amply demonstrated this. In fact, after every period of direct or indirect military rule, the army has left the country in a condition far worse than when it assumed power. No major foreign or national problem has been resolved, and every military ruler has tried to divide and weaken the country’s political parties, thus blocking the political process and severely damaging it. The Musharraf regime has proved no to be no exception. It too has resorted to the same tactics. Democracy does not solve all problems but it enables an open discussion of issues of public concern and through its cumbersome and laborious ways ensures people’s participation in governance, which is their right.

At present, the army seems to have no exit strategy, and is hopelessly bogged down in day-to-day problems that range from reading electricity meters to keeping sewerage lines open. The politicians, despite differences, have managed to develop a common stand on the LFO. This has once again polarized the political scene. The gainers may not be the politicians, but we know who the losers will be — the people. If a compromise is to be worked out, the generals must start from one basic assumption: the army has no moral or political right to rule. The people pay to maintain the armed forces so as to give the country a credible defence. It would be a pity if the generals were to violate this trust by relegating their professional duty to a secondary position and perpetuating themselves in power, directly or indirectly. Several military officers who appeared as witnesses before the Hamoodur Rahman Commission pointed out that the seeds of the disgrace Pakistan suffered in 1971 lay in the army’s decision to seize power back in 1958. Today we need to go back to the raison d’etre for the foundation of Pakistan and the vision of the country’s founder. Thus our foremost goal must be the discovery of Pakistan — the land which Jinnah expected to be ruled by the people.