Why democracy has failed in Pakistan

NOW that the misplaced hope that the 1999 military intervention followed by elections would give Pakistan sustainable democracy has landed the country in another serious crisis, one needs to look at the role of the military and political elites in creating recurrent crises of democracy since independence. A scrutiny of this kind may help the country avert similar crises in the future.

Since its ascendancy to power in the mid-fifties, the military-bureaucratic combine has held that the so-called corrupt, undemocratic and feudal political elite is the real cause of the failure of democracy in the country. Because of its forceful and repeated articulation by the makers of the four coups, the idea has gained considerable currency. Its uncritical acceptance by a section of academics and columnists has lent it a certain intellectual resonance. The opposite view that repeated military interventions in politics are the primary cause of the failure of democracy has not gained wide acceptance. To determine which one of the two views explains the failure of democracy more accurately than the other is examined here. While evaluating the political and military contributions, only the specific acts of the military and the political rulers that are directly related to the working of democracy are analysed.

Some positive contributions of the military interventionists to democracy include the relatively fair elections of 1970 organized by Gen Yahya’s regime and the help that Chief of Army Staff Gen Abdul Waheed Kakar provided in 1993 in resolving a confrontation between the then president and the prime minister leading to the fair elections of 1993. Some steps taken by the Musharraf regime such as the introduction of a somewhat improved local government system, increased participation of women in the electoral process, enhanced opportunities for the people to elect their local representatives, placing the deputy commissioner under the district Nazim, and restoration of the joint electorate system could also be considered important contributions to democracy.

The list of actions by the military rulers that have seriously affected the development of democracy is much longer. They scrapped the constitutions of 1956 and 1962, and twice suspended or held in abeyance the 1973 Constitution. In the process, the militarists destroyed the sanctity of the Basic Law and undermined constitutionalism — respect for rule of law and willing compliance with it. The strangulation of constitutionalism fostered the culture of oligarchy among the power elite of every section of society. The abolition of the first constitution made the later constitutions vulnerable to similar onslaughts. Ayub abolished the 1956 constitution and Yahya scrapped Ayub’s 1962 constitution. Radical surgery of the 1973 Constitution by Zia and Musharraf has distorted both its democratic content and form.

The four coups and 27 years of direct military rule have weakened the independence of the judiciary. Under the shadow of martial laws and emergencies, the judiciary was obliged to legitimize every coup and in two cases was compelled to take a fresh oath under Provisional Constitutional Orders (PCOs) of 1981 and 2000. As a consequence of these oaths, the judiciary lost a significant number of upright judges whom the military rulers replaced with compliant judges. COAS Beg, by his own confession, pressured the judiciary in 1988 not to restore the Junejo government.

The military elite also distorted the electoral process — an important mechanism that helps the citizens and the political parties and leaders in learning democratic norms and culture and in choosing their representatives. The first coup by Ayub and the third one by Zia pre-empted the elections scheduled in 1959 and 1977 respectively. Zia did not hold the elections that he had promised for nine years and at the end of it held only partyless elections. Ayub and Zia changed the electoral system itself; the former deprived citizens to directly elect the members of the national and provincial assemblies and the president and the latter replaced the joint electorate enshrined in three constitutions with the separate electorate system. Instead of getting themselves elected presidents through the normal constitutional process, three coup leaders — Ayub, Zia and Musharraf — held referendums for this purpose. The referendums of 1984 and 2002 are widely considered fraudulent. Ayub and Zia held partyless elections in 1962 and 1985.

Four military interventions seriously hampered the development of political parties and a stable party system. Immediately after taking over, Ayub, Zia and Musharraf subjected popular and defiant political parties to various forms of persecution. Except Yahya, the other three coup leaders used carrot and stick to split the defiant major parties into several factions and created king’s parties out of them to keep themselves in power. Using selective accountability based on flawed laws, they threw many politicians out of politics, including some popular and clean ones. Under these conditions conducting political activity became a punishing experience. Political survival itself became a primary concern and shaped the behaviour of many politicians. Shifting loyalties from parties despised — by military rules to the ones favoured by them become the norm. Expediency gained primacy over commitment to principles, issues and programmes. Long Bonapartist rule and restrictions on normal political activity also prevented the development of internal democracy in political parties.

During the phase of their indirect rule from 1986 to 1996, the military elite, especially the army chiefs, closely monitored the civilian governments and helped the willing presidents armed with powers under Article 58(2) (b) to remove the “delinquent ones.” A state intelligence agency with the support of army chief Gen Aslam Beg created a political alliance — IJI — in 1988 to defeat the PPP. During the 1990 elections Beg openly and actively participated in the electoral campaign of the IJI against the PPP and provided funds collected from dubious sources to the IJI to ensure its victory.

Contrary to their projected image, political parties have made a number of significant contributions to the functioning and survival of democracy. They launched several movements to force military rulers to restore democracy. their commitment to liberal democracy, the parliamentary form of government and federalism has remained unshaken. Muhammad Ali (Bogra), Chaudhri Mohammad Ali and Z.A. Bhutto saw through the passage of three constitutions — of 1954, 1956, and 1973 — the last one still surviving. Prime ministers, Nawaz Sharif and Benazir Bhutto, joined together to remove the undemocratic Article 58(2(b) from the 1973 Constitution. Maulvi Tamizuddin Khan, Z.A. Bhutto, M.K. Junejo and Nawaz Sharif (after 1997) challenged the authoritarian rule of the military-bureaucratic elite. Z.A. Bhutto contributed to the rise of political consciousness among the common people and enhanced their participation in electoral politics.

As against this, some politicians acted in ways that retarded the development of democracy and the political system. Some of them invited military take-over and worked with military regimes providing these with a civilian facade. Under pressure from the military many changed their loyalties from one political party to another. Z.A. Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif introduced amendments to the 1973 Constitution that were meant to strengthen their personal power. Z.A. Bhutto’s amendments reduced the independence of the judiciary. Most of these amendments were done hastily without much debate in the National Assembly. some leaders and workers of the PML(N) stormed the Supreme Court building doing severe damage to the independence and dignity of the judiciary. Z.A. Bhutto rigged elections of 1977 and Nawaz Sharif participated in the rigging of 1990 elections.

The claim of the militarists that they staged coups in supreme national interest is not borne out by the situation prevailing at the time of each coup. There was no serious external threat to the country’s security. Neither the so-called “sham” democracy of politicians had created a serious political crisis that could not be resolved through normal political and constitutional means. The crisis emerging from the rigging of 1977 elections was resolved by Bhutto and the PNA with an agreement to hold fresh elections — only to be aborted by Zia’s coup.

During 15 years (1947-1954, 1972-1977, and 1997-1999) when the political elite was relatively free from military-bureaucratic control, two factors caused their deviation from democratic norms. During 1947-54 harsh physical and socio-economic conditions in which Pakistan was born, weak democratic legacy from pre- and post-partition period and difficulties in resolving conflicts over the role of religion in politics, provincial autonomy and, representation of the two far-flung wings of the country made the politicians’ task of preparing an agreed constitution difficult. During 1972-1977 and 1997-99 Z.A. Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif became authoritarian prime ministers — possibly as a reaction induced by the fear of military intervention and also because of the weakening of democratic culture and institutions that could have held their authoritarian proclivities in check.

It is plain that the repeated interventions of military in politics, spread over 40 years, is the primary cause of the failure of democracy in Pakistan. The faults and lapses of politicians — in many cases, the result of military factors in Pakistan’s politics — are only secondary in this context. The major task before the public, the political elite and the intellectuals of Pakistan, therefore, is to prevent the recurrence of future coups and mini-coups. By creating the National Security Council, reviving the Article 58(2) (b) and election of president through extra-constitutional means, the Musharraf regime has made this task more difficult.

* The writer is a social scientist based in Islamabad. His e-mail address: inayat@apollo.net.pk

America’s new mantra

“SELECTIVITY” in providing development assistance to Third World countries was the new mantra adopted by the administration headed by President George W. Bush once it settled down in Washington. It counselled the IFIs as well as other donors to be selective in the choice of the countries to receive development assistance. According to this line of thinking, only those countries should benefit from the money to be provided by multilateral and development agencies that had clearly demonstrated the capacity and the willingness to make good and effective use of them.

This emphasis on selectivity was underscored by the findings of an influential book written by William Easterly, an economist who had spent several years at the World Bank studying the question of aid effectiveness. Essentially a primer on development, the book was read with great interest by the senior members of the Bush administration. Its conclusions particularly pleased Paul H. O’Neill, the US treasury secretary, who was in charge of framing the new administration’s policies towards the international development and financial institutions. O’Neill wholeheartedly agreed with Easterly’s conclusion that much of development assistance provided over several decades had been wasted or had gone into the pockets of the officials who managed aid programmes in the recipient countries.

It was only with great reluctance, and after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, that Washington’s attention came to be focused once again on the plight of the poor and of the countries in which most of the world’s poor lived. This change in thinking was reflected in the speech given by President Bush in March of this year on the subject of financing development. He was speaking at a conference organized by the United Nations. Held at Monterrey, Mexico, the conference sought ways to provide a larger amount of concessional flows to the developing world, in particular poor countries.

In his address, Bush, with great eloquence spoke about the cost of poverty not only for those who lived in that capacity. Poverty, he said, also bred resentment and resentment created terrorists. Making this connection, he promised to increase the US development aid by 50 per cent — from $10 to $15 billion over a period of ten years.

This change in view was not the consequence of a shift in the administration’s economic philosophy or its disdain for internationalism and globalization. As Washington under Bush was to demonstrate over and over again, it was national interest that was to be the prime objective of the American approach to all global issues. America’s perceived interest in the world, rather than its willingness to work towards the creation of a rule-driven international economic order, was to be the only guide in framing the Bush administration’s approach in the area of international economics. If it changed its stance towards the World Bank group and the IMF, the change was impelled by strategic reasons rather than by a change of heart and development of any interest in the promotion of globalization and internationalism. The promise made at Monterrey was to control the spread of terrorism, and not to get deeply engaged in solving the problem of poverty from which so many countries around the globe suffered so terribly.

It was a serious economic and financial crisis in Turkey, a country situated in the part of the world the Americans regard as both sensitive and strategic, that prompted the US to drop its objections to large IMF rescue packages. After brief hesitation, the Bush administration allowed the IMF to put together a $17 billion programme of assistance to prevent the country from plunging further into crisis. No such interests were involved, however, in Argentina that went from one deep to a still deeper crisis in 2001-2002. The IMF refused to help, largely on account of American insistence. It would not rescue the country unless the Argentineans put in place a series of draconian measures that would have meant political suicide for the policy-makers in Buenos Aires.

The Americans adopted a different stance towards Brazil, a country too large and strategic to be given the same treatment as its smaller and less strategic neighbour, Argentina. After Paul H. O’Neil, the US treasury secretary, had openly expressed serious doubts about the usefulness of yet another IMF programme, fearful that more money from the institution would simply flow into the private accounts of the Brazilians in Switzerland — a comment that plunged the country into a deeper crisis — the US withdrew its opposition to a Fund rescue programme. In fact, the programme that was eventually approved by the IMF Board in the summer of 2002 was not as burdened with conditions as was the case with some of the earlier Fund efforts in the country.

It was also to become the largest programme to be funded by the IMF from its own sources. The programme’s size was $30 billion. Its clear aim was to stop Brazil’s drift towards the left. Washington was fearful that further deterioration in Brazil’s economic situation would prepare the way for the dreaded Luiz Inacio “Lula” da Silva to become the country’s president following the elections scheduled for October, 2002. Lula, a politician of the left, resembled Zulfikar Ali Bhutto in many ways. Washington did not want to see him installed in Brasilia’s presidential palace.

The Bush administration’s scepticism about “globalism,” “globalization,” internationalism was not confined to its constraining approach towards international financial institutions, however. What has begun to surface with clarity under President George W. Bush is the enormous and widening difference in approaches between Europe and America on globalism and globalization. As Francis Fukiyama pointed out in a recent article, there are at least three reasons for the divergence of views between these two parts of the developed world. First is the imbalance of power — military power — between the United States and all other countries. Americans spend more on military and defence than all other countries that are generally classified as developed. “Weak states understandably want stronger ones constrained by norms and rules, while the world’s sole superpower seeks freedom of action,” says Fukiyama.

The second reason has to do with the European experience of coming together into an economic, political and military union — the European Union. In moving towards integration, countries in Europe gave up key elements of sovereignty to the European Union.

The final reason for the difference in approach can be attributed to “America’s unique national experience and the sense of exceptionalism that has risen from it. Americans believe in the special legitimacy of their democratic institutions and indeed believe that they are the embodiment of universal values that have a significance for all of mankind. Europeans, by contrast, regard the violent history of the first half of the 20th century as the direct outcome of the universal exercise of national sovereignty.”

Americans do not believe there is an “international community in the abstract, based on accepted norms of behaviour. The Europeans, on the other hand, want to progress further and go beyond the European Union. They are prepared to trust such international organizations as the International Criminal Court, the creation of which was vehemently opposed by the Bush administration.

“Americans tend not to see any source of democratic legitimacy higher than the nation state. To the extent that international organizations have legitimacy, it is because duly constituted democratic majorities have handed that legitimacy up to them in a negotiated, contractual process, which they can take back at any time. Europeans, by contrast, tend to believe that democratic legitimacy flows from the will of an international community much larger than any individual nation-state. This international community is not embodied concretely in a single, global democratic constitutional order. Yet it hands down legitimacy to existing international institutions, which are seen as partially embodying it, with a moral authority greater than that of any nation-state.”

This is not to suggest, however, that the “go it alone” penchant of the Bush administration on most issues concerning globalization was endorsed by all thinking elements in American society. Several influential voices were raised not only in the editorials of America’s liberal press questioning the wisdom of this way of looking at the world. A number of serious commentators used the space provided by the American and British newspapers in connection with the observance of the first anniversary of September 11, 2001.

“Using our power to build a less bitter and divided world is a national security imperative, not simply because it is morally right but because it defies those who foment anger against an America they perceive as self-absorbed. We will strengthen the fight against terror if we lead across a broader agenda, defined not only by what America is for,” wrote Sandy Berger, who was former President Bill Clinton’s national security adviser.

That the administration of President George W. Bush has very deliberately opted for “selectivity” in dealing with what it sees as a messy world is a development that will have far-reaching consequences. This, relatively new, American approach will influence not only the way the international financial institutions work; it will have an impact on the way the world works.

Selectivity applied to economic development has been defined as the willingness of the international community — multilateral institutions as well as bilateral agencies — to work only with the countries willing to implement the policies advocated by the donors. Aid, therefore, is to be used as a reward for admission to a highly selective club which subscribed to market fundamentalism and liberal democracy.

But the selectivity mantra was also applied to other relationships. President Bush’s speech to the US Congress on September 20, 2001, divided the world neatly into two groups — “you are either with us or against us.” His State of the Union speech in January of this year separated the nations of the world into those that are ‘evil’ and those that are ‘good’. It was necessary for the good to overcome the evil. It was mankind’s duty to crush the “axis of evil” formed by Iran, Iraq and North Korea.

Before President Bush came to power and before the terrorists struck America, the world seemed to be moving nicely towards creating a global order in which all nations, if not entirely equal, at least had the right to have their voices heard. The new global order was also moving towards the creation of a code of conduct based on a broad consensus among people, civil society and nation states. But that movement is now stalled with one country professing that it has the right to lead the way. Those who disagree must step aside and not block the move towards the achievement of a goal defined by the leaders of one supreme power.

Dress code: ALL OVER THE PLACE

LAST week, it would have been possible to watch three test matches almost simultaneously by surfing television channels, Pakistan versus Australia at Sharjah, India against the West Indies at Chennai and Bangladesh doing battle with South Africa in East London.

Of course, if one was not interested in cricket, one could go to Montgomery County in the Washington area and get the latest on the serial sniper or switch to Baghdad and get the latest on Saddam Hussain’s referendum. We have all become globe-trotters. When I was a student, there was no Discovery Channel or National Geographic and I had to hit the books to improve my general knowledge. The world has moved on. This is not necessarily a blessing because viewers are at the mercy of those who own the media and who function as puppet-masters. Television channels are spreading disinformation and even George Orwell was not able to foresee how powerful this brainwashing would get and even the once redoubtable BBC, above reproach like Caesar’s wife, freely mixes news with propaganda and punches the party-line.

Third World countries do not have the resources to match this disinformation onslaught and its point of view goes largely unheard. There is no way that President Mugabe can give his side of the story nor indeed Yasser Arafat. The media has made them villains and one doesn’t know whether the media is being influenced by governments or it’s the other way round. But thee is an up side. Many of the viewers got wise to this spin-doctoring and once news is identified as propaganda, it loses all credibility. We ought to know in Pakistan and now many are turning to the private channels rather than PTV to find out what is happening in their own country. Many years ago, I was in London and there was either a fire or a bomb blast in Bohri Bazaar. My brother Satto telephoned me from Karachi to ask me what was the latest on Bohri Bazaar. He discounted what he was being told by PTV and thought that being in London, I was getting more information from BBC. In this connection, the last word belonged to my brother Abo who said one of the PTV newscaster that he read the news as if he believed it. There was so much sincerity in his voice. I think what got his goat was the repeated references to Pakistan’s ‘principled stand’ on Afghanistan.

This a lengthy preamble to a news item that quotes a spokesman of the MMA that they will ban cable networks for ostensibly spreading obscenity. I hope there is no truth in this. I think that in this day and age, censorship is virtually impossible and if some cable channels are spreading ‘obscenity’ then all one has to do is not switch on those channels. We should not be seen to be throwing out the baby with the bath-water. Besides, obscenity is subjective and it is in the eyes of the beholder. Both Ismat Chugtai and Manto were hauled up because their stories were deemed to be obscene and they were prosecuted. I think I can safely say that their works are now considered literary masterpieces.

There is finally a directive that spells out a dress-code. Ardeshir Cowasjee has dealt adequately with this in his column. But I would like to remember, with some relish, a directive we got on the dress-code when I was working for PIA. The directive stated that it had been observed that PIA employees were not attired in ‘national dress’ when coming to office and it was further observed that the dress of some of them was foppish (sic). PIA employees should wear national dress. Enver Jamal was the chairman of PIA at that time and, naturally, the President of Pakistan was Ziaul Haq. Enver Jamal called a meeting of his directors to convey the government’s diktat. Someone in the meeting asked: “What is the national dress of Pakistan?” A lengthy discussion ensued. Some said it was the sherwani. Other said it was shalwar qameez. Someone said; “Why not kurta pajamas”? There was no agreement on what precisely was the national dress we were expected to wear at work. It was left vague but some kind of a national dress had to be worn. The next day, PIA resembled a fancy dress ball. some wore sherwanis. Captain Shaukat Khan wore the sherwani he had worn at his wedding. Many came in shalwar qameez and a few in kurta pajamas. I raised the legal point that since we all had to wear the national dress, it constituted a uniform and we would be entitled to a uniform allowance. I continued to wear a safari-suit and my peon, Ashraf, continued to wear his uniform. It was also pointed out that the cockpit crew too should wear the national dress! It was a trivial way of trying to establish a national identity.

When I was going to Islamabad to receive my Sitara-i-Imtiaz, I was conveyed the dress code for the ceremony. Black sherwani and white shalwar, black shoes and Jinnah cap. I possessed neither a black sherwani nor a Jinnah cap. So I wore a dark suit and hoped for the best. No one objected. There were other recipients of awards who were in the same predicament as I was. They too wore suits.

I think there is a lot to be done in the country and we should just buckle down and start getting the job done. The idea of a national dress is elitist in concept, more so, since an overwhelming majority of the people are happy to have just the shirt on their back. We must recognize the fact that there are other more pressing priorities. Perhaps the dress-code applies to those who are likely to be sworn in as ministers and in that case, tailors must be quite busy these days. At least some members of the working class will benefit from the elections.

Juvenile justice

The Supreme Court declined this week to reconsider a 13-year-old decision permitting executions of convicts who committed their crimes while they were still juveniles. Four justices dissented, arguing that the logic of the court’s ban last term on executing retarded people applied also to the juvenile death penalty — that a consensus had developed that the practice was cruel and unusual punishment that violated Eighth Amendment. Unsurprisingly, a majority of the court disagreed, leaving the states free to continue killing kids.

The juvenile death penalty —with its arrogant assumption that society can judge whether someone who is still a child will prove redeemable over the course of his life — is one of the least defensible aspects of American capital punishment. It is impossible to contend seriously that many youthful killers will be deterred by the threat of execution years later. And while the dissenters can be accused of seeking to impose their policy preferences in this area on the states, the court’s prior cases have not exactly provided a model of reason. According to current case law, it’s fine for a state to execute someone for crimes committed at 17 or even 16. But 15 is beyond the pale. Exactly where, one is entitled to ask, does the Constitution make that principled distinction?

Justice Antonin Scalia, in a recent article, derided the court for drawing such lines, noting correctly that age limits are its own creation. The Eighth Amendment, he argued, prohibits now only what it prohibited in the 18th century _ and the execution of children was okay then. But nearly a century ago, the court rejected so stark an approach to the amendment, and the one it ultimately adopted instead — which reads the Constitution as forbidding whatever punishments society evolves to regard as cruel and unusual _ requires the court to draw this line somewhere. Distinguishing between legal childhood and adulthood seems a far more rational place to put it than between the sophomore and junior years of high school.

— The Washington Post

Creating a neutral bureaucracy

A NEW elected government is about to assume charge in Pakistan marking a new phase in its political history. The state institutions badly shaken and twisted would need a Herculean effort to be able to run a responsible government. Equally arduous would be the process of putting threads of the economy together and resuscitating political life from the squalid tangle of corruption and self-seeking.

But one of the most important tasks for the new government would be creating a neutral bureaucracy, which had become largely politicized and developed a hunger for power. The process started soon after independence and over the years stepped beyond public service propriety. Working almost without the incubus of competent political leadership the bureaucracy not only spiralled out of civil service traditions but also arrogated to itself new role of formulator of government policies instead of following its traditional role of implementing those policies.

The bureaucracy is said to have started joining in political intrigues before the nascent state was able to steer through shoals of early nationhood to stable political maturity. At least the conduct of three of its senior members — Ghulam Muhammad, Iskander Mirza and Chaudhri Muhammad Ali largely contributed to the weakening of the political governments. General Iskander Mirza abrogated the constitution and imposed martial law in the country in October 1958 but Ayub Khan ousted him from power in less than a month to begin a military rule that lasted for 11 years.

The Hamoodur Rehman Commission in its report on the debacle of former East Pakistan observes that it was not only the politicians but also the bureaucrats who were responsible for making the constitution (1956) unworkable. The Commission recalls how late Khawaja Nazimuddin, in spite of his protests, was persuaded to give up the governor generalship to become the prime minister and recommend Mr Ghulam Muhammad for the governor- generalship. After the food crisis and anti-Qadiani riots during his government “the bureaucrats made it an excuse to turn against him and started joining in political intrigues”.

The commission describes the dismissal of Khawaja Nazimuddin as prime minister in April 1953 when he enjoyed the confidence of the majority in the Assembly as the day, which marks “the death- knell of democracy in Pakistan”. Regarding the assumption of office of the governor-general by Mr. Ghulam Muhammad on October 20,1951 the Commission terms it a fateful day that marks “the beginning of the rule of bureaucrats in Pakistan”.

This role of bureaucracy does not square with the one outlined for it by the country’s founding father, Quaid-i-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah. In one of his addresses to public servants (circulated to government departments from time to time) he said “ You should not be influenced by any political pressure, by any political party or individual politician. If you want to raise the prestige and greatness of Pakistan, you must not fall a victim to any pressure but do your duty as servants to the people and the state, fearlessly and honestly. Service is the backbone of the state. Governments are formed, governments are defeated, prime ministers come and go, ministers come and go, but you stay on, and therefore, there is a very great responsibility placed on your shoulders. Make the people feel that you are their servants and friends, maintain the highest standard of honour, integrity, justice and fair play. Work honestly and sincerely”.

While politicians had paid the price for their failures in the shape of dismissal of their governments, facing restrictions on their political activities including ban on elections and even serving imprisonments the bureaucracy was able to get away with a smokescreen of deceit and deception. Like all developing countries, potential for corruption in our country was enormous and bureaucracy exploited it to the hilt.

The job of the politicians of injecting political content in the institution of civil service was facilitated in no less measure by persistent scramble among some venal bureaucrats for gaining undue favours from them. Quite a few civil servants unashamedly nursed their own political ambitions and donned different hats during their employment and in retirement. Secondly, contrary to general perception, the edifice of bureaucracy proved too fragile to check outside intrusions. Lack of legislation defining its operational role and its own failure to evolve any mechanism to protect its rights made it an easy prey for the politicians.

A political party with tall claims to pragmatism dealt the most lethal blow to the institution of civil service by making political appointments in it. However it took some caution by holding written examinations and interviews to induct new people. The next military government of Ziaul Haq threw all caution to wind in making lateral appointments.

Other parties share the practice of patronage to fill top jobs also. Even the interim government of Prime Minister Meiraj Khalid inducted undeserving friends and relatives into bureaucracy. A new breed of job hunters comprising retired bureaucrats and professionals further muddied the waters by pulling political string to seek the land choicest jobs.

Not that they can’t make both ends meet, they in fact don’t come to terms with life without the trappings of office and personal staff. They are a common sight in the capital cities. The observation of Britain’s renowned parliamentarian Edmund Burk in this regard might interest the readers. “Those who have once been intoxicated with power and have derived any kind of emolument from it, can never willingly abandon it.”

There was need to redefine the role of the bureaucracy and the parameters of its working. While it should be given space and protection from arbitrary assaults from politicians, it should also remain within the confines of the rules of propriety. It should shun aligning itself with the politicians of one hue or the other. A certain percentage of ambassadorial jobs filled by the governments of the day should be subject to their confirmation by the foreign relations committees of the parliament. This is a practice in the American presidential system. In British parliamentary government hardly any ambassador is picked up from outside the foreign service. The last one heard of such appointment was that of a journalist son-in-law of a prime minister in 1970s. He too went through a recruitment procedure and did not last long in the job.

A neutral civil service recruited on merit is an essential part of the parliamentary system of government. Acceptability of a civil servant to the next government of a different political party is the litmus test of his neutrality.