Another false dawn?

THREE years ago a democratically elected government was toppled in a military coup and replaced by the regime headed by General Pervez Musharraf. Now that elections to the national and provincial assemblies have been held, is Pakistan back on the rails and are we on the democratic path once again?

Has President Musharraf redeemed the pledge he gave to the nation three years ago? Does Pakistan stand taller today? Is the common man better off than he was three years ago? Is our long nightmare over and is it morning once again in Pakistan? Is this the dawn of a bright future for Pakistan? The short answer is in the negative. There will, of course, be more to say in the days to come.

The history of democratization in Pakistan is replete with failed attempts. Democratization is a long and complex struggle marked by advances and setbacks. Elections, of course, are only part of the process of developing a democratic culture, and they are certainly not a panacea for societies torn by conflict or countries wracked by poverty or economic crises. The principle that all men are born free and equal, and that no one has a right to rule them without their consent, is the accepted norm the world over. This has inevitably come to be understood as meaning that they cannot be ruled without their clearly expressed consent in the form of an election.

Elections — open, free and fair and held for the purpose of choosing rulers and nothing else — are the essence of democracy, the inescapable sine qua non. Governments produced by such elections are called democratic, no matter how inefficient, short-sighted, blundering, dominated by special interests, and incapable of adopting policies demanded by public good.

Prior to the October 10 elections, rules of the game were changed. The two mainstream political parties were decapitated and their leaders prevented from taking part in the election. This took some of the passion and steam out of the electoral process. But what is worse, it reduced the process to a farce and diminished its credibility.

Sadly for Pakistan, elections held on October 10 were only for the national and provincial assemblies, not for the presidency, the most important and powerful office in the new political order. No meaningful transfer of power to the civilians will, therefore, take place as a result of these elections and an unelected but powerful president will rule Pakistan for another five years, if not longer. People of the older generation would recall that completely free, fair and impartial elections were held repeatedly in pre-independence India under the Government of India Act 1935, but they were not called democratic because they were not held for the purpose of electing our rulers. Despite free and fair elections, Indians were not given complete control over the government of their country; they could not change or amend their constitution; the Indian legislature was not a sovereign body and it was wholly incompetent to legislate on certain matters. Is history repeating itself?

By exempting himself from the democratic process provided for in the Constitution, General Musharraf has denied the people the right to elect their president. Pakistan will therefore remain an illiberal autocracy of the Cromwellian type in which the army has effectively ousted the front-ranking politicians and replaced them by lieutenant-generals. “Whichever party comes out on top”, The Times, London, wrote “in reality, the vote will do no more than cloak continued military rule in democratic mufti.”

When General Pervez Musharraf seized power on October 12, 1999, like millions of his compatriots, this writer welcomed the change and heaved a sigh of relief. Pakistan had found its saviour in General Musharraf. After the trauma of Nawaz Sharif misrule, the emergence of General Musharraf was widely regarded as an opportunity for a new start. Boundless hopes and expectations were pinned on the unsullied young military general. For a brief ethereal moment, the country almost fell in love with him.

However, the euphoria following the dismissal of Nawaz Sharif soon gave way to the sobriety of the ‘morning after’. The revolution we all expected and which seemed so certain at the time did not take place. President Musharraf slipped on one banana peel after another. The Constitution was defaced, disfigured, defiled, and changed beyond all recognition. The economy shows little sign of recovery. Poverty has deepened. Investor confidence has not been restored because the law and order situation shows no sign of improvement.

Three years ago, ruthless accountability of corrupt holders of public office was on top of General Musharraf’s agenda. What prevented him from making good on his promise to initiate expeditious and unsparing accountability of all those who had bartered away the nation’s trust and plundered the country’s wealth? Why are so many corrupt holders of public office still at large and why have they been allowed to contest the elections? Why were they not sent to prison, disqualified, and prevented from re-entering the parliament? Why are they back in business?

What the people expected was not a cosmetic change, not selective accountability, but a purifying, cleansing, surgical operation to purge the country of all robber barons — corrupt politicians, civil servants, judges and generals. Unlike his democratic predecessors, President Musharraf commanded absolute power and had no excuse, no alibi, no political compulsions not to carry out a thorough cleansing process he was expected to do. When expectations were not fulfilled, frustration set in, hopes raised three years ago dimmed and faded away.

This writer has been associated with the conduct of many elections since pre-independence days. Barring one or two exceptions, elections in Pakistan have always been disputed and lacked credibility in varying degrees. Allegations of official interference, rigging and manipulation of results are not uncommon in this country. But the extent and depth of involvement of the civil administration and the blatant, flagrant abuse of official machinery in support of the king’s party in this election was unprecedented even by Pakistani standards and broke all previous records.

At the end of three years of military rule, the people looked forward to a new beginning and a better future for themselves and their children in a genuinely democratic Pakistan. Today the future has quite literally shrunk and the present has stretched out. The centre of gravity, the locus of ultimate power, will shift from the parliament to the National Security Council, an unelected body dominated by the armed forces answerable to no one. It is foreign to the parliamentary form of government and is inconsistent with the role of parliament as the “great inquest” of the nation.

There cannot be two suns in the sky. There should be one authority in any government, in any state, in any country. There cannot be a second centre of power in a parliamentary form of government. If you create a second centre of power, conflict between the two will inevitably develop, confusion and chaos will follow. Cohabitation has not worked well in France. President Zia tried it in Pakistan towards the end of his long military rule but it did not work. He had to sack the prime minister and dissolve the National Assembly with disastrous consequences for the country. Why make the same mistake again? Why not learn from history? But as Hegel said long ago, “Man learns nothing from history except that man learns nothing from history”.

Winds of change in Kashmir

IT IS nobody’s case that elections in Kashmir will solve the 50-year-old problem. But it cannot be anybody’s case that they will not straighten some of the creases which the overused formulas have left behind.

A new dispensation has taken shape at Srinagar. The National Conference (NC) has lost the majority. It was India’s one basket where it kept all eggs. A new beginning is already in the air. Sometimes I feel that Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee, who kept his promise to hold free and fair elections, wished the non-NC combination to come to power, as Rajiv Gandhi did in 1985 when the Akalis won in Punjab. (The rout of the BJP is not by design but by the voters’ rejection).

The Akalis, however, failed to have the central government implement the Rajiv Gandhi-Longowal accord which had promised Punjab an autonomy of sorts. The case of the Congress and the People’s Democratic Party (PDP) is different because they have yet to talk to New Delhi on Kashmir and other subjects. Still there is no running away from the fact that the PDP, like the Akalis, caught the imagination of the separatists in this election and made gains.

The Congress may not have come anywhere near the PDP in its appeal to the separatists. But Sonia Gandhi earned attention for her speech at Srinagar that all elements, even militants, would be associated with the talks which would be without any pre-conditions. New Delhi has already said that it is willing to talk to anyone. If the elected representatives do not try to project their pre-eminence because they have travelled through the valley of death to reach the assembly, the ground seems to have been prepared for talks on the future of Kashmir.

The All Parties Hurriyat Conference, which is increasingly painting itself into a corner, is hoisted by its own petard. It cannot give up its demand for independence or secession. This is the argument the Hurriyat made when several human rights activists from the country pleaded with it to participate in the election. On the other hand, if the Hurriyat does not relate to India, its acceptability in the eyes of New Delhi will go down still further. It must have seen that despite its call for boycott, people from the valley voted in greater numbers than they did in the 1996 election. This does not mean that the alienation against India has decreased. But this does indicate that more and more people want to get out of the present state of affairs. The defeat of the NC should confirm this because the party has come to represent the status quo.

That being the case, all should move to the next stage: talks. It is obvious that no dialogue can take place when the guns are booming. The violence must stop, not only by terrorists but also by the security forces. Human rights violations, interrogation centres, searches, humiliation of people — all these things have distanced the Kashmiris from the mainstream.

Can this process of dialogue begin without involving Pakistan? Even without America’s relentless pressure, talks with Pakistan are necessary. New Delhi itself feels that the solution of Kashmir is not possible without Islamabad’s cooperation. If it had been possible, Jawaharlal Nehru would not have sent Sheikh Abdullah to meet General Ayub. Nor would have Indira Gandhi conceded in the Shimla Agreement that the problem of Kashmir remained to be settled.

India realizes that Pakistan, if not associated, would continue to meddle in its affairs, as it has been doing in the last 50 years. Kashmir is what gives Pakistan its ethos. How to reach an agreement that does not disturb India’s own ethos is the problem. The international support on this point has been verbal, nothing in substance.

Cross-border terrorism has not decreased. Nor is Islamabad willing to give New Delhi an undertaking in this regard. In fact, the manner in which fundamentalists have come up in Pakistan in the military-supervised election may handicap General Pervez Musharraf still further even if he wants to lessen the number of jihadis infiltrating into India.

The crux of the problem is: at what stage should Pakistan be associated? The first priority is the people of Kashmir. Hence the dialogue should begin between New Delhi and Srinagar. Even otherwise, Islamabad has said that it will agree to what the people of Kashmir accept. However, Pakistan would like to be assured that a final settlement would have its participation.

This scenario makes all the more necessary for New Delhi to talk to all elements, even those who are considered pro- Pakistan. This pre-supposes the release of all political prisoners from the state. The PDP, which has the largest support from the separatists, should take the initiative. Releasing political prisoners may not pose a problem. But convincing them or others who did not participate in the election of New Delhi’s bona fides may. This will have to be a long, patient effort.

The PDP may have a problem with the Congress, which would not like to go beyond the Indira Gandhi-Sheikh Abdullah accord of 1975. The Congress would be watching its steps lest the talks should go in a direction where the party’s fortunes might be affected in the general elections in less than two years from now. Probably it would like to position itself halfway between secession, which the separatists demand, and complete integration, which the BJP and a few other political parties want. Does that help?

Probably the new dispensation would do better if it were to begin with the administration first. With a clean and purposeful government, the atmosphere would improve. The demand in the valley is not so much for a representative government as for a responsible government that could give jobs, health, education and the like. Development is what people want.

The NC administrations generally failed in this respect. Can the new government deliver the goods? What the state wants is no different from what other parts of India want. Free and fair election is not an end in itself. It provides an opportunity to the elected government to build up the state economically.

But the many-year-old insurgency makes it clear that development alone will not meet the aspirations of the people. The stir, which began after the rigged election in 1987, has cost thousands of lives. It has cost the people’s faith in the ballot box which, thanks to the election commission, has returned to a large extent. Roughly 41 per cent voted this time.

Kashmir is beset by a horde of problems. The Hurriyat will continue to ask for a tripartite meeting between India, Pakistan and the Kashmiris. The Hindutva forces, decimated in their stronghold of Jammu, will continue to demand the trifurcation of the state. Islamabad will continue to say that Kashmir is a lifeline for Pakistan. And New Delhi will continue to say that Kashmir is an integral part of India.

To reconcile all these is a tough problem. But elections have aroused hope. People are optimistic about a new beginning. How long that optimism lasts will depend on how much the government can do to win back the people and to span the distance between New Delhi and Islamabad. I do not think any new configuration is possible in the immediate future. But a sense of accommodation may bring about something which is not visible at present. Both sides have their compulsions.

Nehru told Zulfikar Ali Bhutto 40 years ago: ‘Zulfi, I know that we must find a solution for Kashmir. But we have got caught in a situation which we cannot get out of without causing damage to the system and structures of our respective societies’.

The writer is a freelance columnist based in New Delhi.

Lula and the markets

George Soros, the world’s leading currency speculator, told a Brazilian newspaper in August that the 170 million Brazilians simply wouldn’t be allowed to have Labour Party leader Luiz Inacio ‘Lula’ da Silva as their president.

The higher his standing rose in the opinion polls, the fiercer would be the speculative attacks on Brazil’s currency, the real. If he actually won the presidency, the markets’ reaction would be so negative that the country would have to declare a moratorium on its huge $260 billion foreign debt.

“In the Roman empire, only the Romans voted,” Soros explained gently. “In modern global capitalism, only Americans vote. Not the Brazilians.” Brazilians were so outraged that even outgoing president Fernando Henrique Cardoso was forced to defend Lula publicly — but since the former steelworker and trade union leader started climbing in the polls, the real has dropped in value by about one percentage point for every point that he has risen. Since April, it has lost more than a third of its value.

This has happened despite the fact that Lula is now closer to moderate socialists like Britain’s Tony Blair and Germany’s Gerhard Schroeder than to Fidel Castro or Salvador Allende. He has promised to service Brazil’s international debt and to continue Cardoso’s successful fight against inflation. Asked why he abandoned his old radicalism, he simply replies: “I changed. Brazil changed. Trade unionism changed. Everyone is now more organised, more mature.” But the international money markets don’t believe him.

Most of the market traders know nothing of Lula and little about Brazil; he just seems to match their Identikit stereotype of a left-wing extremist, so they flee screaming. Even those who do their research cannot afford to act on their superior knowledge of the situation, because they know that the majority of their colleagues will react differently, and a successful trader is one who guesses which way the herd will run and gets there first.

In terms of his origins, Lula does have the classic left-wing activist’s background. He never went to school and only started learning to read when he was ten. Eventually he found work in the steel-mills of the industrial towns that surround Sao Paulo and became a union organiser. He founded the Labour Party in 1980, and led the strikes that brought down the military dictatorship in 1985. He is pure working class and proud of it — and that is precisely the problem.

A little story. Twenty-three years ago I spent some time in Brazil doing a radio series about the country — and on two successive days in Sao Paulo I interviewed the two most prominent figures of the Brazilian opposition to military rule: Fernando Enrique Cardoso, now completing eight years in the presidency, and Lula, who will have the job for at least the next four. They didn’t get much foreign attention in those days, so they each gave me a full afternoon. Their goals were similar, but the differences in style were huge.

Cardoso, who had spent years the harsh early years of the generals’ rule in exile in Cambridge and Paris, was every inch the Marxist intellectual: a sociologist of middle-class origins who lived in a book-lined apartment overlooking the city. He didn’t talk politics; he talked about ‘dependency theory’ and other then-fashionable Marxist concepts. He was a pleasant man, but it occurred to me as I left that he lived somewhere along an axis that had Lenin at one end and Jean-Paul Sartre at the other.

Cardoso did a good job as president — inflation is finally tamed, and important indices like infant mortality, education and housing are finally moving in the right direction despite sluggish growth — but he has used up his popularity.—Copyright

The split mandate and foreign policy

THE uncertainties aroused by the startling outcome of the election on October 10 have led two federal ministers to issue statements that Pakistan’s foreign policy would not be affected by the results. Doubtless the main element in these uncertainties relates to the likely impact of the weight acquired by the Muttahida Majlis-i-Amal (MMA), the alliance of religious parties that made a strong showing in the two provinces bordering Afghanistan namely NWFP and Balochistan.

One has to recall the arguments that used to be advanced while defending Pakistan against accusations of fundamentalist bias over the past decades. The most telling argument used to be that while the religious parties tended to make vociferous statements about the Islamic content of the ideology of Pakistan, they never gained more than 3 or 4 per cent of the popular vote. Consequently they had never played a major role in shaping Pakistan’s foreign policy. The rise of the MMA as the third largest party in the National Assembly, and its likely emergence as the largest party in the Senate raises the prospect of its exercising greater influence in shaping national policies than ever before.

The fact that some of the member groups in the MMA were closely identified with the Taliban movement is bound to arouse concerns in the West, and the US in particular whether Pakistan will stay as a leading member of the coalition against terrorism. It is after all Pakistan’s frontline role in the war against terrorism that has revived its standing in the post-9/11 world. Indian commentators and analysts have already drawn the conclusion that pro-Taliban forces having won an impressive success in the election, Pakistan will lose credibility as a reliable partner in the war against terrorism. Some Indian journalists have gone so far as to predict that the US will tend to see Pakistan as a haven for pro-terrorist forces.

The Indian Foreign Minister, Yashwant Sinha, has adopted an approach that is as petty as it is shortsighted. He took note of the rise of fundamentalism in Pakistan, with all its adverse consequences. He also forecast the emergence of a “lame duck” government in Pakistan, owing to the divided mandate. As a Pakistan foreign ministry spokesman stated, these comments sound strange, coming from the representative of a Hindu extremist government that has abetted anti-Muslim violence in Gujarat, and stepped up human rights violations in Kashmir.

The initial reactions of the MMA leadership that clearly rejected the suggestion that there will be any sympathy for the Taliban, or any desire to promote a system of governance associated with the Taliban, have been marked by maturity and an awareness of the current international environment. Indeed, the MMA spokesmen have eschewed any sweeping statements on policy issues, since they are aware that they have to display moderation and restraint, given the compulsions of inter party negotiations on the one hand, and the country’s delicate international situation on the other.

Till the massive mandate of 1997, Pakistan had witnessed a fragmented political culture, with no single party gaining a clear majority. This had necessitated the forging of coalitions with smaller parties such as MQM, playing a leading role in bringing some politicians to power. The first government of Nawaz Sharif in 1990 had been based on a coalition with the Islamic parties. The latest elections have also resulted in a split mandate, and different parties have emerged to a leading position in different provinces. Many analysts view this as a vote for the status quo.

Foreign observers have generally described the conduct of the elections as fair and transparent. This is evident from the unexpected nature of the results, which would have been different if the polls had been stage-managed. The most telling proof of this is visible in the upsets in many constituencies, where traditionally strong candidates have lost to newcomers. The lowering of the age limit for voting has made a difference, notably in the increased representation of the religious parties in the NWFP and Balochistan.

The younger generation in the areas adjacent to Afghanistan has registered what appears to be protest vote against the concentration of US strikes against Pakhtoon areas of Afghanistan, where the Taliban had their main power base. Some reaction to the pursuit of Al Qaeda elements into the frontier regions has also been voiced, and opposition expressed to any intrusive role by the US forces in those regions.

Pakistan’s main foreign policy concerns have traditionally enjoyed the general support of all responsible parties. The two key components of these policies have been Pakistan’s stand on Kashmir, where there is universal support for the struggle of the Kashmiris for self-determination, and Pakistan’s nuclear programme, that is vital to national security. Other components of our foreign policy, that have recently assumed prominence, also enjoy a broad measure of support, as they are relevant to our vital national interests.

Pakistan’s participation in the coalition against terrorism is perhaps the most important single factor in our current role in the region. The terrorist attacks on the US in September 2001 were universally condemned. On account of its geographical location, Pakistan was called upon to play a leading role in the war against terrorism. No political party in Pakistan supports terrorism. There is also a broad awareness that Pakistan itself faces a major challenge from extremists in our midst, many of whom get support from countries hostile to us. As such, whatever coalition emerges in Pakistan, it will honour our commitments against terrorism in any form.

Our policy towards Afghanistan is the main area where divergences could occur, notably on account of a popular sentiment of sympathy for the sufferings of the people of that war-torn country. The MMA is unlikely to press for a revision of the key components of our Afghanistan policy. These components are non-interference into its internal affairs, mutually beneficial cooperation both bilaterally and multilaterally, and a commitment to assist in the reconstruction of the country.

We are supportive of the role of the UN in fostering a government of national unity, and also visualize closer relations within the other forums to which we belong, such as ECO and OIC. The MMA leadership is unlikely to depart from these parameters since any excessive interest by them could become a source of embarrassment, vis-a-vis the present government in Kabul as well as the international community.

Taking up other major areas of national unity, and also visualize closer relations within the other forums to which we belong, such as ECO and OIC. The MMA leadership is unlikely to depart from these parameters since any excessive interest by them could become a source of embarrassment, vis-a-vis the present government in Kabul as well as the international community.

Taking up other major areas of national concern, it is doubtful if the MMA or any other major political force would differ on the current approach to Kashmir, where all Pakistanis are critical of India’s repressive policies, and efforts to crush the liberation movement in the name of counter-terrorism. Pakistan’s foreign policy would remain centred on the revival of a dialogue to address all major issues, including Kashmir. There would be unstinted support for strengthening regional cooperation, reinforcing ties with the Muslim world, and building closer relations with our all-weather friend, China.

In the contemporary world, foreign policy is no longer confined to political issues, of which we have plenty in our region, but has also become linked to economic and social progress. As none of the political forces thrown up by the recent elections is strong enough to give a decisive lead in any direction, the split mandate will virtually ensure the continuation of the present policies, whether they relate to terrorism, Kashmir or Afghanistan.

The emergence of MMA is unlikely to bring about any far-reaching changes. In fact, it is probable that our religious parties would wish to project a more benign and liberal attitude, to contrast with the bigoted and violence-prone policies of such forces in India.

The increased support garnered by the religious parties in Pakistan may also lead other powers, notably the US and the EU to consider measures to deal with the new situation. On the one hand, they would have to rely more on President Musharraf so that they may wish to see his dominant influence continue. They may also pay greater heed to the sensitivities of the religious constituency, provided it does not adopt a hostile attitude to them.

As the rise of the religious forces is partly traceable to the growth of poverty, they may realize the need for doing more to eliminate this phenomenon by increased aid and investment. Other consequences may be increased pressure on India for a dialogue, and greater regard for Pakhtoon sensitivities in the context of Afghanistan. India’s wish, on the other hand, would be for the West to persist in a tough stance towards the Muslim world, by harping on the dangers from fundamentalism.