Washington ‘unconsensus’
IT APPEARS that the consensus on The Washington Consensus has begun to dissipate. This is particularly the case in several parts of the Latin American and the Caribbean region. A decade ago, many development economists and policy makers in both the developed and developing world believed that they had found the answer to two problems that had plagued developing countries: persistent backwardness and poor integration with the richer parts of the global economy.
These challenges had earlier drawn policy responses that produced little positive impact in the past. South Asia’s and Latin America’s attempt to build the economies of the two regions on the basis of policies aimed at import substitution and creating highly activist states did not work over the long run. These policies were adopted but the results were anemic growth rates, increased poverty, and technologically backward economies. Not only that, there was also an adverse impact on the political development of the two regions.
I believe it is correct to postulate that economic hope helps build a democratic order. This is as true of the developing world of today as was true in the past of what are today’s rich countries. It was during periods of economic progress and promise that first Europe, then America and, somewhat later, Japan succeeded in erecting stable and durable democratic structures in their societies. That relationship also seemed to work in the developing world. The decade of the 1990s saw the amazing transformation of the political systems as country after country dispensed with authoritarian rule in favour of broad-based democratic systems.
The world looks very different today from what it did a decade ago. There is palpable loss of hope as economic crises have begun to hit most developing countries. The promise the process of globalization seemed to hold seems to be fast evaporating. Every day brings a fresh series of bad economic news. Let me mention some of the newspapers reports that appeared in the week of September 23, 2002 — the week in which the leaders of finance from around the globe gathered in Washington to attend the annual meetings of the International Monetary Fund and The World Bank Group. This is to underscore the mood that prevails today and also to understand how the world’s economic problems are being evaluated in the context of the environment in which we currently live. On Monday, September 23, most newspapers reported the main findings of a study by Oxfam which indicated that the trickle-down effect was not working for coffee producers in Latin America and Asia. Prices for coffee producers were at a 30-year low while the consumers in the developed world continued to pay the top dollar for their “lattes.” While the farmers who produce coffee were being paid only 24 cents for a pound for their produce, the consumers in the developed world were being charged $3.60.
The difference between the two prices — those paid to the producers in developing countries and those payable by the consumers in the developed world — was fattening the profits of the transnational corporations engaged in marketing and retailing coffee. Coffee farmers who were suffering enormously were not confined to Latin America. According to one newspaper story, producers’ distress in the coffee growing states of Karnataka and Kerala, India’s coffee producing states, had reached the point where a number of suicides by farmers had been reported.
On Tuesday, September 24, most newspapers reported on the sharp decline in the value of the Brazilian currency — the real. The Brazilian real fell 4.6 per cent, to 3.57 per dollar, while the nation’s bonds fell to 51.2 cents for a dollar. At that bond price, the effective interest rate for borrowing by Brazil increased to nearly 25 per cent. If this rate were to persist, said several commentators, Brazil will be faced with enormous difficulties in managing its $300 billion-plus public debt. The fall in currency and bond prices was reflected in the prices of the stock market.
Sao Paulo Bovespa fell by 3.35 per cent to 9,264. This fall in the markets was the consequence of the widening by 4 percentage points the margin of lead of Luiz Inacio “Lula” da Silva, the candidate of the left against Jose Serra, the representative of the centre-right. With the polls showing Lula’s support at 44 per cent, 25 percentage points over the support for Serra, the Workers’ Party candidate seemed within striking distance of the majority he needs to win the presidency outright in the October 6 elections. There was no doubt that the political pendulum in Brazil was swinging to the left — a journey not prevented by the approval of a $30 billion IMF support programme by the institution’s Board seven weeks earlier. The Fund’s package was the largest ever approved by its Board.
On Wednesday, September 25, all American newspapers commented on the continuing woes of Wall Street. Tuesday’s trading brought the Dow Jones industrial average to 7,683, the lowest point in four years. The technology-heavy Nasdaq declined to 1,182, its lowest level in six years. The fall in the US markets continued to press upon the financial and currency markets in Mexico. The Mexican Bolsa declined by another 0.63 per cent while the peso, the country’s currency, dropped to 10.27 its lowest point ever since the devaluation of that currency in December 1974.
On the same day, September 25, the editorial page of The Washington Post carried an article questioning the wisdom of market fundamentalism that was the basis of The Washington Consensus, and regretting that the IMF and the World Bank continued “to sing from the market-fundamentalist hymnal.” It saw plenty of evidence from many countries around the globe that suggested — at least to the author of the article — that the main pillars of the economic structure the world had attempted to build were crumbling.
“Marketization” of services previously in the public and non-commercial realm had brought misery to many consumers. In Papua New Guinea, for instance, the introduction of user charges led to a decline of about 30 per cent in the average monthly attendance at outpatient health care. According to this author, “deregulation,” the second pillar of the new structure, had helped large transnational companies to gouge customers. “In the Philippines and in Ghana, for example, deregulation in the mining sector has opened the countries to giant multinational companies, displacing tens of thousands of residents and paving the way for environment devastation.”
The third pillar of the structure — “privatization” — had not brought about the promised benefits to the customer of the entities whose ownership had been transferred from public to private hands. Public utilities which had acquired water systems around the globe had raised water charges by around 10 to 20 per cent without improved service to the poor. “Financial opening” — the new system’s fourth pillar — had exposed most emerging markets to extreme volatility. Flows of foreign capital were supposed to bring long-term benefits to all. Instead they created short-time problems for many.
My point in focusing on so many bad news from the pages of newspapers published in the week of the Bank-Fund annual meetings is not to demonstrate that the economic policy-mix adopted in the 1990s was wrong and, therefore, needs to be abandoned. My aim is to point out that there is enough bad economic news in the air to raise some serious doubts in the minds of millions of people that the pursuit of liberal democracy and economic liberalism has not brought promised results.
On the contrary, slumping economies, growing unemployment, swelling in the ranks of the poor and serious economic crises in a number of countries in the developing world — not only in Latin America but also in several countries of Asia and Africa — have all created an environment of extreme pessimism. As said before, economic optimism helps democracy and freedom. On the other hand, economic pessimism pushes the pendulum to the other side.
What could be done to prevent this swing of the pendulum? This is an important question that must be answered and answered quickly. The answer has four components — they must form part of the policy response of four actors who must work together to fashion a new economic order in the developing world. First, the leaders of the G-7 nations — the leaders of the world’s richest countries — have the obligation to reassert the importance of multilateralism over unilateralism.
The economic turmoil of the last two years may have given globalization — a process that has brought the nations of the world together into a structure that needs a great deal of collective thinking and action — a bad name. But globalization is the only way for bringing about greater prosperity to all citizens of the world. This process needs to be nurtured, not discarded.
Two, transnational corporations which have done a great deal of good in creating a one-world production system must not always pursue profit at the expense of badly hurting their customers. That is the lesson taught by the demise of Enron, Global Crossing, WorldCom, etc. The world’s corporations must act within a framework which provides not only protection to them and the monies they invest but also to the countries which are their hosts and the customers whom they expect to reach. This acceptance of mutual responsibility should lead to the development of universally agreed rules of conduct embedded in regulatory systems that would be accepted around the globe.
Three, the international financial system should recognize that the pursuit of marketization, deregulation, privatization, trade and financial opening in bringing long-term benefits to all can sometimes create short-time problems for many. The institutions represented in this system must, therefore, include the development of strong safety nets as one of the instruments to be used for promoting sustainable development.
Four, the states in the developing world must not abandon all responsibility to the marketplace for bringing increased prosperity to their citizens. The pursuit of economic liberalism does not mean creating a weak state. But a strong state does not mean an interventionist or an interfering state. It means a state that lays down laws that ensure the safety and protection of all economic actors — citizens and consumer on the one hand and investors and corporations on the other.
These four actors must work together to renew their pledge for creating a new world economic order based on multilateralism and pursuit of common good across the globe.
Victory from the jaws of defeat
WHAT does it take to win an election? According to conventional wisdom, economic growth, low unemployment, low taxes. In Germany: personality, good luck and defiance of the US. That, at least, was the winning formula that made Gerhard Schroeder chancellor for a second term.
It was not supposed to be that way. At the beginning of the year the Social Democrat leader trailed a good nine points behind his CSU/CDU rival, Edmund Stoiber. Schroeder looked set to be the first German chancellor in years to be ousted from office after just one term.
He had failed to deliver on his 1998 campaign promise to cut unemployment to 3.5 million (currently around four million). In his own words, he did not deserve re-election. But the coincidental crises of floods in eastern Germany and war against Iraq allowed that failure to be forgotten, or at least forgiven.
The floods that ravaged much of central Europe, including eastern and southern Germany, were a nightmare for the people living in those regions. But for the German chancellor they were a godsend. Any natural disaster offers an excellent opportunity for the incumbent to present himself as a strong, caring leader.
Schroeder played the role to perfection: visiting stricken regions, cancelling campaign commitments, quickly releasing government funds. In a moment of crisis, Germans saw they had a leader who could cope. His opponent, by contrast, did little more than criticize the government — a petty and totally inappropriate response.
Schroeder had a big ‘personality’ head start over the conservative Stoiber anyway. The German Chancellor has a knack of coming across as ‘one of the people’, an ordinary person who did well but who never forgot his roots. Stoiber is a native Bavarian, traditionally known for their gregariousness and bonhomie. But his personality is far from that: his campaign speeches were humourless lectures that failed to inspire those listening.
Personality was an important factor in an election with little to differentiate the programmes of the leading candidates, especially on the economy — the most pressing problem for ordinary Germans. Schroeder, understandably, was not making any firm policy commitments. He promised to slash unemployment but did not clearly outline how he would achieve this. The conservative CDU/CSU was equally vague: an early commitment to cut taxes was offset by the announcement that flood costs would be met through higher taxes.
Neither party was willing to tackle the fundamental problem with the German economy: that its workers are simply too expensive. This dissuades employers from recruiting, while the generous benefits paid to those on the dole dissuade them from taking low-paid jobs. The other problem is a propensity to state pampering: Schroeder bailed out the telecom firm Mobilcom in the middle of the election campaign. Stoiber stimulated hi-tech investment in his native Bavaria with massive state funding. Unless these fundamental flaws are tackled, Germans should not expect any improvement in their country’s 0.5 per cent growth rate.
With little to choose between the two sides in relation to domestic issues, foreign policy became the key differentiator — more particularly the question of German involvement in any US-led war against Iraq. Germany’s first-hand experience of the traumas of war has given its people a deep aversion to conflict. Schroeder cleverly picked up on and exploited that sentiment. Germany would not support a war against Iraq, he declared, even if the UN endorsed it. Compared to that clear stance, Stoiber’s vague calls for UN involvement in any attack came across as weak and indecisive.
Washington is promoting the war against Iraq. Little wonder then that Schroeder’s anti-war rhetoric became tinged with anti-Americanism. While he confined himself to saying Germany would make its own foreign policy decisions ‘in Berlin’ and would not ‘click its heels’ to anyone, his justice minister compared Bush to Hitler. His remarks were well received at home; hers were not. Neither went down well in Washington.
Condoleeza Rice described the atmosphere between Washington and Berlin as ‘poisoned’ by the German election campaign. Bush pointedly did not congratulate Schroeder on his victory. The German chancellor has since replaced his outspoken justice minister and, even before the election, sent a note of semi-apology to the White House. The Americans, however, are in no mood to be appeased. William Safire, writing in the New York Times, urged: ‘Our response...should be to reassess the need for our troop presence in Germany.’
Schroeder will not be able to do a U-turn on Iraq. He owes his victory to his Green coalition partners. They swallowed their pacifist principles when they committed German forces in Kosovo and Afghanistan: they will not do so again on Iraq. Gerhard Schroeder could find that the price for electoral success is soured US-German relations for the duration of his chancellorship.
If Germany’s elections defied conventional wisdom by giving victory to an unemployment failure, they also bucked the rightward trend in European politics. Pim Fortuyn’s party in Holland, Silvio Belusconi’s in Italy, the BNP in England: these and other right-wingers throughout Europe have made remarkable electoral progress by playing the race-immigration card. Keep immigrants out; send those already in back home; force those who stay to integrate with the majority culture. That is the general message coming from the European right.
It is also the message that Edmund Stoiber used at the last minute to stave off defeat in the elections. “Of the 30,000 Islamists”, he told an audience in Werne, “there are 4,000 who are ready for violence. I say to you: these 4,000 — I will expel them from the country.” A clever linking of terrorism and immigration, with no mention of the judicial process. To the credit of the German electorate, Stoiber’s attempt to sow panic failed. One can only hope that other European electorates reject right-wing prophets of doom in the same way.
Schroeder stays on as chancellor, then, but with a reduced majority and with the burden of an angry Washington added to that of high unemployment and poor growth. If Schroeder wants a third term he will have to come up with a different, more substantial, winning formula.
A pride of shame: ALL OVER THE PLACE
THE pride of shame goes to the killing of seven Christians in Karachi last week. It was an act that defies all reason. It is unfortunate that a religious colouring has been given to it.
The cold-blooded way that the killings were carried out, single bullets into the head at point blank range, suggest not zealots but a psychopath mindset. Those killed belonged to Idara Amn-o-Insaf, a Christian charity which has been operating, unhindered, for the past 30 years. It was a ‘soft’ target which makes the act cowardly, as well as barbaric.
There has been widespread condemnation, including from the United States and Britain, one more example of Islamic terror on the rampage. But every Muslim will disown and condemn this killing. Was it a calculated act to further fan the flames of hatred against Islam? On the face of it, this could have been the motive. There could not have been any other motive for those killed were humble, nondescript workers of a low-profile NGO. Why would any group or persons want to attract so much notoriety? It makes no sense.
It would make sense if the killers had some other agenda, not only to spread fear but to defame Pakistan, to show up Pakistan as a lawless country where armed ‘religious’ fanatics roam the streets. The timing too is significant. The attack came while US Assistant Secretary of State, Christina Rocca was in New Delhi.
Is it just a coincidence that everytime a ranking US or British official visits India, something ‘spectacular’ happens? Something that diverts attention away from the catalogue of crimes being committed against the Kashmiris or against the Muslims in Gujrat.
Mr Advani has a pathological hatred of Pakistan and it is India’s misfortune that it has him as its deputy prime minister. Instead of looking deeper into the assault on the Akshardham temple in Gandhinagar in Gujrat, he has leapt to accuse Pakistan of carrying out the attack. His reasoning is twisted, as it usually is, and he cites President Pervez Musharraf’s speech to the United Nations General Assembly in which he had referred to Gujrat. “This indicates they (Pakistan) had planned this for sometime,” he said like a latter-day Archimedes shouting “Eureka”.
He offers not a shred of evidence, unmindful, indeed blissfully unmindful, of how inflammatory his accusation is, likely to further inflame communal passions not only in Gujrat but in India generally. The time has come for those Western leaders who have become regular visitors to New Delhi to demand concrete proof, from Mr Advani and others of his ilk.
But it is to our own state of affairs that we must turn. Newspaper reports of terrorists being arrested, of raids on supposed hideouts and the recovery of a large number of sophisticated weapons, all now very much a part of routine, suggest the frail nature of our social fabric, suggests too that law and order is far from stable.
In days gone by, there was a nexus between politicals and crime. I had written many columns claiming that crime had been politicised and politics criminalized. Now there seems to be a nexus between religious militancy and terrorism. We have the scarifying sight of police and rangers standing guard on our streets, carrying out random security checks. But those determined to carry out terrorist attacks are able to do so.
The attack on the Idara Amn-o-Insaf was carried out in broad daylight on a busy street, it would seem, with boldness and impunity. When the targets are random, it is impossible to provide hundred per cent security. Embassies and consulates are high-profile targets and steps can be taken to guard them, though not necessarily to secure them as the bombing of the US Consulate in Karachi would indicate. The business of making Karachi safe is everyone’s business and not of the law-enforcing agencies alone but a greater vigilance, greater and more scientific intelligence-gathering could prove helpful.
This was not the first attack on Christians and not the last, one is ashamed to say. Last October, a congregation at a church in Bahawalpur was attacked, killing 16. In August this year, a Christian school in Murree was targeted, six died and then some days later, terrorists opened fire in the compound of a Christian hospital in Taxila, three nurses were killed.
Is there a pattern? It is hard to say. A church, a school, a hospital and now the offices of an NGO in Karachi. Is there any method in this madness? All these attacks have been vigorously condemned by a cross-section of the public in Pakistan. No one has come forward to defend them as being righteous acts. Pakistanis from all walks of life and every political persuasion have expressed their dismay and their sorrow.
The people see them as attacks against Pakistanis who happen to be Christians, attacks against our own citizens. To take the ‘religious’ sting out of these attacks, many Muslims have also died. Pakistan’s track-record on minorities is a very good one. If there has been intolerance and bigotry, it has been of the sectarian kind, Muslim against Muslim. This too has been shameful.
Don’t ask
HERE are some things you wanted to know about Iraq but were afraid to ask.
“If George Bush believes in a unilateral preemptive strike against Iraq, why doesn’t he change the name of the Department of Defence to the Department of Offence?” — Thinking Out Loud
“It would cost too much money to change the stationery.”
“When are we going to go to war?” — Itchy
“When the president says we are going to go — and not one minute sooner.”
“If we go to war, will it be because Iraq has weapons of mass destruction or because Saddam Hussein is a liar, a cheater, a rat, and he won’t take a lie detector test?” — True Patriot
“All of the above.”
“How much will the Iraqi adventure cost us?” — Nervous Taxpayer
“One hundred billion in hard dollars, three hundred billion in soft dollars, and fifty billion dollars from Enron.”
“Will this help or hurt the economy?” — Confused, As Usual
“It depends on which economic expert you are talking to and whether you are buying or selling, or if you’ve been laid off to satisfy the company you are working for.”
“Can we talk about the UN?” — One Worlder
“I guess so. It’s a free country.”
“Why are so many of our friends against us?” — Confused Again
“They are against us launching a preemptive attack against Iraq. But many of the United Nations countries would have no problem with first strikes against the countries they consider their enemies. For example, Pakistan wants to bomb India before India bombs them. South Korea would bomb North Korea. And Iran would bomb Saudi Arabia in advance of the Saudis bombing them.
“There isn’t a country in the world that wouldn’t like to launch a strike against a neighbour. The United States will show them the way.”
“The president is demanding he be given permission to go it alone anywhere, anytime. Doesn’t that make every president after him a cowboy?” — Just Asking
“No more than Lyndon Johnson was when he engineered the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution.”
“Will Bush’s policy of first strike diplomacy have any effect on the November elections?” — Suspicious Voter “No way. The American people would never stand for it.”
“Then why don’t the Democrats question it?” — Still Asking
“They are afraid they will lose the election.”
“Will the war interfere with Monday Night Football?” — NFL Fan
“Of course not. The president has to see that we continue to have football to take our minds off what is going on in Iraq.”
“If we do go to war, will there be a shortage of pantyhose?” — Thinking Ahead
“No, we have enough hose in our warehouses to supply every woman in the United States, and even some men.”—Dawn/Tribune Media Services
The genesis of the October 1958 coup
FORTYFOUR years ago, on October 8, 1958, the people of Pakistan woke up in the morning to find out that there had been a military coup during the previous night. President Iskander Mirza, who had taken oath of his office under the 1956 constitution and swore to preserve and protect it, had abrogated it.
He dismissed Prime Minister Feroz Khan Noon and his cabinet, the provincial ministers, dissolved the National Assembly and provincial assemblies, proclaimed martial law in the country, appointed Gen. Ayub Khan, C-in-C of the Pakistan Army, as the Chief Martial Law Administrator (CMLA), banned political parties and cancelled the general elections expected to be held in February, 1959.
Roedad Khan in his article, “Does America really care?” (Dawn September 2, 2002) has observed: “A string of secret and confidential despatches to the State Department from the US embassy in Karachi, in 1958 suggests that the US administration did little to deter the Ayub-Mirza Junta from stabbing Pakistan’s fledging democracy in the back. In fact, it backed the military and bureaucratic combination and gave it the green signal to topple the civilian government.
Roedad Khan’s observation is based on his study of the American papers of the period released in Washington. He has also indicated that the Americans considered Mirza and Ayub Khan as their “closest friends and supporters”. They both had collaborated and worked in a clandestine manner for months to carry out their plan for the change-over. By May 19, 1958, they, in separate conversations with the US ambassador, had conveyed their opinion that “only a dictatorship would work in Pakistan”.
A more elaborate and detailed account of how Ayub Khan pleaded in this regard with the Americans at a much higher level in Washington, is available in Altaf Gauhar’s book, ‘Ayub Khan’, in the chapter entitled, ‘Man on the Horseback’, under the sub-heading, ‘Ayub wins American Support for the Coup’ (pages 112-23). This account is also based on American papers, plus Ayub Khan’s personal diary and minutes of the meetings with American officials.
Altaf Gauhar mentions that Mirza openly ridiculed the idea of elections. He made no secret of his contempt for the constitution and the political process; for him these were luxuries that Pakistan could ill-afford. His problem was to convince the Americans that Pakistan was not yet ready for the parliamentary system of government.
Mirza felt that Ayub was the best man to do the job. He had a clout with the Americans and could exercise influence on them. He had secured military aid from the US government and was responsible for getting Pakistan into US-sponsored alliances — CENTO and SEATO. Mirza deputed Syed Amjad Ali, a former finance minister, a personal friend and a relation, being the father-in-law of one of Mirza’s daughters, to assist Ayub in the task and to keep him informed of the developments.
Altaf Gauhar also refers to the change in the American attitude towards Pakistan since 1956, which had to be countered. A powerful group within the US administration was suggesting that India was a better bet, which could be projected as model democracy in Asia to stem the tide of communism and contain the influence of the Soviet Union and China. This caused concern in Pakistan and the US-Pakistan alliance came under heavy attack in the National Assembly.
It was under these circumstances that Ayub Khan’s and Syed Amjad Ali’s visit to the United States in April, 1958 assumed critical importance. The task assigned to them was to secure military aid on a long-term basis; assure US that Pakistan’s security and stability depended on its defence forces, convince the Americans that Pakistan would be destabilized if elections were to be held in February, 1959, because a large number of persons with dubious antecedents and socialist leanings would get themselves elected, grab power and frustrate the American plan of building Pakistan into a bulwark against communism.
Ayub arrived in New York on April 27 and on the following day had a meeting in Washington with Allen Dulles, Director of US Central Intelligence Agency, and recorded in his diary: “Allen Dulles happens to be an old friend of mine. I particularly wanted to see him as obtaining his support for our point of view and getting him to work on his brother (John Foster Dulles, US Secretary of State) can be of decisive effect. During the interview I told him all thinking people in Pakistan were worried because Indian attitude on Kashmir had hardened.”
Ayub told Allen Dulles that most people in Pakistan were attributing Indian stubbornness to the recently promised American aid and this was weakening the hands of the ‘friends’ of America who were in control in Pakistan. This would become an election issue and may well result in the victory of a majority of politicians hostile to the United States.
Ayub Khan and Syed Amjad Ali had a meeting with William M. Rowntree, Assistant Secretary of State, on April 29, 1958. The meeting was attended by Mohammed Ali (Bogra), Pakistan’s ambassador to the United States. In this meeting Syed Amjad Ali argued that American economic aid to India had enabled it to divert its own resources to large-scale purchases of armaments. Many prominent politicians were attacking the government for its foreign policy and a “definite ground swell was developing against alliances which, the people felt, were not taking Pakistan anywhere. If this tendency continued it will turn into a turbulence and would affect the next elections. It would weaken the hands of the present leaders in Pakistan because the supporters of the present foreign policy were definitely finding themselves on a sticky wicket.”
Rowntree assured the finance minister that there was no weakening in his government’s desire to support Pakistan and that the United States had the same sympathetic consideration of Pakistan’s problems as before.
Ayub Khan, Amjad Ali and Mohammad Ali (Bogra) called on John Foster Dulles on April 30, 1958. Also present on the occasion was William M Rowntree. They went over the same ground and tried to convince the secretary of state that American aid to India was weakening the position of the government of Pakistan which was firmly committed to regional alliances. Dulles said that the aid given to India and to other neutralist countries was actuated by a conviction that it was in the ultimate interest of the ‘free world’, including Pakistan and the whole of Asia. However, Dulles promised to “try to influence India as tactfully and diplomatically as possible.”
Later Ayub also met the top brass of the army. In his meetings with them he stressed the point that “the present aid only gives Pakistan an army that will have to be kept in Pakistan for its own defence, but if given further assistance to organize an army corps or so we can certainly provide an expeditionary force either in Iran or elsewhere in the Middle East.”
Ayub also called on Allen Dulles again to thank him for putting his brother in the picture. Allen Dulles assured him that he “will do all he can on Pakistan’s behalf.”
Ayub Khan returned to Karachi on May 18. He felt reasonably pleased with the results of his mission. He told Mirza that the Americans may not review their programme of aid to India but they had understood the risks involved in pushing Pakistan towards the unchartered ocean of general elections in the hope of consolidating the democratic process in the country. With a major hurdle thus removed, Mirza and Ayub found the path clear to put their plan into action. However, it took them nearly five months to make the necessary preparation.
They finally struck on October 7 in the darkness of the night. But as it often happens in a situation of bizarre diarchy, the collaboration between them did not last for more than 20 days. As power flows from the barrel of the gun, the more powerful of the two, Gen. Ayub Khan, had the upper hand. Altaf Gauhar in his book has narrated the story of the rift between Mirza and Ayub and how power started slipping out of Mirza’s hands. Finally, Ayub invited Mirza for a meeting on October 19, which was attended by Justice Munir, chief justice of Pakistan and Col Kazi, judge advocate-general in the GHQ.
Altaf Gauhar does not say so but I feel that actually it was a little drama that Ayub had staged for Mirza’s exit from the scene. Under discussion at the meeting was the question of defining the respective powers of the president and the chief martial law administrator. When Justice Munir was explaining the legal position, Col Kazi interrupted him and said that with the abrogation of the constitution the president had lost all powers and the CMLA was now the only lawful authority in the country. Justice Munir was a little put off by that and Ayub asked Kazi not to press the point any further, which, I suspect, must have been a part of the script.
The meeting came to an abrupt end but Col Kazi had conveyed Ayub’s message to Mirza. A week later Mirza was ousted and despatched to London in exile and Ayub took over as president. He was now the sole ruler in supreme command of all that he surveyed.
We have seen the American involvement in Gen. Ayub Khan’s military coup of October, 1958. The extent of the American involvement in Gen. Ziaul Haq’s military coup of July, 1977, and the circumstances leading to it will perhaps become known when the American papers for the period are released.