Two wrongs don’t make a right
WHEN the US was shaken by the terrorist attacks on September 11 most of the Islamic world prayed that the perpetrators of the crime would not be Muslims. Once the identity of the terrorists was announced we prayed that the US in its very understandable rage would not do something senseless that would further aggravate the problem of world terrorism. Everyone heaved a sigh of relief when there was restraint shown by the US and George Bush acknowledged that this is a “different type of war.”
However, by this time the American public wanted blood, egged on by some rash statements of some in power and a section of the media that preached hatred. Those who argued that international terrorism is a complex issue and needed a comprehensive and carefully thought through solution were brushed aside and accused of appeasing terrorists.
Thus, despite acknowledging that it was a different type of war, the US has embarked on a conventional war by bombing Afghanistan. In doing so it may have played into the hands of the terrorists themselves. For terrorism to flourish there has to be a feeling of injustice which breeds the anger and hatred needed to produce someone desperate enough to kill himself for his cause.
The sight of any further suffering of Afghan civilians in the form of ‘collateral damage’ will shift Muslim sympathies towards them. A side-effect of the bombing is going to cause massive dislocation, leaving them vulnerable to the severe Afghan winter which will inevitably take a severe toll on these impoverished people who had absolutely nothing to do with the September 11 outrage.
Even more alarming for the Muslims is the news that the US has told the UN that it reserves the right to attack any state that it thinks harbours terrorists. Since the countries that are suspected of doing so are Islamic, the US may again play into the hands of the terrorists who want the Muslim world to perceive the US as anti-Islamic and hence unite against it. Neither Mr. Blair’s wonderful speech in the House of Commons nor Mr. Bush’s visits to Islamic community centres will allay Muslim fears that the target of the anti-terror campaign are the Muslims, especially if another Muslim country is bombed after Afghanistan.
As a Pakistani my fear is that if some Pakistani fanatics get involved in terrorist acts in the US (there are some four million Pakistanis overseas), will we as a country of 140 million get blamed? For the past 10 years our country has been unable to control internal terrorism. What if our government cannot destroy the terrorist networks within? Could we face the same situation as Afghanistan? Another worrying aspect is highlighted by Henry Kissinger in his latest book that powerful lobbies in the US influence US foreign policy. The Israeli lobby is the strongest lobby in the US and its power can be gauged by the fact that for the past 30 odd years it has managed to annually procure three billion of American taxpayers’ dollars for its population of three million.
Moreover the Israeli lobby has ensured that every atrocity committed by the Israeli government against the Palestinians is given complete protection in the United Nations by the US. That’s why the US has failed to become an honest broker in the Middle East. The fear amongst the Arab countries is that Israel could use its enormous influence on the US to have any of its neighbouring Arab countries declared as supporting or harbouring terrorists on one pretext or another.
The country worst affected by the US bombing of Afghanistan is Pakistan. President Musharraf was bluntly and arrogantly told that either we cooperate with the US or be considered its enemy and be prepared to be bombed into the stone age. For no fault of its own Pakistan was put into this no-win situation. Today Pakistan is a US ally and trying to destroy the friendly Taliban regime and as a result helping the Northern Alliance which is pro-India and openly hostile to Pakistan. Anyone who knows Afghanistan also knows that the vacuum created by destroying the Taliban could lead to a civil war that could take years to settle and have a destabilizing effect on the two bordering provinces of Pakistan.
Most worrying for us are the protests that have erupted all over Pakistan that could take the country towards anarchy and chaos. At the moment President Musharraf is in control but he knows that the silent majority is rapidly turning against the bombing of Afghanistan, especially when they watch on TV the US missiles creating more rubble in the war ravaged country. Were it to become vocal and come out in support of the extremists the whole region could be destabilized — something the perpetrators of the September 11 acts are desperately hoping will happen.
The worst case scenario for Pakistan would be the US botching up in Afghanistan and killing thousands of innocent civilians, countrywide protests that lead to a change of government led by hardliners and eventually getting bombed by the US into the stone age. If the conflict in Afghanistan gets prolonged and bloody then other Muslim countries could get destabilized too with pro-American governments replaced by rabidly anti-American ones. The ultimate nightmare scenario for the world will be the US taking military action against Muslim countries and in the process breeding many more Osamas and Al Qaedas. Bear in mind that a few desperate people today can do more damage than ever before in human history. I don’t need to go into the havoc chemical or biological warfare can create among civilian populations. Thus it is advisable for the US and its allies to sit back and consider whether this war is not being aimlessly guided by opinion polls and popularity ratings rather than by common sense.
The only way for the civilized world to deal with global terrorism is through justice. We need international institutions of credibility like a fully empowered world criminal court or an independent powerful world body (what the UN was meant to be but never became) to define terrorism and dispense justice with impartiality.
There should be a distinction made between freedom struggles based on human rights and self-determination and terrorism. This is again not going to be an easy thing to do because there are a lot of shades of gray — but unfortunately we have run out of easy options. We should strive for an environment in this world in which no human being should be allowed to reach such a desperate state where he is willing to kill himself just to harm others.
In some sections of the western media a perception was created that the September 11 terrorists were driven to suicide by the lure of virgins waiting for them in heaven. This simplistic and naive assumption cannot explain why the maximum number of suicide attacks have been conducted by the Hindu Tamil tigers in Sri Lanka, or for that matter the Japanese Kamikaze pilots during the Second World War. The world is heading towards a disaster of mammoth proportions if the sole superpower behaves as judge, jury and executioner when dealing with terrorism. It is also the direction the terrorists of September 11 desperately hope will be taken: to pit the 1.3 billion Muslims in this world against the US.
Coping with the crisis
THE bombing of Afghanistan has sparked off street protests in Pakistan but not civil war as some had feared. The demonstrations have been more melees than meetings marked more by violent disposition than large numbers.
General Musharraf overstated the numerical strength of the opposition to his Afghan policy when he put it at 10 to 15 per cent. The number is smaller and they are not all religious extremists. The ethnic affinity is playing a larger part.
Interior minister Moinuddin Haider is right in identifying Jamaat-i-Islami (JI) and JUI (both Fazlur Rahman and Samiul Haq groups) as the only significant opposition. In no election the combined vote of the two parties has exceeded 10 per cent. Even in that the JI, till the change in its stance on Thursday, was opposed to the policy but is not agitating on the streets.
The violence and mayhem in skirmishes with the police are restricted to the belts in Balochistan and the North-West Frontier province and pockets in Karachi where the JUI has its adherents and also concentration of its madressahs. Most Taliban leaders are their alumni, Mulla Omar among them. That’s however not to deny the sympathy the people here have for the common people of Afghanistan, and the torment they suffer, on account of the bombing of Afghanistan but see no way how Pakistan’s military leadership could have averted it.
For the violence that has occurred here and may occur again the government has no one but itself to blame. It has failed on the propaganda front as much as in enforcing the law. It did not inform and convince the people that the on-going internecine strife in Afghanistan was for ethno-tribal hegemony; it was not a war for the supremacy of Islam.
The tribes fighting the Pakhtun Taliban — Hazara, Uzbek, Tajik, Turkmen — are all Muslims and larger in number. Pakistan raised and recognized the Taliban militia not as soldiers of Islam but to bring stability to Afghanistan and thus earn the goodwill of the world and benefit by trading with the newly opened, resource-rich Central Asian republics.
Instead, they are feared and loathed, for which Pakistan cannot escape the blame, or the consequences, being their original sponsor and now a solitary friend. Their activities and alignment with the Arab rebels or malcontents have cast a shadow on Pakistan’s relations with China, its most steadfast friend. Yet a feeling persists among the people here that Pakistan has abandoned the Taliban when they are suffering in the cause of Islam.
The failure of the government, more particularly of ISI, to persuade the Taliban not to confront the whole world in the wake of the September 11 carnage in America may be excusable but its inability to prevent killings and pillage in their sympathy is not.
This government all along has been wary of enforcing the law against the religious parties in politics. Their dual role in public life has enabled them to escape almost every restriction suffered by the other, much larger political parties. Their meetings and processions are viewed as religious even when the cause is political just because the authorities would rather not stir up a hornet’s nest. The regulatory laws are invoked only against the weak and the secular.
That attitude has bred a sense of immunity among the religious parties, culminating in some cases to open defiance. Its worst example came in their open call for protest demonstration, shutdown and wheeljam on September 21. The administration did not act against its sponsors either before or after though lives were lost and properties were damaged or looted.
The same story was repeated three weeks later when JUI staged a rally in Quetta. No law was invoked to stop it nor were the organizers restrained. The lawless elements have since then let loose a killing and burning spree, bringing life to a halt midst intimidation and violence.
The administration is failing on two counts: it is not stopping the Taliban supporters from breaking the law; secondly, it is not providing an opportunity to those people who are opposed to the government but would like to help it tide over this crisis to articulate their views.
The Baloch tribes form a majority in Balochistan. By common knowledge they all loathe the Taliban regime. The Baloch sardars (chieftains) are seen or heard nowhere though they would have only backed the government’s policy on the question of terrorism.
Nawab Akbar Bugti, it is believed, was invited by the president but a special plane sent to fetch him was recalled just in time as the Nawab waited to board it at Quetta. It seems the advice or the adviser changed in the intervening period.
Sardar Ataullah Mengal from his exile in London told a television audience that if the atrocity of September 11 was perpetrated by Osama bin Laden, it is unthinkable that the ISI did not know about it beforehand. Nawab Khair Buksh Marri, traditionally the most venerable of them all, was last heard of when in prison. Now all Balochs must be watching the zealots rampaging through their own province — sullen but helpless. President Musharraf may like to believe that the attack on Afghanistan will be short-lived. President Bush who should know better says it would last much longer, may be for two years.
The worry is that the government here is ill-prepared to cope with the stresses a prolonged offensive will cause in the form of a renewed influx of refugees and periodic eruption of violence on the streets.
The administration is in a shambolic disarray. The power and money said to be devolving from the centre to the provinces and further down to the districts is lost somewhere along the way. The authority has lost its focus. Just one of the many questions arising is: will a nazim, as executive head of a district, be free and willing to stop a procession or a strike organized by his own party defying a legal ban? The Karachi nazim will be facing this dilemma tomorrow (Monday) when his party (JI) has called for a strike. Elsewhere the nazims are said to have sided with the party rather than with the law.
The government should now, without loss of time, invite the leaders of all parties and scholars from all schools of thought to educate the public opinion through radio and TV on he following controversial aspects of the current crisis:
* Is it right and appropriate to view the Taliban as being engaged in jihad when all the contending parties are Muslim?
* Is it permissible to finance a jihad by growing poppy and selling heroin extracted from it to the infidels?
* Is it justified for Muslim groups to fight and kill each other for territorial gains and, in the process, condemn one-third of their people to a life in slums to subsist on food handouts coming mostly from the Christian West?
* Is Mulla Omar’s call to the Muslims world for jihad against America and those who support America, valid?
The OIC meeting at Doha on Wednesday last could have given guidance and comfort to the Muslims in this moment of grave crisis but with its enormous influence and wealth all that came out of it, besides a homily, for the starving, tormented Afghans was 40 million dollars. Their tormentor America alone has given $500 million.
Lastly, a question, mean but pertinent, that must be asked of the zealots: how had the government and people of Afghanistan reacted when Pakistan was bombed and its eastern half torn apart by an invading army of infidels? National interest predominates in all crises with all people. So it must with Pakistan.
What to fight for
IN explaining to Americans the war he is leading against terrorism, President Bush described the enemy as heir to the “murderous ideologies” against which this country fought for most of the last century: fascism, Nazism and totalitarianism.
As with those ideologies, he said, the terrorists responsible for the Sept. 11 attack sacrifice human life to their radical vision of the world and respect no value but the “will to power.”
The analogy is powerful in many ways. It reinforces Bush’s message that the struggle will be long; the United States fought communist totalitarianism for many decades. It bolsters also the message that the struggle will be fought on many fronts — not just military but, as in the cold war, economic, political, propaganda and more.
Above all it elevates the struggle to a seriousness that cannot be slighted, by this or future administrations; if the enemy is aiming for the destruction of civilization, no priority could be more important than that enemy’s destruction. As during the cold war, the United States might take on other tasks and causes but must never forget the long-term ideological struggle.
But precisely for that reason — because Bush has put this war at the very forefront of the nation’s agenda — it is important to be careful and precise in measuring the foe and setting the goals. Is it the entire story, for example, that the terrorists target America because they hate its open society?
Bush described a fight between freedom and fear, and that is part of it. But then why do the terrorists also target authoritarian regimes such as those of Uzbekistan or Saudi Arabia? It’s important to recognize distinctions where they exist — among different terrorist organizations and among varying goals even within organizations. And it’s important to think about the ways in which “a fringe form of Islamic extremism,” as Bush described the ideology of the foe, also might differ from the hostile ideologies of the past century in tactics, goals and sweep. —The Washington Post
A peace plan for Afghanistan
AFGHANISTAN has been under attack since October 7. The United States, reeling from the massive terrorist attacks, decided that the Afghan regime had harboured Osama bin Ladin and therefore must face the consequences of not handing him over. The Taliban government has foolishly allowed itself to get cornered on behalf of a Saudi alien.
Because of their total inflexibility in dealing with their internal or external relations, they have caused a massive crisis of survival for the entire Afghan nation. Six to seven million Afghans will be forced out of their homes by fear and starvation. The situation is heavily stacked against the Taliban regime. The ground realities in and around it are completely against the regime, even though nearly nine-tenths of Afghanistan is under the Taliban control, who are largely Pakhtuns. The Northern Alliance, which is mainly Tajik, has held its position in the north-eastern Afghanistan. It has now won considerable interest of the US-led coalition against terrorism.
Previously supported by India, Iran and Russia, the Northern Alliance has now laid claim to international support of every kind. For the immediate future, because of the terrain and ethnic factors, the chances of General Dostumb’s success are greater than the chances of the north-eastern forces of the late Commander Ahmad Shah Masood taking over Kabul. The Shiaiite Hazaras of Bamiyan also await the turn of events to free themselves of the brutal stranglehold of the Taliban. The once powerful governor, Qadeer Khan, and his mentor Maulvi Younus Khalis wait in the wings to recapture the control of the entire Ningehar region provinces.
Another potent factor is the proclivity of Afghan leaders and commanders to change sides. If they see the writing on the wall and if suitable negotiations are conducted with them, many local commanders are bound to change their allegiance. All these factors will weigh against the Taliban.
But the question is: will the defeat of the Taliban at the hands of the Northern Alliance and the US-led coalition force end terrorism and bring peace to the region? The answer to this question is both yes and no. A Northern Alliance victory will be seen as a minority Tajik-Uzbek victory over the Pakhtoon majority. They feel the Afghan state was founded by a Pakhtoon leader in the eighteenth century, Ahmad Shah Durrani, by virtue of which the Pakhtoon majority has the right to rule Afghanistan. The Northern Alliance is going to be seen as a quisling of the US-led coalition, out to harm Islam.
The fall of the Taliban at the hands of the Northern Alliance will trigger many negative forces in Afghanistan. Fear of reprisals will spread panic. Some Pakhtoon leaders will give the call for a renewed jihad, and Afghanistan will be sucked into the vortex of another civil war. Pakistan will suffer the most in such a turmoil.
Whereas I see no great difficulty for the coalition and the Northern Alliance in defeating the Taliban, I see great turmoil in the post-war period unless a clear-cut political plan is presented to the Afghan nation and the world. There does appear to be some confusion with regard to the future dispensation. From Washington there are only mixed signals. President Bush wants the removal of the Taliban but no “nation-building”. Elements in Congress and the European Union are looking at ex-king Zahir Shah to deliver a political solution. Pakistan is extremely worried about the possibility victory of the Northern Alliance. Iran is uneasy about the possibility of restoration of monarchy.
Where Iran is comfortable, Pakistan is uncomfortable. Iran will support the Northern Alliance but not the ex-king. Pakistan is opposed to the Northern Alliance but could support Zahir Shah. Dostum of the north-west will accept Zahir Shah, but ex-president Burhanuddin Rabbani may not. Hikmatyar might reject the ex-king, but, surprisingly, the Taliban might support him if he is presented as a face-saver to them.
In this bleak Aghan scenario can there be some silver lining, some hope that peace can be restored? Being a chronic optimist about the human condition, I believe that if America acts wisely, lasting peace is possible. Neither the defeat of the Taliban, nor the victory of the Northern Alliance will bring peace. The declaration of war by America must now be followed by a declaration of peace. This is not a contradiction in terms.
The UN Security Council has been busy passing threatening resolutions against the Taliban, which have not worked. Why not try a Resolution of Peace whose elements and language should be: “Mindful of the dangers of a prolonged war in Afghanistan, the Security Council does hereby urge the Northern Alliance and the Taliban forces to cease hostilities forthwith and withdraw their respective personnel and war materials 12.5 miles away from their ground positions; and the 25-mile wide space so created be called The Demilitarized Zone to be manned by UN observers, raised from among countries acceptable to both sides; and that this Security Council ruling is being passed under Chapter 7 of the UN Charter”. The above cease-fire resolution can be enforced by the UN by any means the Security Council deems fit, including the use of force. Along with this resolution must be passed a Resolution of Peace by the UN Security Council which could read as follows: “Desirous of permanent and lasting peace in the war-torn state of Afghanistan, the Security Council resolves that the way to end the war is to have a political settlement between all protagonists, and for purposes of forming a broad-based representative government that will reflect the ethnic, sectarian, regional, linguistic and religious diversity of Afghanistan, has determined that the best way of achieving this objective being the historically tested and tried Loya Jirga; the Security Council approves and authorizes the formation of an Afghan Council of Elders to put up proposals to the Security Council within two weeks on the venue, time, composition and agenda of the proposed Loya Jirga;
“That the Security Council, having considered various persons most suited to sit on the Council of Elders, hereby nominates ex-king Zahir Shah as the convener and Pir Syed Ahmed Gaylani and Pir Nabi Mohammadi, as members of the Afghan Council of Elders;
“That ex-king Zahir Shah will act only as convener of the Elderb’s Council;
“That the Security Council will examine the recommendations of the Afghan Council of Elders and having finalized the same, authorize the convening of the Loya Jirga, for the purposes of which all logistic support will be made available;
“That the Security Council will recognize the decisions of the Loya Jirga as the will of the Afghan nation and therefore its decisions with regard to its constitution, internal and external security, the purposes and structure of the future state of Afghanistan; be deemed to have international legal sanction and legitimacy, and that all other entities will cease to have any legal effect;
“That the Security Council recognizes and declares the permanent neutrality of the Afghan state as the cardinal principle of policy of the United Nations to be recognized by all member states of the United Nations;
“That the Security Council resolves that a massive reconstruction programme of Afghanistan being an imperative of permanent peace, all states of the world be asked to make contribution commensurate to their economic size, to an Afghan reconstruction fund which would be made operative under the directions of the Security Council;
“That for the above purposes, the Security Council will be guided by the various agencies of the United Nations, and any other institutions deemed necessary;
“That for purposes of freeing the Afghan state from insecurity and proliferation of weapons, the Loya Jirga be asked to put up its recommendations for decommissioning of arms, creating of a neutral Afghan army and internal security forces;
“That the United Nations will assist the Afghan state to rebuild all institutions of civil society and civil administration;
“That the United Nations will assist and otherwise help repatriation of Afghan refugees to their homeland in peace and honour, and take all possible measures to facilitate the task of their repatriation and resettlement.”
It is my submission that such a peace initiative must accompany the threat and use of force. Force must not be used for retribution alone. It should be used as an instrument of peace. Only then will use of force be acceptable and its results get moral legitimacy. During the Benazir Bhutto government, this campaigner for peace called on ex-king Zahir Shah in 1994 and 1995, in Rome. All principal power wielders in Pakistan — the president, the prime minister and the COAS — were on board that the Zahir Shah option be explored.
As foreign minister, I was asked to generate support for this peace plan within Afghanistan and abroad. On my extensive tours and visits to Afghanistan I found tremendous goodwill for the ex-king among money, including the Taliban and General Dostum. Iran, though hostile to monarchy, agreed not to oppose this initiative by Pakistan. Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan were favorably inclined. China decided to go along with the plan.
In early 1996, the government asked me to talk to Washington. There I knocked at many doors, the White House, the State Department and the Pentagon. But the answer was negative. Maybe, the peace plan Pakistan had presented was premature and maybe elements within Pakistan were not convinced. But now history has come full circle.
The US-led coalition is considering the Loya Jirga concept seriously. One hopes it works, within the ambit of the UN, of course.
The writer is former foreign minister of Pakistan.