A MILITANT attack claimed by the banned TTP on the Peshawar-Khyber Agency boundary, a separatist attack in Balochistan — the new year has continued with grim reminders of a troubling reality: the country still has a long way to go before victory can be declared in the fight against militancy.

While it was never expected that a year and a half of sustained counter-insurgency operations in Fata and intensive counterterrorism actions across the rest of Pakistan would eliminate militancy, the worry is that the state may have reached the point of diminishing returns.

Past counter-insurgency operations, like the several iterations in Khyber Agency, have yielded a worrying pattern.

Also read: FC loses six men in blast near Bolan

While the military is able to reclaim territory and ensure militants do not return en masse, the militants adapt their tactics to new realities. The occasional suicide bombing against security targets and frequent IED attacks have prevented the return of true normality.

Vastly improved as the situation on the ground may be, small-scale attacks continue with disturbing frequency. Meanwhile, in Balochistan, two years of outreach by the previous civilian governments to separatist elements have not been able to offset the continuing realities of a province where politics and security have effectively been militarised.

The Bolan attack on FC personnel and the claim of responsibility by the BLA suggest that a decade of trying to militarily crush the separatists has not worked.

Could NAP be the answer to both problems in areas abutting Fata and in Balochistan? On paper, yes. But in reality, patchy implementation and the lack of meaningful coordination between the centre and the provinces and the civilian and military arms of the state continue to impede long-term success.

The attack on Khasadar personnel stationed at a Khyber-Peshawar check post embodies the dizzying array of challenges — border control with Afghanistan; normalising Fata; and protecting the provinces.

Neither the success of Khyber I and Khyber II, nor high-level attempts to improve border management prevented the militants from being able to kill personnel right on Peshawar’s doorstep.

The NAP platform offers potential solutions, but only if intra-state cooperation and centre-province interaction are taken more seriously.

Similarly, as per NAP, has the Balochistan civilian dispensation really been empowered as was envisaged? The Bolan attack cannot be seen in isolation.

If engaging separatist elements via the civilian government is not made the cornerstone of state policy, no amount of military resources can be used to prevent low-level violence. But are the powers-that-be really willing to listen?

Published in Dawn, January 20th, 2016