PRIME Minister Nawaz Sharif’s recent visit to China was successful — 19 inter-state agreements focused on energy were signed, and China has promised investment worth $42 billion. Close cooperation between the two has existed for decades. But not many know that this ‘iron friendship’ was actually conceived as a result of the demarcation of shared borders.

Conflict and contestation regarding Pakis­tan’s borders make headlines regularly. Re­­cently, aggression increased on the LoC and the Pak-Iran border. The Durand Line has also proven problematic with its permeability allowing militants to cross over. But what about the border with China? One never hears much about it. This evinces its relative security and definiteness.

The delimitation of the border between Pakistan and China actually became the cata­lyst for much-needed improvement of ties between them, and resulted in high levels of economic and military collaboration.

A secure border with China has saved us billons of dollars.

Until 1962, relations between the two were far from perfect. One point of contestation was that Chinese maps included parts of the northern areas under the actual control of Pakistan as part of Chinese territory. Pakistan’s voting in favour of a permanent Security Council seat for China provided the necessary impetus for the latter to retract these controversial maps and enter into serious negotiations with Pakistan, eventually culminating in the border demarcation agreement between the two states signed on March 2, 1963.

This treaty is not known to many, but its entry into force is a big accomplishment for Pakistan. Pakistan was negotiating from a position of weakness and at that juncture did not enjoy good relations with other states nearby — USSR, Afghanistan and India.

Under this agreement Pakistan retained all territories that were under its control in areas contiguous to China’s Xinjiang region. In addition, Pakistan also obtained 1,942 square kilometres of territory under the effective control of the Chinese.

This additional area constitutes the Shimshal region, north of the main watershed dividing Pakistan and China. Here the Shimshali inhabitants of north Hunza had historically enjoyed grazing rights, and had previously established a post without Chinese objection. Apart from this projection, the boundary followed the main watershed between the Tarim river system (tributaries of the Tashkurgan river) and the Indus river system (tributaries of the Hunza river).

Through this agreement China dropped her claim to Hunza. The Chinese had once occupied Gilgit and Hunza, but at the end of the eighth century their authority waned in the region. Still, their links with Hunza remained, as evident by the fact that up till 1911 Hunza rulers recognised Chinese suzerainty by paying one and a half ounces of gold annually as tribute to the Chinese emperor, even when the region was under British control.

The British had occupied Hunza in 1891-92, and when Russia gained influence in Xinjiang, the British became concerned that through the proxy of Russia, China might push for claims over Hunza and even further southward. Therefore they attempted in 1899 to delimit the border with China on the main watershed line along the Karakoram. They attempted to do so again in 1905, but included a small projection north of the watershed in the Shimshal/Darwaza region.

In the coming decades, the British did argue for a more northerly line as part of their ‘forward policy’ strategy, under which buffer zones were to be created between their territories and other imperial powers. However, by 1927 the British had retracted this aggressive stance and accepted the watershed as the main boundary in the region.

When Pakistan became independent in 1947 it inherited the boundaries in the region from Britain — a principle of succession recognised under international law.

The settlement of the border dispute between Pakistan and China has saved Pakis­tan billions of dollars in military expenditure and prevented loss of territory under its control. Further, strong bilateral relations have resulted, leading China to provide diplomatic, military, economic and investment support to Pakistan. The building of the Karakoram Highway has improved connectivity and promoted trade links with China. However, such developments have not translated into prosperity for the former Northern Areas (Gilgit-Baltistan) or its communities.

The region has not been politically and legally integrated into Pakistan. Its citizens have been deprived of basic political, civil, socio-economic and even cultural rights. The pivotal right to suffrage is unavailable to them at the national level.

The region is also not legislatively represented in the federal parliament. While at the time of partition the inhabitants of the region were overwhelmingly supportive of being Pakistani citizens, their disenfranchisement has led to disillusionment and resentment.

The state should therefore wholly integrate the area into Pakistan. The realisation needs to kick in that Gilgit-Baltistan is not just a tourist destination.

The writer is the former legal advisor to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Published in Dawn, November 13th, 2014