CONFIRMING recent speculation, the Afghan and Pakistan Taliban have announced a joint focus on fighting the US/Isaf troops in Afghanistan. What this means in the Pakistani context is that the TTP will likely scale back its attacks inside the country, meaning a drop in violence. From the narrowest and most myopic point of view, this will be viewed as a good thing for Pakistan in the short term. But is the formation of the Shura-i-Murakbah, a five-member council representing the who’s who of militancy, the Waliur Rehman, Hakeemullah Mehsud, Gul Bahadur, Mullah Nazir and Haqqani groups, in any way a welcome development for us?

First, the caveats. There is still some uncertainty about the extent to which the agreement between the Afghan Taliban and parts of the TTP can be enforced. The splintering of the TTP in Pakistan has led to many offshoots with agendas of their own.

Even with the ‘big five’ represented in the Shura-i-Murakbah it’s not clear to what extent they will reorient towards Afghanistan to the exclusion of activities inside Pakistan. Having said that, the danger to Pakistan is a broader one. With sections of the Pakistani Taliban announcing their intention to focus on Afghanistan, have we slipped closer to being labelled as a ‘sponsor of terrorism’ in the international community? Since 9/11 and the start of the so-called war on terror, Pakistan has publicly and consistently maintained that it will not allow its soil to be used for terrorist acts abroad. To the extent that was happening, whether through the Haqqani group or the Taliban using Pakistan as a sanctuary, the groups in question downplayed their use of Pakistani territory. And the Pakistani state suggested it was unable to seal a lengthy and porous border. What’s changed now is primarily the international community’s mood. Patience with Pakistan is running perilously low and the tolerance for misbehaviour may no longer be there.

Does it make sense for us to flirt with attracting further international opprobrium in order to achieve the most limited of gains in terms of a short hiatus in violence inside the country? And by allowing TTP elements to once again push for closer ties with the Afghan Taliban, what happens when the ‘goal’ in Afghanistan is achieved? Would they not then turn their sights back on Pakistan, stronger and more motivated than ever? We ought to remember two things: one, the TTP has wrought great damage on Pakistan and will seek to do so again; two, an Al Qaeda-TTP-Afghan Taliban combine would be devastating for the region.