THE core political economy question facing Pakistan today is whether the military in Pakistan has a place in civilian affairs, or whether it should be permanently removed to the barracks and be made answerable to a civilian elected government.

The core contradiction being faced by Pakistan, one that has a bearing on almost every aspect of political and public life, ranging from domestic politics, the economy, foreign relations to a lot more, is between Pakistan’s military and civilian forms of government and control.

This core contradiction has been defined and dominated by Pakistan’s military since the 1950s, almost without break and without opposition. Perhaps the only time when the hegemony of the military was broken, albeit for a short time, was after the military’s abject humiliation in 1971.

Soon after, due to the ineptitude and failure of a civilian democratically elected government, as well as complicit political actors in the opposition, the military found its way back, first through Balochistan and subsequently all over Pakistan in 1977.

For 30 years, till 2007, the military has governed at times, but always ruled and held power without much civilian discontent. Pakistan’s political class has lived comfortably with the military without feeling much discomfort and without seeing much contradiction in a subservient relationship.

This hold of the military was tempered, but not fully broken, in 2008, just as it was in 1971, when the military was forced to yield power to a democratic movement. The moment to resolve the contradiction and to ensure that there would be a break from the past, so that civilian authority would once and for all dominate and define Pakistan’s future, lasted some months, but was never fully enforced.

The first few months after the elections, when the two main parties were working together, represented a key possibility for both to enforce their writ over Pakistan’s political equation. As in the past, that opportunity was lost. The military was not going to give up its power and domination voluntarily and some attempts to take that authority by civilians was greatly contested by the military which prevailed. More opportunities have arisen just in this year when the military and its institutions have been weakened, not due to civilians asserting their legitimate authority, but because of military failures, such as Abbottabad and Mehran base. However, the legitimate holder of political power, i.e. the democratically elected civilian government, has been unable to put the military where it belongs. Key moments to replace military hegemony with the bona fide representatives of the people, continue to be lost.

This core contradiction between the military and civilians is played out in multiple manifestations, ranging from issues of Pakistan’s sovereignty of its borders to those related to memogate. This contradiction is observable in almost any decision that the government takes.

Government spokespersons went out of their way to state that all ‘stakeholders’ were on board when the MFN status was announced for India. It is absurd that the military needs to clear an elected government’s economic and trade initiatives, but this is precisely the nature of Pakistan’s political contradiction. Much of Pakistan’s politics can be explained through this contradiction.

Civilian elected governments (as opposed to those which have been propped up by military rulers, such as the 2002-07 Musharraf ‘democracy’) cannot function unless this contradiction is resolved. They cannot work freely with the shadow of the military hanging over them. The military is not a democratic institution and to assume that it is a check on elected government is a fallacy of huge proportions. The institution of the military and the institution of democratically elected government are opposed to each other, with both having a very different perspective on governance, representation and authority.

The idea that some sort of ‘balance’ needs to be maintained between civil and military institutions is complete folly given the nature of power in Pakistan. It results in playing into the hands of the military establishment. Democracies need to be free of the burden of the military determining key issues, or of sharing views about decisions which don’t affect them. Trade with India is a good example.

Why on earth does the military need to be ‘on board’ for decisions related to commerce or the economy? Will it also be on board when the government decides to increase the purchasing price of wheat and rice, or when it lowers the rate of interest?

Democracy cannot function in an environment in which civilian governments fear the military. Nor can it work effectively if political leaders turn to the military for help as they have on numerous critical occasions in the past, to bail them out against an inefficient and corrupt government. If checks are required on the workings of a government, a strengthened judiciary and civil society and media as well as a more effective political opposition ought to be enough.

To suggest that a political party or a political leader is supported by the establishment or is seen favourably by the military undermines the basic foundations of democracy. Just as the military should be resisted publicly when it interferes in affairs that pertain to parliament, so should its attempts to create political parties or to support political leaders.

However, this can only happen once the core contradiction between civilian and military institutions is resolved, and the responsibility of doing this rests unambiguously on civilian actors. Only then will Pakistan be a free democracy.

The writer is a political economist.